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Summary of Dissertation: The United States and the Concentration Camp Trials, 
1945-1947 
After much debate during the war years over how best to respond to Nazi 
criminality, the United States embarked on an ambitious postwar trial programme in 
occupied Germany, which consisted of three distinct trial sets: the International 
Military Trial at Nuremburg, the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, and military trials 
held at the former concentration camp at Dachau. Within the Dachau military tribunal 
programme, were the concentration camp trials in which personnel from the Dachau, 
Mauthausen, Buchenwald, Flossenbürg, and Dora-Mittelbau concentration camps 
were arraigned.  
These concentration camp trials at Dachau represented the principal attempt 
by the United States to punish Nazi crimes committed at the concentration camps 
liberated by the Americans.  The prosecutors at Dachau tried 1,045 defendants 
accused of committing violations of the ‘laws of war’ as understood through 
‘customary’ international and American military practice.  The strain of using 
traditional military law to prosecute the unprecedented crimes in the Nazi 
concentration camps was exposed throughout the trials.  To meet this challenge, the 
Dachau concentration camp courts included an inventive legal concept: the use of a 
‘criminal-conspiracy’ charge—in effect arraigning defendants for participating the 
‘common design’ of the concentration camp, ‘a criminal organisation’. 
American lawmakers had spent a good deal of time focused on the problem of 
how to begin the trials (What charges? What courts? Which defendants?) and very 
little time planning for the aftermath of the trials. Thus, by 1947 and 1948, in the face 
of growing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, the major 
problem with the Dachau trials was revealed –the lack of long term plans for the 
appellate process for those convicted.  After two scandals that captured the press and 
the public’s attention, the United States Congress held two official investigations of 
the entire Dachau tribunal programme. Although the resulting reviews, while critical 
of the Army’s clemency process, were largely positive about the trials themselves, the 
Dachau trials faded from public memory.  
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In April 1945, as the American army marched ever deeper into Germany, 
soldiers stumbled upon the sites of the Nazi concentration camp system.  Ohrdruf, a 
sub-camp of Buchenwald, discovered by the 4th Armoured Division of the Third 
Army on 4 April 1945, was the first camp that contained prisoners (and corpses) to be 
liberated by the Americans.  On 12 April, Generals Dwight Eisenhower, George 
Patton, and Omar Bradley toured the camp.  Eisenhower famously remarked, ‘We are 
told that the American soldier does not know what he is fighting for. Now, at least, he 
will know what he is fighting against’.1  The day before, 11 April 1945, the 6th 
Armoured Division (Third Army) liberated approximately 700 people, and over 3000 
corpses, at Dora-Nordhausen V-2 labour complex, and around 21,000 people at the 
Buchenwald concentration camp.  On 23 April 1945, Flossenburg was liberated by the 
90th Infantry Division. On 29 April 1945, the Seventh Army arrived at Dachau, the 
first concentration camp established by the Nazi regime, liberating 32,000 inmates. 
On their way into the camp’s main entrance, American soldiers passed a silent train 
outside the camp, which contained approximately 2000 dead inmates from a final 
evacuation from Buchenwald.2   
																																																								
1 Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: 1951), 539; see also Dan Stone, The 
Liberation of the Camps: The End of the Holocaust and Its Aftermath (New Haven, CT: Yale 
2 Wolfgang Benz and Barbara Distel (eds.) Dachau and the Nazi Terror, 1933-1945: Volume 
II, Studies and Reports (Dachau: Comite International de Dachau, Brussels, 2002), 16. 




Photo 1. American soldiers view the Dachau death train. Courtesy of the USHMM 
Photo Archives. 
 
The Third Army, 11th Armoured Division, liberated Mauthausen on 5 May 1945.  In 
May 1945, embedded reporters sent pictures and newsreels home arousing strong 
public support for war crimes trials. The United States Congress sent a bipartisan 
committee to tour the camps at Buchenwald, Nordhausen, and Dachau. At the end of 
their tour, the committee produced a report for Congress entitled Atrocities and Other 
Conditions in Concentration Camps in Germany,3 which concluded:  
It is the opinion of your committee that these practices [in the administration 
and operation of the concentration camps] constituted no less than organized 
crime against civilization and humanity and that those who were responsible 
for them should have meted out to them swift, certain and adequate 
punishment… 
With reference to the punishment of those guilty of war crimes, which an 
indignant world will expect and demand, we desire to report that at the present 
time various agencies are actively and comprehensively engaged in the 
																																																								
3 Atrocities and Other Conditions in Concentration Camps in Germany, Report of the 
Committee requested by Dwight D Eisenhower through the Chief of Staff General George C 
Marshall to the Congress of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1945). The members were Senators Alben W. Barkley, Mr. Walter F. George, 
Elbert D. Thomas, C. Wayland Brooks, Kenneth S. Wherry, Leverett Saltonstal and 
Representatives R. Ewing Thomason, James P. Richards, Ed. V. Izac, John M. Vorys, James 




gathering of evidence throughout the regions where these atrocities were 
committed.4 
The congressional report mentioned both ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘war crimes’ 
as two distinct sets of crimes.  As the concentration camp trials held at Dachau, the 
subject of this dissertation, were based entirely on arraigning its defendants for war 
crimes (based on American military laws and ‘customary’ international ‘laws of 
war’), as opposed to ‘crimes against humanity’ (based on a newly codified 
international law) used at the International Military Tribunal, (commonly known as 
the ‘Nuremberg Trial’ or IMT) and Nuremberg Military Tribunals (or ‘Subsequent 
Nuremberg Trials’ or NMT),5 it is important at this early stage to note the major 
differences between the two.  
 War crimes can only be committed during wartime and can be committed by 
an individual, either with or without the approval of his government. War crimes were 
violations of the ‘laws of war’ – a code of generally accepted rules that all belligerents 
were required to follow. There was no single list of war crimes, but a list of generally 
unacceptable behaviours began to be defined in the modern era during the American 
Civil War of 1861-1865 in the ‘Lieber Code’. Francis Lieber, a Prussian-American, 
was a legal scholar and historian. He first presented his ideas in a series of lectures 
entitled ‘The Laws and Usages of War’ at the Columbia Law School in October 1861, 
followed by Guerrilla Parties Considered With Reference to the Laws and Usages of 
War (a 6,000-word report, replete with historical examples, which was distributed 
widely to Union generals), and finally, in April 1863, Instructions for the Government 
of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Order No. 100, which was issued 
by President Lincoln to all American armies.6  The Lieber code was influential on the 
codification of war crimes in international agreements: the Hague Conventions of 
																																																								
4 Ibid, 15. 
5 For more on the use of ‘Crimes against Humanity’ at the IMT see United Nations War 
Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XV: Digest of Laws and 
Cases (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1949); Robert Jackson, The Case Against 
the Nazi War Criminals: Opening statement for the United States of America and other 
documents (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1946); Robert H Jackson, The Nurnberg Case 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1947); Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg 
Trials: A Personal Memoir (New York: Knopf, 1992). 
6 See Richard Shelly Hartigan, Lieber's Code and the Law of War (Transaction Publishers, 
1985) and John Fabian Witt, Lincoln's Code: The Laws of War in American History (Free 
Press, 2013). 
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1899 and 1907 and, later, the Geneva Convention of 1929.  According to these 
internationally recognized agreements, during the Second World War, war crimes 
included the following: mistreating prisoners of war, refusing treatment to the 
wounded, attacking hospital ships, using poisons and gas weapons, using soft-point 
bullets, bombing from balloons ‘or by other new methods of a similar nature’7, killing 
enemy combatants who have surrendered, looting, attacking undefended towns, 
forcing inhabitants of occupied territories into military service, and using collective 
punishment on prisoners or occupied peoples. 
In contrast, ‘crimes against humanity’ can be committed during war or peace 
and are committed with the approval of the government or authorities. Although the 
term ‘crimes against humanity’ was used sporadically before the London Charter of 
1945 (for example in a 1890 pamphlet describing King Leopold II’s actions in the 
Congo, in the preamble to the Hague Conventions, and in an Allied statement in 1915 
condemning the Ottoman Empire’s actions against the Armenians)8, it was after the 
Second World War that ‘crimes against humanity’ was defined and proscribed.  
Article 6, paragraph 6 (c) of the London Charter defined 'crimes against humanity’ as: 
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or 
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.9 
The IMT and the NMT arraigned defendants for ‘crimes against humanity’ (as well as 
‘crimes against the peace’ and, a few, for ‘war crimes’) while the Dachau trials only 
used ‘war crimes’ – a legal difference between the two sets of trials. 
																																																								
7 Both the United Kingdom and the United States opted out of this clause of the treaty, thus 
their use of airplanes for bombing throughout the Second World War, technically, was not a 
war crime according to the standing treaties. 
8 See Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, Third 
Edition (New Press, 2007); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical 
Evolution and Contemporary Application (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); 
Willem-Jan van der Wolf (ed.) Crimes Against Humanity and International Criminal Law 
(The Hague: International Courts Association, 2011); and, for a examination of the 
personalities involved in the development of these legal terms see Philippe Sands, East West 
Street: On the Origins of “Genocide” and "Crimes Against Humanity" (Knopf, 2016). 
9 Trials of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 1: 




The governments of newly liberated countries and the Allied occupation 
authorities in Germany, chief among them the U.S. army, needed an official line on 
alleged German crimes.  Spontaneous retribution against ‘war criminals’ and 
‘collaborators’ (real and imagined) was widespread in the waning days of fighting, as 
locals took justice into their own hands –for example in France some 10,000 people 
were killed in extrajudicial proceedings, while in Italy 15,000 were killed.10  In 1945, 
the Americans, other occupation authorities, and new governments needed a 
comprehensive judicial programme in order to deal with, as Tony Judt wrote, ‘the 
legacy of the discredited wartime regimes’. 
The Nazis and their friends had been defeated, but in view of the scale of their 
crimes this was obviously not enough. If postwar governments’ legitimacy 
rested merely on their military victory over Fascism, how were they better 
than the wartime Fascist regimes themselves? It was important to define the 
latter’s activities as crimes and punish them accordingly.11 
But how should suspected war criminals be punished for their crimes? What form of 
justice should be used? Summary executions? Courts-Martial? Local courts? 
International tribunals? If legal legitimacy was paramount, what laws should be cited? 
How should the crimes be defined? Would existing laws cover the particularly 
horrendous nature of Nazi crimes, such as those committed in the concentration 
camps? For the Allies, and the Americans in particular, how would trials fit into larger 
occupation plans for postwar Germany? While there was never a complete consensus 
on American war crimes policy (government agencies and individuals fought bitterly 
over the issue), three trial programmes emerged in Europe, the International Military 
Trial (IMT) at Nuremburg, the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMT), and the 
American military trials at Dachau. After spending the war engaged in rhetoric 
promising retribution for Nazi crimes, the United States embarked on an ambitious 
postwar trial programme in Europe.  
																																																								
10 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 
42. Judt has an excellent overview of this subject in his chapter 3 ‘Retribution’ (pages 41 – 
62).  Also see Pieter Lagrou, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic memory and national 
recovery in Western Europe, 1945-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) and 
discussions in Istvan Deak, Jan T. Gross and Tony Judt (eds.), The Politics of Retribution in 
Europe: World War II and its aftermath (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
11 Judt, Postwar, 41. 
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The European trials were part of an extensive American justice programme at 
the end of the war in both Europe and the Pacific region. Huge numbers of cases and 
defendants were involved. In the Pacific region alone, at least 426 cases involving 
over 1,230 defendants were conducted from 1945 to 1948. At Yokohama, a major 
American base during the occupation of Japan, 814 war criminals were tried in 297 
cases. Of 744 convictions, 113 were sentenced to death and 49 to life imprisonment. 
In China and the Philippines, 108 cases were heard, involving 290 defendants, of 
whom 262 were convicted and 102 were sentenced to death. In Guam, 108 defendants 
were heard in 20 cases. 100 were convicted and 29 sentenced to death. In Tokyo, the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), ‘comparable to the 
Nuremberg International Tribunal in theory and jurisdiction’, 12  heard one case 
involving 25 defendants. All 25 were convicted, and seven were sentenced to death. 
Sixteen were sentenced to life imprisonment, and the remaining two to lesser terms.13 
In Europe, the American military held trials on the grounds of the former 
concentration camp at Dachau from November 1945 until December 1947; 1,672 
defendants were tried resulting in 1,416 convictions from 489 trials. The 
concentration camp trial portion involved 240 trials and 1,045 defendants from the 
ranks of personnel from the concentration camps at Dachau, Mauthausen, 
Flossenburg, Buchenwald, and Dora-Nordhausen. The Dachau trials were held 
concurrently with, but entirely separately from, the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg (IMT) and the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMT).  The IMT was 
established through quadripartite agreement (The London Agreement, 8 August 1945, 
followed by the more instructive London Charter) by representatives of the United 
States, the USSR, France, and Great Britain, for the purpose of trying war criminals 
whose offenses had no particular geographical location. Only one trial was conducted 
before the IMT. All twenty-two major war criminals were top German, Nazi, or 
military leaders. Nineteen were convicted, three acquitted. Twelve of the nineteen 
																																																								
12 Conduct of the Ilse Koch War Crimes Trial: Interim Report of the Investigations 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, (Washington 
DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1948), 3. 
13 Statistics for full trial programmes found in the US Senate’s Conduct of the Ilse Koch War 
Crimes Trial: Interim Report, 3-4. For the Pacific trials see Tim Maga, Judgment at Tokyo: 
The Japanese War Crimes Trials (The University of Kentucky, 2001) and John W Dower’s 
Pulitzer prize winning book, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New 




were sentenced to death, three to life imprisonment, and four to lesser imprisonment 
for varying terms of years.  Additional Nazi war criminals were tried at Nuremberg 
before ‘courts appointed by the United States military governor and composed of 
civilian judges’, 14  the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (or, more commonly, the 
‘Subsequent Nuremberg Trials’). Twelve cases were tried with 177 men indicted; 97 
were convicted and twelve men were sentenced to death. The cases, in chronological 
order, are known as (1) The Medical (or Doctors’) Case, (2) The Milch Case, (3) The 
Justice Case, (4) The Pohl Case, (5) The Flick Case, (6) The I.G. Farben Case, (7) The 
Hostage Case,  (8) The RuSHA Case,  (9) The Einsatzgruppen Case, (10) The Krupp 
Case, (11) The Ministries Case, and (12) The High Command Case.15 A small number 
of trials of war criminals by military courts took place in Rome, Italy, where fourteen 
defendants were tried in nine cases; eleven convictions and seven death sentences 
were imposed. 
The rules that governed the courts at Dachau built upon precedent established 
in American and ‘customary’ international military law, not in the London Charter 
adopted for the International Nuremberg Tribunal.  The new indictments of ‘crimes 
against the peace’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ were not found in the charges at the 
Dachau courts. There was no overt coordination between the jurists at Nuremberg and 
those at Dachau, although some attorneys worked at both sets of trials.  When 
Benjamin Ferencz, a war crimes investigator for the Dachau trials and the lead 
prosecutor for the ‘Einsatzgruppen Trial’ at Nuremberg (NMT), was asked about the 
relationship between the trials at Dachau and the trials at Nuremburg he replied, 
‘Nothing. You can’t compare the two. Comparing the trials at Dachau to the trials at 
Nuremberg is not like comparing even apples to oranges. It’s like comparing apples to 
trucks’.16  The Dachau tribunals warrant a full scholarly study in their own right 
because they: (1) represent the largest attempt by the United States to punish Nazi 
crimes committed at the concentration camps liberated by the Americans and thus add 
a significant story to the study of postwar Germany and the transitional postwar 
justice programmes happening there and (2) the Dachau trials have the potential to 
																																																								
14 Conduct of the Ilse Koch War Crimes Trial: Interim Report, 4. 
15 See Kim C Primel and Alexa Stiller (eds.), Reassessing the Nuremberg Military Tribunals: 
Transitional Justice, Trial Narratives, and Historiography (New York: Berghahn, 2012). 
16 Interview of Tomaz Jardim, ‘Rough American Justice: Interview with Tomaz Jardim on the 
Mauthausen Trials’ on historynewsnetwork.org, October 2012. Accessed 31 July 2015. 
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make an intervention, a correction, in the prevailing historiographical literature in 
American war crime policy and adds to the development of the concept of human 
rights and transitional justice in the postwar era. 
Despite the fact that Nuremberg and the Holocaust play an enormous role in 
human-rights literature even in the most celebrated and authoritative accounts, such as 
Elizabeth Borgwardt’s A New Deal for the World, Samuel Moyn’s The Last Utopia, 
Mark Mazower’s No Enchanted Place, and Bradley’s The World Reimagined, the 
Dachau trials are ignored.17 Some historians, such as Elizabeth Borgwardt, see 
Nuremberg as a moment in the genesis for a global human rights discourse; others 
such as Moyn and Mazower, argue that the importance of Nuremberg and the 
Holocaust have been grossly exaggerated; while others still, such as Mark Bradley, try 
to split the difference. These four major books are all emblematic of a massive 
amount of additional literature on the early genesis of human rights, all of which 
affords little to no recognition of the Dachau trials. 
The Dachau trials were much larger and more extensive than either set of 
Nuremberg trials. In the following chapters, the Dachau trials will reveal themselves 
to be much more politically cautious and legally conservative in that they were more 
respectful of state sovereignty, less attuned to the emergence of ideologies about 
genocide and crimes against humanity, run along narrower, traditional lines of 
military justice, and more conducive to clemency during review. Thus, the Dachau 
trials were a better fit with the temperament of world politics until the 1970s-80s than 
the burgeoning human rights movement. Yes, norms were in the midst of changing, 
but they did not change quickly or comprehensively. Like Moyn and Mazower, the 
Dachau trials proved a sceptical reading of human rights history. Where the IMT was, 
arguably, more novel and transformative, the Dachau trials were more conservative 
and practical with their foundation in legal precedent and the more firmly established 
conventions of laws governing war. 
																																																								
17 Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s vision for Human Rights 
(Cambridge, MA: University of Harvard Press, 2005); Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, William I. 
Hitchcock (eds.) Nuremberg in The Human Rights Revolution: An International History 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in 
History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2012); Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Place: The 
End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton: Princeton 
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Indeed, the Dachau trials occupy a unique place in the programmes of justice 
put together by the Allies because they operated under military law and had the 
established focus of meting out ‘swift, certain and adequate punishment’ of 
‘organized crime against civilization and humanity’. Early documents, like the 
Geneva Conventions and Kellogg-Briand Treaty allude to human rights, and the 
American prosecutors at Dachau in particular, may have felt they were extending and 
expanding the definitions of ‘aggressive war’ and ‘crimes against peace’ highlighted 
in these documents. However, they also felt strongly about maintaining precedence 
for the trials in the ‘customary’ international military law and prior American cases. 
Thus the Dachau Trials focused along the more traditional and conservative lines of 
military justice. The push of human rights did, however, seemingly move Congress to 
mount a full review, discussed later in this thesis, of the Dachau trial programme, 
based on the need assure the legality of the trials and to protect and validate the 
defendants’ rights, after the defendants in the Malmédy trial claimed they had been 
tortured for their confessions. 
Some scholars argue that the international political, economic, social and 
judicial systems were impacted by the planners of the New Deal and inheritors of the 
Bill of Rights.  Borgwardt, for example, believed that the ideals of the New Deal—its 
emphasis on improving the social welfare of all people—directly impacted the social 
engineering of a new world order that transcended national boundaries, found in the 
ideals outlined in the Atlantic Charter, Bretton Woods Agreements, United Nations 
Charter (Dumbarton Oaks Agreements) and the Nuremberg Charter. The Nuremberg 
Charter in many ways laid out a path to transitional justice by which people could 
move from violence and repression to a more stable society and political order.  
However, these transitional justice principles, like Truth Commissions, repatriation 
programmes and institutional reforms did not fully flower until the later part of the 
century—in places like Chile (1975), Argentina (1983) and South Africa (1995).  This 
is similar to the arguments of most of the contributors to The Human Rights 
Revolution (2012), who, as a group, looked at human rights legislation emerging out 
of World War II, including the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Military Tribunal, the Geneva Conventions, and the later expansion of human rights 
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activity in the 1970s.18 Other historians, like Samuel Moyn in The Last Utopia, have 
argued that the Nuremberg Trials were not an accurate starting point for the modern 
human rights movement and that it arose much later, as a response to the 
disillusionment with anticolonial independence struggles in the 1950’s and 1960’s, 
and the emphasis of President Jimmy Carter on human rights in United States foreign 
policy.  This is more in line with Mazower (No Enchanted Place 2013), whose history 
of the early UN emphasises its connections of the British Empire and ‘imperial 
internationalism’ – not the burgeoning human rights movement.   
The Dachau concentration camp trials, and indeed all the trials held at Dachau, 
remain relatively unknown today, as very little has been written and published about 
them. Even Harold Marcuse’s thorough study of Dachau from 1933 to 2001, Legacies 
of Dachau, barely mentioned the United States military trials held there, noting only 
that ‘except for trial transcripts, very little is known about these trials’.19 While a few 
published sources are available on the Malmédy Massacre trial and some of the other 
‘Fliers cases’ tried at Dachau,20 so little has been written on the concentration camp 
trials at Dachau, that all books dedicated solely to the study of one or more of these 
trials can be discussed below. 
The most thorough academic study of the Dachau trial programme is Frank 
Buscher’s The United States War Crimes Trial Program, 1946-1955.21  In his book 
Buscher studied the entire American postwar trial programme in Germany and 
analysed its connections to denazification policy and the emerging West German state 
in the American zone of occupation in Germany.  He argued that while ‘for historians 
and legal scholars, the IMT proceedings were significant because of their precedent 
setting nature’ it was the US army ‘which was most active in bringing war criminals 
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1933-2001 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 70. 
20 There are two excellent published Malmédy trial sources: James J. Weingartner’s A 
Particular Crusade: Willis M Everett and the Malmedy Massacre (New York: New York 
University Press, 2000) and Crossroads of Death: The Story of the Malmedy Massacre and 
Trial (University of California Press, 1979). The most comprehensive Fliers trial source is 
Gregory A Freeman, The Last Mission of the Wham Bam Boys: Courage, Tragedy, and 
Justice in World War II (New York: St. Martin’s Griffon, 2012). 
21 Frank M Buscher, The US War Crimes Trial Programme in Germany, 1946-1955 (New 




to justice…they dealt with almost 90% of all defendants in the American zone’.22  
Buscher’s study concentrated primarily on the postwar period and ‘the post-trial 
treatment of war criminals as a judicial and political problem’.23 When writing about 
the trials themselves, Buscher focused most of his examination on the politics 
surrounding the trials, particularly American and German diplomacy, rarely 
concerning his work with events themselves inside the Dachau courtrooms. He took 
no particular interest in the concentration camp trials. The majority of his book was 
focused on what happened in the years after the trials were concluded at the end of 
1947, in which he argued that the pressures of the emerging Cold War affected the 
American commitment to continuing prosecution and imprisonment of Nazi 
criminals.   
Tomaz Jardim has written an excellent study of one of the Dachau 
concentration camp trials, the first Mauthausen ‘parent trial’.24  He began by arguing 
that the famous International Military Tribunal, which ‘has received the benefit of 
extensive research’, was only one of ‘three distinct paths the United States followed in 
bringing Nazi perpetrators to justice at war’s end’.25 The other two ‘paths’ were the 
Nuremberg Military Trials and the trials at Dachau. He used most of his book to look 
at the testimony given in the Mauthausen ‘parent trial’ to both ‘shed light on the 
motives, justifications, and worldviews of common concentration camp personnel’ 
and to provide ‘a venue in which more than one hundred victims of Nazi persecution 
could both tell their stories and participate in the prosecution of their former 
oppressors’.26 Jardim concluded that American military justice at Dachau was well 
intentioned but harsh and uneven, and was heavily influenced by the emerging Cold 
War politics.  The disadvantage of Jardim’s work is that he looked at only one set of 
trials, which took place over a very limited period of time: January 1946-March 1946. 
																																																								
22 Ibid., 2. 
23 Ibid., 2. 
24 Tomaz Jardim, The Mauthausen Trial: American Military Justice in Germany (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). ‘Parent trial’ can be defined as the first trial for a camp 
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A third book that focused on the Dachau trials, this time particularly on the 
concentration camp trials, was written for a general audience by a film 
producer/director, Joshua Greene. Entitled Justice at Dachau: The Trials of an 
American Prosecutor, Greene’s book was presented as the story of an American hero, 
William Denson, chief prosecutor of the ‘parent trials’ for Dachau, Mauthausen, 
Flossenburg, and Buchenwald, fighting against both the horrific crimes of the Nazis 
and a lack of resources and commitment from the American army and government.  
The book said very little about the trials relating to POWs and downed airmen, and 
instead told the story of the Dachau trials as a ‘David versus Goliath’ epic, one man 
versus the perpetrators of the Holocaust.  Greene’s primary purpose was to tell a good 
story, and, while researched using Denson’s personal papers (available for the first 
time for this book)27 , he took liberties with the source material, for example 
misquoting the Congressional Senate reviews to make them more dramatic.  
Chief Prosecutor William Denson published a long brochure, through his law 
firm, written almost 50 years after these events, entitled Justice in Germany: 
Memories of the Chief Prosecutor.28  It was a very small original edition and is now 
out-of-print, thus rarely cited.29  The brochure was full of excellent photographs, but 
had little text, and it covered only basic information about the trials. Elisabeth Yavnai, 
now a staff member at the United States Holocaust Museum and Memorial, wrote an 
unpublished dissertation on the subject of the American trials at Dachau, and had two 
chapters published on the subject, both containing short overviews of the war crimes 
trial programmes and the briefest of introductions to some of the issues surrounding 
the trials.30  The major drawback of her work was that it focused on the trials solely 
																																																								
27 After Greene finished his book, Justice at Dachau: The Trials of an American Prosecutor 
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Crimes trials in Germany, 1945-1947’ in Patricia Heberer and Jugen Matthaus (eds.) 
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through the lens of the Holocaust. Yavanai suggested that legal limitations restricted 
the scope of the trials and thus the history of the Holocaust presented in the courtroom 
was distorted.  In her published work, she neglected to explain why the American 
army chose to keep the scope of the trials limited. Her work focused on what the trials 
failed to do, not what they did or aimed to do.   
There are three books about the Dachau trials that can be largely discounted 
due to their non-academic and biased nature.  Fern Hilton, a playwright, took a 
handful of defendants and studied their personalities as revealed through the 
documentation of their trials.31   She was selective about which defendants she 
choose, often posing them in a positive light – each man is an ill-fated, tragic 
protagonist. She wrote that each of the defendants ‘have something to teach us about 
World War II-era Germany and the tragedy that grew out of the German culture of 
that time’32; thus repeating the outdated argument that German culture was to blame 
for the Holocaust.  There are two non-academic condemnations of the Dachau trials: 
Joseph Harlow’s vehemently negative book, Innocent at Dachau (1993), and Herbert 
Gebers’ personal account, I Was a Prisoner of War: POW War Crimes Trial in 
Dachau (1971). Both were recently reissued by the Holocaust-denial advocacy 
organization, the Institute for Historical Review. Neither author offered defensible 
historical arguments. 
German historians began to grapple with the history of the criminal 
prosecution of NS criminals more intensely in the 1980s, though this was 
concentrated overwhelmingly on the time period after the founding of the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic when the role of NS 
trials within the German-German system conflict became the main point of interest.33  
In the few works focusing on trials prior to 1949, the Allied military trials appear as 
one facet of international prosecution politics shortly before and after the end of the 
Second World War or as a precursor to the International Military Tribunal.34   
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Robert Sigel’s, Im Interesse der Gerechtigkeit,35 was a pioneering study about 
the American military trial against Dachau personnel.   Sigel argued that the Allies 
developed the process of trials in order to help shape postwar Germany by 
prosecuting the Nazi elite down to the lowest foot soldier, although ultimately the 
American goal failed because of obstacles put up against them by the political 
situation in the US and Europe.  His book draws heavily on the Dachau ‘parent trial’, 
incorporating little empirical information or analysis of the subsequent trials.  This 
focus on the Dachau parent trial (to the detriment of the hundreds of subsequent trials) 
is also a problem that plagues Holger Lessing’s Der erste Dachau Prozess (1945-
1946).  
Other German scholars focused on the IMT part of the programme, with some 
of the authors looking at specific Dachau trials in order to highlight poor judicial 
practices, the ignoring of evidence, and questionable jurisdiction on the behaviours of 
honourable soldiers who followed superior orders. German historians, writers and 
politicians, in general, viewed the trials as Siegerjustiz (‘victor’s justice’). This is 
congruent with the views of contemporary Germans who pushed back almost 
immediately on the unlawfulness of the trials.  German defense attorneys often 
claimed that the non-signing of various international pacts, like the 1929 Geneva 
Convention, by certain Allied governments made the war crime trials moot since they 
were operating outside lawful agreements.  Furthermore, the ‘common design’ or 
criminal conspiracy basis for prosecution was seen as ex post facto law, created after 
events had occurred.  Charles Wyzanski, in the April 1946 issue of The Atlantic, 
stated that Germans, in general, were neither interested in nor persuaded by these 
proceedings, which they regarded as partisan. They saw the proceedings ‘not as 
marking a rebirth of law in Central Europe, but as a political judgment on their former 
leaders’.36  
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A few German historians have also written about specific parts of the Dachau 
trial programme to highlight a variety of characteristics of the trials.  Robert Sigel saw 
the Dachau trials as an Orienterungsmarke—an orientation point –for the start of legal 
pursuits against National Socialists and the beginning of trying to end German 
militarism and ‘aggressive’ war.37  Ludwig Einer, along with Sigel, studied how the 
jurisdiction for the trials was restricted to crimes against Allied personnel after 1941 
and how that particularly impacted the concentration camp guards.38  Florian Freund 
focused on the Mauthausen parent trial.39  He argued that the defendants at the trial 
pleaded not guilty, down played the severity of their actions (‘just following orders’) 
and tried to strengthen the belief that Austria was the first victim of National 
Socialism—Mauthausen was a ‘German Problem’, not an Austrian one.  Rudolf 
Schlaffer studied the Flossenberg parent trial and asked if the possibilities and limits 
of the trial could ever correctly help the Allies create ‘justice’.40  Martin Gruner 
challenged the legality of the trials, the jurisdiction of the Allies and specifically 
highlighted the Alex Piorkowski trial, which dramatically showed the chronic 
disparity of treatment between the prosecution and defense around evidence and 
judicial procedure.41  While all of these works are valuable for their individual insight, 
they only cover small portions of the trials at Dachau – not the entire programme.  
This limited scope, particularly if chosen to prove a specific point or support a single 
argument, can thus limit the generalizability of the analysis and arguments presented.  
It is worth noting that this thesis focused on the American dimension of the 
story of the Dachau trial programme.  In a broad sense it is an exploration of the 
American foreign relations and associated legal history that surrounded these trials.  
Given this premise, occupied Germany represented a backdrop for examining the 
views and actions of the Americans.  It was driven in part by the desire to focus on the 
American perspective. Furthermore, the surviving transcripts contained little of the 
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defendants’ voices – they rarely testified in statements to defend themselves – and 
when on the stand being questioned, their replies went through a convoluted series of 
translators in order to be recorded by the court.  Translators were limited so the courts 
worked with what local citizens, or camp survivors, they could find. Often a question 
to the defendant (or witness, for that matter) as well as the subsequent reply would 
need to go through two or three translators, for example German to Polish to English.  
This was not only tedious for those involved in the trial but also distorted the true 
German voice on the written record. 
The trials at Dachau represented the best attempt by the United States to 
punish Nazi crimes committed at the concentration camps liberated by the Americans.  
When compared to the other American trials, the prosecutors at Dachau tried the most 
defendants, 1,045, who were responsible for conditions in the concentration camps. 
These men were arraigned using established ‘laws of war’ as understood through 
customary international and American military practices. Still, the Dachau trials had 
flaws, particularly reflecting the strain of using American and ‘customary’ 
international military law to prosecute the unprecedented crimes in the Nazi 
concentration camps.  Furthermore, the concentration camp trials were an 
amalgamation of two opposing ideas, argued passionately between the followers of 
hard-liner U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. and the more lenient U.S. 
War Secretary Henry Stimson, of what should be the appropriate American reaction 
to Nazi crimes committed during the Second World War.  Born of these tensions, the 
Dachau concentration camp courts, although taken predominantly from traditional 
military law, included an inventive legal concept: the use of a ‘criminal-conspiracy’ 
charge –arraigning defendants for participating in the ‘common design’ of the 
concentration camp, which was defined as ‘a criminal organisation’. Finally, 
additional challenges were associated with the post-trial period, as American 
lawmakers had spent a good deal of time focused on the problem of how to begin the 
trials (What charges What courts? Which defendants?) and very little time planning 
for the aftermath of the trials.  
Reporters and the public followed the postwar trials in Europe only for a short 
time. As early as 1946, the general public, and the politicians who represented them, 
grew weary of the Nuremberg and Dachau trials; for, as one scholar argued, ‘having 
constantly to confront the awful evidence may have helped to bring about the 




trial of major war criminals at Nuremberg dragged on’.42  The winding up of the trials 
in 1947 and 1948, in the face of growing tensions between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, revealed the major problem with the Dachau trials; namely the lack of 
long term plans for the appellate process for those convicted.  After two scandals (the 
Ilse Koch sentence reduction and Malmédy accusations) that captured the press and 
the public’s attention, the United States Senate held two reviews of the entire Dachau 
tribunal programme. Although these reviews, while critical of the Army’s review 
process, were largely positive about the trials themselves, the Dachau trials faded 
from public memory. 
The Dachau trials have been overshadowed by the extensive study of the 
famous Nuremberg Trial (IMT).43 The IMT became a precedent-setting example for 
new ideas of international law and helped lead to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (part of the Geneva Convention) in 1948, and, eventually, the International 
Criminal Court.44 By contrast, the military trials at Dachau are the proverbial ‘road-
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not-taken’. Furthermore, the clemency during the 1950s of those convicted in the 
trials make it too easy to conclude the Dachau trials were a failure.  
Most meta-arguments about whether or not postwar justice was fair or 
successful are almost exclusively based on extensive study the IMT.45 My study 
affects these arguments by introducing a different set of trials into the debate.  A 
thorough analysis of the Dachau trials makes it possible to discuss a distinctly 
American postwar justice, putting this thesis more in line with studies of national 
responses to Nazi criminality, which were by far the majority of trials in the postwar 
era.46 
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As for the contemporary applications of the Dachau trials, despite historical 
neglect, the legal legacy of the Dachau trials remains relevant today.  The American 
‘War on Terror’ has produced another series of trials run by military commissions, 
held at Guantanamo Bay.  The ‘laws of war’ serve as ‘the basis for the criminal 
prosecution of al-Qaeda members and associated forces in military commissions’.47  
President George W. Bush created the military commissions in 2001 to try foreign 
nationals; under his administration thirteen defendants were charged.  When President 
Barack Obama took office, he continued the use of military commissions and 
announced the detainees would be charged with violations of the laws of war.48 
Although Attorney General Eric Holder attempted to transfer the case of four men 
charged with organizing the 9/11 attacks to a federal court in New York City, due to 
massive public backlash, the men remain in the jurisdiction of the military 
commissions. 
As Tomaz Jardim recently wrote, 
Criticism [of the military trials at Guantanamo] is often couched in terms of 
contrasting the Guantanamo hearings to Nuremberg. These critics sketch out a 
narrative in which they say that, after the Second World War, the United 
States rose to the occasion with Nuremberg and illustrated that even 
perpetrators responsible for the most horrific crimes would have received the 
benefits of a full and fair trial and that was the legacy of American justice in 
the wake of the Second World War, and therefore Guantanamo is a gross 
deviation from an otherwise noble course.  If you understand the Mauthausen 
trial and the Dachau trial system, you realize that’s not true at all. In fact, 
Guantanamo Bay is very much in keeping with how the United States has 
dealt with the vast majority of war criminals in the past.49 
Both the Dachau tribunals and the Guantanamo Bay trials locate their legal 
precedence in the ‘laws of war’ (and the Supreme Court case Ex parte Quirin)50. 
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Today, the ‘laws of war’ have, once again, found their way to the forefront of 
American policy towards war criminals. Although there are absolute differences 
between the courts for Guantanamo Bay and the Dachau courts, the Dachau trial 
programme takes on a new relevance in this context.  
This dissertation will study the Dachau concentration camp trials, the 
successes, and the drawbacks, in their full historical context through the examination 
of secondary and primary sources including archival material primarily from the 
National Archives and Records Administration (Washington DC and College Park, 
MD), the National Archives (Kew, UK), the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum archives (Washington DC), and Manuscripts and Archives at Yale 
University (New Haven, CT).  The thesis engages particularly deeply with the Dachau 
trial records and William Denson’s personal papers (housed at Yale University). 
While certain scholars have engaged with parts of these archival materials to analyse 
one trial or one aspect of the postwar trials, this narrow analysis has led to conclusions 
that may not be generalizable or apply to the entirety of the American postwar trial 
programme. This thesis will combine and analyse large selections from these archives 
in a more comprehensive way, giving a broader and farther-ranging picture of the 
American postwar trial programme in Germany.  This thesis’ methodical analysis of 
recorded sentencing data is unique and allows the analysis, in part, to account for the 
greatest void in the archival materials – the lack of written judicial decisions.  
The following chapter (1) explores the ‘United Nations’ (the formal name of 
the Allies) wartime rhetoric promising retribution for Nazi crimes and the divisions 
between the U.S., U.S.S.R., and Great Britain over what form punishment for war 
criminals should take. Additionally, this chapter offers a brief introduction to the 
history and crimes in the concentration camps at Dachau, Mauthausen, Flossenbürg, 
Buchenwald and Dora-Mittelbau (sometimes called Nordhausen). Chapter 2 focuses 
on the development of the American war crimes tribunals from the fall of 1944 
through the summer of 1945, and the search for legal precedents for punishing Nazi 
crimes. The chapter recounts arguments between those in the American government 
who favoured a tough policy towards defeated Germany (led by Secretary of the 
Treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr.) versus those who argued for a more lenient policy 
(led by Secretary of War, Henry L Stimson). Chapter 3 introduces the whole of the 





Chapter 4 explores a number of interesting aspects that presented themselves 
throughout the ‘parent trials’, including legal arguments as they played out in the 
courtroom. The chapter finishes with an exploration of the press and politics in the 
courtroom in two case studies. Chapter 5 follows the changing American policy 
towards occupied Germany in light of tensions with the Soviet Union, which led to a 
policy of clemency for former Nazi criminals. It explores in-depth the review process 
of the Dachau trials, which took the place of an appellate process. In the wake of two 
scandals involving the Dachau trial programme, two U.S. congressional reviews were 
held.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the reports of these two reviews. 















Chapter 1: Rhetoric and Reality: The Nazi Concentration Camps and The 
United Nations’ Wartime Policy 
Throughout the war, the allies of the United Nations,51 particularly the US, 
USSR, and UK had used rhetoric to define the war in legal tones: the Nazis and their 
actions were criminal and needed to be brought to justice by the Allies. After making 
promises throughout the war, the actual practicalities of using international law to 
punish the worst of the Nazi crimes, including those committed in the concentration 
camps, was unresolved.  Although united by multiple promises to punish Nazi crimes, 
for most of the war the Allies remained divided over what form justice should take: 
swift and summery executions? Political trials? Military tribunals? This chapter looks 
at the wartime rhetoric as well as the realities of crimes committed in the 
concentration camps (with specific focus on the concentration camps which would 
become the subject of American prosecution at Dachau).  
 
A.  An Overview of the Concentration Camp System 
The Nazi concentration camp system began at a makeshift camp in an old 
munitions plant at Dachau, about ten miles from Munich.  Initially the camp held 
4800 inmates. The first prisoners of the concentration camps, including Dachau, were 
political prisoners who had resisted Hitler’s rise to power – Communists and Social 
Democrats, along with other left-wind activists and journalists.52  The camp system 
was ‘wild’ and decentralized as German police, the SS, and the SA arrested alleged 
subversives en masse. By 1934, ‘the function of political repression had been taken 
over by the police, the courts, and the regular state prisons and penitentiaries’53 and 
the concentration camp population dropped.  The camp system, starting with Dachau, 
was centralized under the control of Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler and the SS; ‘it 
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was the approach pioneered here –with both the political police (in charge of arrests) 
and the SS (in charge of the camp) united in Himmler’s hands—which was soon 
extended to the whole Reich’.54 
SS Lieutenant General (Gruppenführer) Theodor Eicke, commandant of the 
Dachau camp from the summer of 1933 to the summer of 1934, became the Inspector 
of Concentration Camps (Inspekteur der Konzentrationslager).  Eicke used his 
experience at Dachau to introduce a model system to the entire camp system 
including, ‘the organizational structure with separate administrative departments; the 
formal division of SS men into those stationed around the camps perimeter and those 
inside; draconian camp regulations and punishments such as whippings; and the 
creation of a professional corps of SS jailers’.55 In 1935, Dachau became the primary 
training centre for SS concentration camp guards. 
The character of Dachau, particularly its inmate population, changed rapidly 
through the years. Soon after its foundation, Dachau became the central Bavarian 
camp for police custody. After the Anschluss, Dachau was the holding place for many 
prominent persons including the deposed mayor of Vienna Richard Schmitz, the sons 
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand Ernst and Maximilian Hohenberg – whom the other 
prisoners referred to as ‘Your Royal Highnesses’—and the last Chancellor of Austria 
Kurt Schuschnigg.  The camp was expanded from 1937-1938 and the number of 
Jewish prisoners rose after Kristallnacht (10-11 November 1938).  Dachau eventually 
incorporated thirty larger sub-camps that included over 30,000 prisoners. The main 
camp had a courtyard used for executions, thirty-two barracks and a prison block, 
along with support buildings. A crematorium and gas chamber were constructed in 
1942; the gas chamber was never used as prisoners were sent to a euthanasia centre in 
Hartheim near Linz, Austria, along with inmates from Mauthausen and Buchenwald, 
																																																								
54 Nikolous Wachsmann, ‘The Dynamics of Destruction,’ Concentration Camps in Nazi 
Germany: The New Histories, eds. Nikolaus Wachsmann and Jane Caplan (London: 
Routledge, 2010), 21. There are many excellent sources that detail the beginnings of the camp 
system including discussions in Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: 
Penguin, 2004) and Evans’s The Third Reich in Power (New York: Penguin, 2005); Christian 
Goeschel and Nikolaus Wachsmann (eds.) The Nazi Concentration Camps, 1933-1939: A 
documentary history (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012). 
55 Wachsmann, KL, 21. For in-depth accounts of the practice of administration of the 
concentration camps as a whole there are many excellent sources; in particular see Eugen 
Kogon. The Theory and Practice of Hell: the German concentration camps and the system 
behind them (New York: Berkeley, 1960); and Wolfgang Sofsky, The Order of Terror: the 




to be killed if they were too weak to work.56  Between 1933 and 1945, 188,000 
inmates passed through Dachau.57 
Over the next few years, Dachau remained, and more camps were established 
including Buchenwald (1937), Flossenbürg (1938) and Mauthausen (1939). By 1939, 
there were six concentration camps (and their subcamps) in the Greater German Reich 
– Ravensbrück, Sachsenhausen, Dachau, Flossenbürg, Buchenwald, and Mauthausen.   
Opened in July 1937 near Weimar, Buchenwald was one of the largest 
concentration camps in Germany. Despite the later predominance of communist 
prisoners, most of the prisoners at Buchenwald were not political prisoners; they were 
‘asocials,’ repeat criminals, homosexuals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Roma, and German 
military deserters.58 After 1938, Jews made up a large proportion of the camp’s 
population.  Around 250,000 people passed through Buchenwald from July 1937-
April 1945.59  Buchenwald had eighty-eight subcamps, including the notorious Berga-
Elster camp where 350 American POWs worked in horrendous conditions along with 
other inmates to build an underground munitions factory. At its peak population, in 
February 1945, the Buchenwald camp system held 112,000 prisoners.  Among other 
sites, prisoners worked quarries, the Gustloff armaments works, and rail works, and at 
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the DAW (Deutsche-Ausrüstungs-Werke, German Equipment Works). Medical 
experiments were carried out on prisoners including testing vaccines and treatments 
against contagious diseases such as typhus and cholera. At least 56,000 male prisoners 
died at Buchenwald; they died from medical experiments, over-work, starvation, 
executions (shot or hanged), or were sent to be killed at Bernburg and other 
‘euthanasia’ sites to be killed by injection.60  The 6th Armoured Division liberated the 
camp on 11 April 1945.61 
The first prisoners arrived at Flossenbürg, in northeastern Bavaria, in May 
1938.  The campsite was chosen partly because it was near a large granite quarry and 
the SS planned to use the inmate as forced labour to harvest the stone for building 
projects.62 Later in the war, prisoners were used as forced labour in the Messerschmitt 
plant as well as in around one hundred sub-camps concentrated in the armaments 
industries.63   By the end of 1938 the camp contained 1500 inmates. These inmates 
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were mostly ‘asocials’ and repeat criminal offenders; very few Jewish inmates were at 
Flossenbürg until Hungarian and Polish Jews arrived in large numbers from August 
1944 through the winter of 1945.  Later from 1940 onwards, political prisoners and 
resistance fighters from Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and the Soviet Union, made up a large number of the prisoners. In late 1941, 
Flossenbürg received over 1700 Soviet prisoners of war, who were housed separately 
and singled out for particularly brutal treatment – nearly 1000 Soviet POWs were 
executed in 1941.64 At the high point of the camp population in March 1945, 
Flossenbürg contained nearly 53,000 inmates in its main camp and subcamps.65  
Mortality at the camp was high; out of an estimated 97,000 inmates who 
passed through Flossenbürg, approximately 30,000 died. Inmates died of starvation, 
disease, overwork, executed at ‘euthanasia’ centres, and were killed by shooting or 
hanging.  On 15 and 20 April 1945 most of the remaining inmates were evacuated by 
the camp; almost 7000 of the most then 16,000 died in route.66  Fewer then 7000 were 
left in the main camp and subcamps.  Members of the 358th and 359th United States 
Infantry Regiments liberated Flossenbürg, and around 1500 inmates, on 23 April 
1945.67 
The concentration camp at Mauthausen was created in August 1938, in Upper 
Austria, near Linz, in conjunction with the German Earth and Stone Works Inc. 
(Deutsche Erd-und Steinwerke, GmbHDESt), a company founded by the SS to exploit 
the granite in the area.68  The number of inmates increased rapidly from 300 in August 
1938 to 2600 in December 1939.  A majority of the inmates were convicted criminals, 
‘asocials,’ political opponents, and Jehovah’s Witnesses.  It is estimated that over 
197,000 prisoners ‘passed though the Mauthausen camp system between August 1938 
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and May 1945’ and at least 95,000 died there.69 Mauthausen camp was the home to a 
notoriously deadly set of steps: inmates were forced to carry fifty kilogram stones 
from the quarry up a set of 186 steps and ‘if they staggered and fell, the prisoners 
were shot by the SS guards, who would sometimes throw them down into the quarry 
from thirty to forty meters up, or force them to empty trucks of stones on to the men 
working below’.70 Mauthausen had its own gas chamber and crematorium, which 
operated until liberation, and its administrators sent thousands to their deaths at the 
‘euthanasia’ centre at Hartheim. 
In April 1945, a War Crimes Investigating team was created in Europe by 
order of the Headquarters European Theatre of Operations and on 17 July 1945 they 
reported their major findings on the Hartheim site, near Linz, Austria, to the 
Commanding General of the Third US Army. 71  Around 30,000 people were 
murdered, including many German T4 (the Nazi designation for their euthanasia 
programme) victims through August 1941 and as many as 18,000 prisoners from 
Mauthausen and its subsidiary camps (and some from Buchenwald and Dachau) 
starting in July 1941.72 After the German euthanasia programme had been halted in 
August 1941, following the intervention of the religious establishment in Germany, 
the T-4 unit began sending its doctors to evaluate and select sick concentration camp 
inmates to be killed, mainly by gassing, under ‘Special Treatment 14f13’.73  
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Conditions at Mauthausen main camp deteriorated rapidly towards the end of 
the war as thousands of prisoners from smaller subcamps were herded in. Between 
October 1944 and 5 May 1945, when American troops liberated the camp, 45,000 
inmates died.74  
While political prisoners remained in the Nazi concentration camp system, 
from 1937-8 the camps’ inmate population included ‘asocials’ and ‘social deviants’ 
including alcoholics and vagrants. Himmler’s Reich Work-Shy Action (Aktion 
Arbeitsscheu Reich) in April and June 1938 in Austria and Germany sent thousands to 
the camps.  These raids included specific targeting of ‘asocial’ and ‘criminal’ Jews. 
Between 31 May and 25 June three trains arrived at Dachau from Vienna carrying 
1521 Jewish men aboard.75 Newly arrested Jews were also sent to Buchenwald, where 
in the summer of 1938 the conditions were particularly appalling, as ‘the SS forced 
hundreds of new arrivals among them many Jews from Berlin, into a sheep pen’.76 
Between June and August 1938 almost 100 Jews died at Buchenwald.77  Despite the 
lethality of the camps, up until the outbreak of war, prisoners were regularly released. 
For example, a majority of the Jews arrested during the November pogroms of 1938 
(Reichskristallnacht) went free, after brutal (and sometimes fatal) treatment by the 
camp guards.  These inmates bought their freedom by ‘bribing the camp authorities or 
selling their properties and businesses to local authorities at knock-down prices’.78 
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The understanding was that they would emigrate immediately. Still 
Reichskristallnacht marked a distinct change in the SS concentration camps; 
Never before had they held more inmates: within days, the prisoner population 
doubled from twenty-four thousand to around fifty thousand…never before 
had there been as many Jews in the KL: at the start of 1938, they had made up 
only around five per cent of the prisoner population; now they were suddenly 
in the majority. And never before did as many prisoners die in the KL as in the 
week following the pogrom.79 
Further change came to the camps at the start of the war in September 1939.  As 
millions of workers marched off with the army, the German war economy needed 
replacement labourers. Forced labour was always a core element of the concentration 
camp project – camps were meant to ‘teach’ ‘asocials’ and other non-conformists the 
value of productive work, as it was the way to maintain basic social order.80  Forced 
labour became a necessary element in the survival of Germany’s war time economy 
and the camps, ‘were transformed into centres of forced labour, buttressed by the 
industrial sub-camps that spread like a cancer through the body of the German 
Reich’.81  Throughout occupied territories, millions of people, including POWs, were 
transported to the Reich to work.  The Auslandereinsatz (Foreign Labour) system 
functioned side-by-side with the forced labour in the concentration camps. The 
foreign labourers were treated better than the inmates, as historian Stone noted,  
The foreign labourers were more or less well treated; that is to say, at least 
they were kept alive. Depending on where they happened to end up, they were 
all required for work and a rational calculation underpinned their positions. By 
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contrast, the inmates of concentration camps were there to be beaten into 
submission, and if they died it was of no significance.82 
Furthermore, by 1942, many concentration camps prisoners were being deliberately 
worked to death as a means of extermination. At Mauthausen, thousands died running 
up the infamous steps in the quarry while carrying huge boulders.  As Richard J. 
Evans observed, ‘By the end of the war there were more then 700,000 forced 
labourers held in this vast network of camps and sub-camps in rapidly deteriorating 
conditions; half of them did not survive’.83  
Established originally as a sub-camp of Buchenwald, Dora-Mittelbau, 
(sometimes called Dora-Nordhausen or just Nordhausen), located in the Harz 
Mountains, was founded in August 1943.84  By October 1944, the SS transformed 
Dora-Mittelbau into an independent camp with more than thirty subcamps of its own.  
At the end of the war, the ‘desperate desire to press prisoners into the service of the 
SS, army, state, and private industry—often without any sense of planning or logic—
acted as a centrifugal force: a vast number of new satellite camps sprang up…until the 
whole of Germany was covered’.85 Dora-Mittelbau consisted mainly of underground 
factories for the V-2 missile programme (and other ‘Weapons of Retaliation’ or 
Vergeltungswaffen). The incredibly brutal factory conditions meant that the workers 
were rarely productive and the environment often lethal.86 About 12,000 inmates were 
at Dora-Mittelbau by the fall of 1944.  In April 1945, most prisoners were evacuated 
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to Bergen-Belsen. When American forces liberated the camp in April 1945, units of 
the Third Army found over 2700 corpses and 3000 barely surviving inmates.87 
 Over time, the camps grew exponentially in size; there were 24,000 inmates in 
the camps in June 1938; 53,000 by 1940; by ‘September 1942 there were about 
110,000 camp inmates; this number shot up to 224,000 a year later, 524,286 a year 
after that, and over 700,000 by the start of 1945’.88  
 From 1941 until the end of the war, the Nazis’ extermination programme of 
the Jews meant that ‘Jewish inmates were removed [from the concentration camp 
system] and taken to extermination centres, where they were killed along with Jews 
brought from every part of Europe over which the Nazis had control’.89  Even if they 
were not the primary sites of the Holocaust, the concentration camps were places of 
truly grievous crimes and large number of inmate deaths.  At Buchenwald, from 
1937-1945, around 56,000 inmates died; at Dachau (1933-1945) 39,000 were killed; 
at Mauthausen from 1938-1945 more then 90,000 died; at Flossenbürg (1938-1945) 
around 50,000 inmates died; and at Dora-Mittelbau 15,000-20,000 inmates were 
killed in a little over a year.  At all five camps, POWs, particularly Russian soldiers, 
were often executed outright. Along with severe neglect and general ill treatment, the 
inmates of these concentration camps were subjected to two particularly deadly 
practices: forced labour and human experimentation, both of which were considered 
war crimes by contemporary international treaties. 
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B.  The Crimes at the Camps as Defined by Established Law 
 By the beginning of the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, a number of 
international laws and treaties existed to codify and govern a nation’s conduct during 
war. Unlike the International Nuremberg Tribunal—predicated on the London 
Agreement of 1945, which was a new treaty defining new international crimes—the 
Dachau tribunals found legal precedent in both the traditional laws protecting the 
small number of POWs in the camps based on international treaties signed in the 
earlier part of the century90 and American military law.  Defendants at Dachau were 
charged with ‘violations of the laws and customs of war’.  
 It is important to note, that while there were a small number of POWs at the 
concentration camps, particularly at the Berga sub-camp of Buchenwald, a majority of 
the inmates were civilians. While protections of POWs were codified by the outbreak 
of the Second World War, international protections for civilians mostly relied upon 
customary laws of war.  Although not codified in international law, discussion and 
acceptance of the honourable treatment of civilians by soldiers was widespread by the 
time of William Shakespeare.91  As one legal scholar noted:  
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Most of the early rules of war were in the form of orders issued by sovereign 
authorities for the regulation of their own armed forces… In 1625, Hugo 
Grotius published his masterwork, The Law of War and Peace, in which he 
analysed the practice of states over the centuries in order to outline 
systematically how that practice had hardened into the law of nations.92 
As early as the Brussels Conferences in 1874, there was an attempt by international 
parties to codify customary laws of war into a binding treaty.  By the Hague 
Convention of 1899, ‘the so-called “Martens clause”,’93 provided that: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting 
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and 
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the 
requirements of the public conscience.94 
This is far from clear and customary protection for civilians was predicated upon 
‘honourable’, restrained behaviour by the army.  It wasn’t until the Geneva 
Convention of 1949 when protections for civilians and non-combatants were codified.  
 While international law was, perhaps, lacking, many nations had laws 
outlawing the ill-treatment of civilians. By the end of the First World War, France, 
Belgium, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States, all had national laws 
in place that allowed for the court-martial of enemy soldiers. Thus the ‘prosecution of 
war crimes by national criminal courts was possible, although the absence of 
extradition agreements was a major drawback’. 95  The absence of extradition 
agreements proved a massive problem at the end of the First World War, as neither 
neutral countries (The Netherlands where the Kaiser was in exile) nor Germany itself 
would give up accused war criminals. But, at the end of Second World War, German 
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territory was conquered completely and no extradition laws were necessary.  The 
Dachau trials thus included the application of national (American) ‘laws of war’. 
Even the IMT, with proceedings based on a new international treaty defining war 
crimes, fell back on national law to dismiss defence arguments:  
When the Nazi defendants in the Nuremberg trials raised the non-applicability 
of the Hague and Geneva Conventions as a matter of defence, the International 
Military Tribunal held that the general principles of these Conventions had 
passed into general international law and were thus binding on Germany.96 
In general, most of the personnel charged at the concentration camp trials were found 
guilty of violating the established forced labour law and/or the laws regarding the 
treatment of prisoners of war. A third group of defendants were found guilty of 
experimenting on humans.  It is important to note, as we shall see in upcoming 
chapters, that although the Hague and Geneva conventions were written to protect 
POWs (and some civilian populations), during the American trials at Dachau, these 
protections were interpreted to apply broadly to most of the Allied victims in the 
concentration camps. 
 
1. Forced Labour 
 The two major international treaties in existence before the Second World War 
were The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 1929. 
Both contained regulations about the correct treatment of prisoners of war in captivity 
and about using captured enemy soldiers or civilians as forced labours. The Hague 
Regulations (1899) stated in Article 6: ‘The State may utilize the labour of prisoners 
of war according to their rank and aptitude. [But] Their tasks shall not be excessive, 
and shall have nothing to do with the military operations’. This was amended in the 
1907 Convention to excluded officers. The work was to be paid in accordance with 
the national army’s wages. Based on several documents supplying evidence of 
outrages committed during the First World War, ‘the 1919 Report of the Commission 
on Responsibility lists violations of the laws and customs of war which should be 
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subject to criminal prosecution, including forced labour of civilians in connection 
with the military operations of the enemy and the employment of prisoners of war on 
unauthorized works’.97  The relevant section of The Hague convention of 1907 was 
entitled the ‘Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV)’ and contained nine 
articles promising the signatory countries would abide by the laws of war on land and 
that any belligerent county would be liable for the actions of its soldiers. The ‘Annex’ 
to the convention contains more specific laws – particularly banning the use of 
‘inappropriate’ forced labour.  
 The Geneva Prisoners of War Convention (1929) reinforced the rules set by 
the Hague Convention in Articles 29-32; work had to be appropriate, not excessive in 
time or danger, and POWs could not be forced to work on any works that had direct 
connection with the operations of war.  In the 1930s, the Forced Labour Convention98 
defined forced labour as ‘all work of service which is extracted from any person under 
the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself 
voluntarily’. It further stated: ‘Each Member of the International Labour Organisation 
which ratifies this Convention undertakes to suppress the use of forced or compulsory 
labour in all its forms within the shortest possible period’.99  Germany was a signatory 
of both Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 1929. 
As thus, German military members and employees, including concentration camp 
personnel, were expected, by law, to follow the rules and conduct of war.   
POWs were a tiny percentage of the overall inmate population of the 
concentration camps. They were so small in number that their presence was 
sometimes forgotten. From the beginning of the postwar investigations, there were 
conflicting stories about American POWs in the concentration camp system.  The 
Congressional committee that investigated Buchenwald, Nordhausen, and Dachau at 
the request of General Eisenhower concluded in its official report that:  
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In the first place the concentration camps for political prisoners must not be 
confused with prisoner of war camps. No prisoners of war are confined in any 
of the political-prisoner camps, and there is no relationship whatever between 
a concentration camp for political prisoners and a camp for prisoners of 
war.100  
This was not correct, as some POWs were sent to concentration camps.  At least one 
American POW (a major) was found when Dachau was liberated.101  Several dozen, 
British and American airmen were machine-gunned at Sachsenhausen from December 
1942-April 1943. 102   The war crimes investigators’ report on Flossenbürg 
concentration camp concluded that, ‘according the several reports, 13 American or 
British parachutists were hanged there after being captured trying to blow up bridges 
in March or April 1945’.103  During the Flossenbürg ‘parent trial’, the prosecutor 
related that:  
“English and American POWs were placed in dark isolated cells. Some of 
these inmates remained in these cells from their arrival until April 1945, a few 
as long as 11 months…An American second lieutenant who was confined in 
this prisoner was hanged the day before Good Friday in April 1945.”104 
However, there was only one camp, a subcamp of Buchenwald called Berga, where a 
large number of American POWs were confined as slave labourers. Close to 94,000 
Army and Air Corps personnel ‘were POWs in more than 50 permanent camps in the 
European and Mediterranean theatres. Also 99 per cent survived. Of the 1121 who 
																																																								
100 Report found in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military 
Tribunal, Nuremberg 14 November-1 October 1946 (Nuremberg, 1947), Vol. 37, 610. 
101 See the New York Times, ‘Dachau Captured by Americans Who Kill Guards, Liberate 
32,000’, 1 May 1945.  Interestingly, the article describes Dachau as ‘Germany’s most dreaded 
extermination camp’. 
102 Szymon Datner, Crimes Against POWs (Poland: Zachodnia Agencja Prasowa, 1964), 317-
318. Quoted extensively in 102 Mitchell G Bard, Forgotten Victims: The Abandonment of 
Americans in Hitler’s Camps (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994). 
103 ‘Investigations of Killing and mistreatment of Allied POWs in Flossenbürg Concentration 
Camp, Headquarters, Third US Army Judge Advocate General Sections, War Crimes Branch, 
21 June 1945,’ in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Vol. IV (DC: Government Printing 
Offices, 1946), 1001-2. 
104 See Bard, Forgotten Victims, 42; original source is US vs. Friedrich Becker, et al, 21 May 
1947, Vol. 1 Trial Record, Part 2, Folder 2, Box 293, The War Department and the Army 
Records, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (RG 153), The National 
Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, USA. 
	 	 	 	
	
38	
died, approximately 6 per cent were in one virtually unknown camp [Berga] where the 
fatality rate was 20 per cent’.105   
 On 13 February 1945, 350 American POWs arrived at Berga from Stalag IX-B 
the POW camp at Bad Orb.  These 350 men were singled out for transfer because they 
identified themselves Jewish, (or because the their Nazi captors thought they looked 
Jewish). At Berga, the Americans worked alongside Buchenwald inmates to dig an 
underground munitions factory. Of the 350 men sent to Berga, ‘at least 73, or 21 
percent, died in the space of 10 weeks, the highest rate of attrition among American 
prisoners of war in Europe’.106  The surviving men were liberated, along with other 
inmates, after a ‘death march’ of over 150 miles, on 23 April 1945.107 
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Photo 2. American medics treat 63 American POWs who survived a death march 
from the Berga concentration camp and were liberated by soldiers of the 357th 
Infantry Regiment. Courtesy of the USHMM Photo Archives. 
Other inmates at Buchenwald were forced to work at the main camp and sub-camps at 
the SS-owned German Equipment Works (Deutsche-Ausrüstungs-Werke), the stone 
quarry, construction, and munitions factories including the nearby Gustloff munitions 
factory. At the other camps, Dachau, Mauthausen, Flossenburg, and Dora-Mittelbau, 
the civilian inmates, and the odd-POW inmate, were forced to perform slave labour. 
At Dachau the inmates were forced to construct the camps as well as to drain marshes, 
build roads, work in gravel pits, and later in armaments production. Mauthausen was 
founded near the site of a stone quarry for the purpose of using inmates as slave 
labour to extract the stone for the SS company, German Earth and Stone Works Inc. 
(Deutsche Erd-und Steinwerke, GmbH-DESt.)  The quarry at Mauthausen was a 
notoriously lethal place to work and at least 95,000 inmates died at Mauthausen. At 
Flossenbürg, the inmates were used as slave labour for the stone quarry (for the SS 
owned Deutsche-Ausrüstungs-Werke) until 1943 when inmates were transferred to 
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work in a newly built Messerschmidt plant.  Dora-Mittelbau, originally a subcamp of 
Buchenwald, was a large underground industrial complex in the Harz Mountains, and 
most of inmates were used as slave labour to build Vergeltungswaffen (Weapons of 
Retaliation – V-2 missiles and other experimental weapons). The underground 
working conditions were particularly brutal and deadly. As Dora-Norhausen rapidly 
expanded in 1944-1945, inmates were used as slave labour in sub-camps specializing 
in quarrying, construction, and other weapons projects.  
 These inmates were technically ‘police detainees’ in ‘protective custody’ 
(Schutzhaft) and civilians, not POWs or another internationally protected group.108  
Police detainees could, under Nazi law, be executed without trial.109  When the 
Americans, and other Allies, occupied Germany they rebuilt the judicial system 
modelled on the Weimer period – the last period of German law they considered 
legitimate.  As the Allies sought to prove that the Nazi regime was criminal, its laws 
were considered illegal – thus it mattered not to American prosecutors at Dachau that 
the concentration camp inmates were brought to the camp legally under Nazi law – 
Nazi law was invalid. The judges at the Nuremberg ‘Justice Case’ (1947) described 
the Allied view of Nazi law as, ‘the prostitution of a judicial system for the 
accomplishment of criminal ends’.110   
 
2. Mistreatment and Killing of POWs 
 Murder and torture were long illegal under German domestic law, and in their 
horrendous treatment of inmates at the concentration camps the Germans violated 
almost every article concerning the protection of POWs of the Geneva Convention of 
1929. For example, Article 2 stated that POWs ‘shall at all times be humanely treated 
and protected, particularly against acts of violence, from insults and from public 
curiosity. Measures of reprisal against them are forbidden’. Or Article 3: ‘Prisoners of 
war are entitled to respect for their persons and honour. Women shall be treated with 
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all consideration due their sex’. Or Article 4: ‘The detaining Power is required to 
provide for the maintenance of prisoners of war in its charge. Difference of treatment 
between prisoners is permissible only if such difference is based on the military rank, 
the state of physical or mental health, the professional abilities, or the sex of those 
who benefit from them’. Article 6 allowed prisoners to keep their personal 
belongings, Article 7 permits correspondences between family and prisoners of war, 
and articles 10-12 promised POWs lodging in heated, lighted, well-outfitted 
dormitories, sufficient drinking water, use of tobacco, food of the same quality and 
quantity of the depot troops, adequate clothing, underwear and footwear, and access 
to a canteen which prisoners might use to buy things they wished. All of these 
conditions were grossly violated in the camps. Of course, who qualified as a Prisoner 
of War was hotly debated in the trials (as discussed in detail in Chapter 5) While the 
Dachau trials did not only deal with the mistreatment of POWs, the POWs’ presence 
in the camps was small yet significant, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 Russian prisoners of war were singled out for particular mistreatment both in 
and out of the camps.  Although the USSR had never signed the Geneva Convention 
of 1929, nor the Hague Convention of 1907, Germany had.  Fifty-seven per cent (3.3 
million) of Russian prisoners were killed by the Germans over the course of the war: 
the second largest victim group besides the Jews.111  Russian POWs were deliberately 
singled out for brutal treatment and death through starvation, shooting, and gassing. 
The Nazi policy of ‘living space’ for Germans in the East included the clearing out of 
the native population. On 8 September 1941, the German High Command  
Decreed that Soviet prisoners-of-war had forfeited all rights. Why and how 
was not explained, but any and all measures were now permissible…On 
receipt of the 8 September order, some army units simply machine-gunned 
their captives. The majority were left in barbed-wire compounds, deprived of 
food and war clothing and allowed to starve or freeze to death in conditions of 
indescribable squalor.112  
By 1942, Hitler had decreed that Russian POWs should be used for slave labour. 
Thousands transported to camps in Germany were used in construction, coal mining, 
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agriculture and other heavy labour. The POWs were gassed, shot, or otherwise killed 
when they were unable to work any longer.113  
 Thousands of Russian POWs were killed outright as soon as they arrived at 
the camps. For example, between 1941-1943 at Buchenwald, at least 4400 (with 
estimates of up to 8000)114 Soviet prisoners were shot in the back of the neck in a 
former horse stable built specifically for this purpose.  The facility was disguised as a 
medical exam room and prisoners were shot from behind as they were lined up to 
have their height measured. Thousands more were executed by firing squad at 
Dachau, Mauthausen, and Flossenbürg. 
 
3. Human experimentation.   
 By the end of the Second World War, no ‘international’ law, itself a novel 
concept, existed to regulate human experimentation or to codify correct and incorrect 
treatment of medical patients. The Hippocratic oath was used by a small number of 
medical schools in the United States by the 1920s, but was not legally binding. 
Experiments on human subjects were not uncommon in western countries in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century.  In fact, ‘their publication evoked little concern for 
the welfare of the human subjects, among either physicians or the unaware public. 
When ethical concerns were raised at all, it usually was to demonstrate the supposed 
integrity of the researcher, not to deplore the plight of the subject’.115   
In 1946, the defendants at the medical trial (as part of the Subsequent 
Nuremberg Trials), ‘tried to convince the judges that those experiments had not 
crucially exceeded conventional standards for medical experimentation on human 
subjects, and their exceptional callousness was not as much a sign of individual 
human failure as it was a testimony to the brutalizing effect of the war’.116  In the past, 
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physicians largely defined ethical standards themselves—there was no law stating the 
basic tenet, Primum non nocere. However, as established above, there were 
international treaties governing the treatment of soldiers (and enemy civilians) in 
captivity.  As we will see, it was under these laws that the American military 
commissions came to try Nazi doctors. 
German medical experiments conducted during the Second World War on 
camp inmates at the camps of this study can be grouped as follows: experiments to 
help rescue fliers and sailors, the improved treatment of war injuries, and controlling 
epidemics. 117 Dachau served as a major centre of experimentation for the Luftwaffe. 
In 1942, Luftwaffe physicians received an assignment from their high command to 
study the effects of high-altitude ejection and subsequent descent with and without 
oxygen equipment.  At Dachau nearly 200 inmates were used as subjects between 
March and August 1942 in an experimental low-pressure chamber (that simulated 
high-altitudes) built inside the Dachau main camp.  In exchange for their 
participation, ‘these purportedly condemned prisoners were promised a pardon’.118 At 
least seventy inmates died as a result of these experiments.  The apparent cause of 
death was brain embolism, ‘incurred as a result of low atmospheric pressure shortly 
after simulated ejection at record height of up to 68,000 feet’.119  In May 1942 the 
scope of the aviation experiments was expanded to find the most effective rescue 
methods for warming fliers stranded in water at low temperatures.  The Luftwaffe 
physicians performed a series of hypothermia experiments on approximately 300 
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concentration camp inmates. Hypothermia was rapidly induced through submersion in 
ice-water and once achieved, various warming techniques were administered. 
At least eighty inmates died in the water as a result of cardiac failure or during 
attempted rewarming.  Experiments discovered that rapid rewarming was most 
effective in hot water (not lukewarm water as previously thought).120 
By 1943, the air war had shifted to the Mediterranean and the Luftwaffe 
ordered research to find a portable kit that could desalinate seawater.  By the end of 
1943, two such kits had been developed that sweetened sea water.  The kits were 
tested on forty-four Gypsies at Dachau in the summer of 1944. One group drank 
sweetened seawater, and one drank no water at all. Limited information was obtained 
from the experiment; it was, essentially, a failure. 
 At both Dachau and Buchenwald, as well as other camps, German doctors 
experimented on inmates to find treatment and cures for various war injuries. At 
Buchenwald in November 1943, doctors looked to find cures for burns caused by 
phosphorous bombs, no helpful medication was found, and many subjects were 
grievously injured. At Dachau, abscesses were induced in forty Catholic priest 
inmates to study different cures in August 1942.  Ten died as a result and the subjects 
left untreated were harmed less than the subjects who received experimental 
treatment. Like the sweetened seawater experiments, the war injury experiments were 
useless. 
At Dachau and Buchenwald, along with Natzweiler and Sachsenhausen, 
experimental stations were set up to study how to halt the spread of typhus and ‘most 
other epidemic diseases as well, including influenza, typhoid, jaundice, yellow fever, 
malaria, tuberculosis, and hepatitis…Hundred of subjects were injected with the 
cultivated viruses or viral blood of infected inmates and later inoculated with different 
vaccines to study their comparative effectiveness’.121 
 At Dachau most of the epidemic experiments centred on finding a vaccination 
and cure for malaria, under the direction of Dr Klaus Schilling.  Dr Schilling had 
worked on tropical diseases for forty-five years, particularly in Africa, and was well 
known in the field as a member of the prestigious Rockefeller Foundation in Berlin. 
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In 1941, after a meeting with Himmler, who ordered him to continue his research, Dr 
Schilling chose Dachau concentration camp to continue his work because it was close 
to his hometown.122 He inoculated inmates 900-1000 prisoners, by his own count, and 
‘as well as I can remember, in three years there were forty-nine patients who died 
outside the malaria station’.123  At Buchenwald, physicians experimented on inmates 
to test vaccines and treatments for typhus, typhoid, cholera, and diphtheria.  Some of 
the vaccines developed at Buchwald ‘were administered to infected and threatened 
populations and soldiers. Vaccines were apparently not offered to the inmates of 
concentration camps, whereby the end of the war the spectre of death by epidemic 
disease was overshadowed only by the horrors of mass killings in the gas 
chambers’.124 
Activities sponsored by the Nazis in the camps, including human 
experimentation, the mistreatment and killing of POWs, and the use of POWs as 
forced labour, were blatant violations of the existing international laws as established 
in the Hague and Geneva conventions.  
 
C.  The United Nations’ Wartime Rhetoric, 1941-1945 
Throughout the war, the governments of the United Nations were well 
informed about German transgressions of the laws of war.125  Although President 
Roosevelt, along with the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, made several 
wartime statements pledging to punish the perpetrators of war crimes, the United 
States government did not develop a concrete plan to punish offenders until summer 
1944, after the Allied invasion and breakout from Normandy.  Winning the war was 
considered the top priority for the United States. However, the legal emphasis set by 
the leaders of the major United Nations during the war in their speeches about the 
objectives of war drew attention to the criminality of the Germans and the need to 
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bring them to justice. While this fuelled morale for the war effort, the rhetoric set the 
Allies up to bring the perpetrators to justice.  
The legal emphasis was set early in the war as both the United States and 
Great Britain made statements defining the fight against Nazism as a fight for justice. 
Like Winston Churchill before him, President Roosevelt sounded the alarm early on 
about the ‘reign of terror and international lawlessness’ practiced by the fascist states 
of Europe. On 5 October 1937, in his  ‘Quarantine’ Speech, he warned, ‘Innocent 
peoples, innocent nations,’ he declared, ‘Are being cruelly sacrificed to a greed for 
power and supremacy which is devoid of all sense of justice and human 
considerations’. 126  He believed the United States should lead an international 
quarantine of these states and could not be isolated from these events. The nation, still 
reeling from the Great Depression, was not yet willing to follow with action.  
When President Roosevelt began speaking about the war in 1940 and 
America’s role in it, he used a marked emphasis on religious vocabulary in his 
speeches. By 1942, Roosevelt added legal language to his religious imagery as he 
began planning for what possible concrete legal action he might take in the postwar 
period. The convergence of religious thought and legal action was particularly 
prominent in the eventual foundation of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Rights.127 In late May 1940, President Roosevelt explained, in one of 
his famous ‘Fireside’ radio chats to the American people his choice to ask Congress 
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for more funding for defensive measures: ‘We defend and we build a way of life, not 
for America alone, but for all mankind. Ours is a high duty, a noble task’.128 By 29 
December 1940, President Roosevelt declared America would be the ‘great arsenal of 
democracy’.129 The US must help in the fight against the ‘new order’ imposed by 
Germany.130 
In January 1941 President Roosevelt gave his famous ‘Four Freedoms’ 
speech. He defended continued support for Great Britain by making the war about 
protecting freedoms he believed all people were owed (the freedom of speech, the 
freedom of worship, the freedom from want, and the freedom from fear) that the 
Germans had taken away illegally.  These ideas became the foundational principles 
that evolved into the Atlantic Charter, a policy statement about UK and US goals for 
the postwar world, declared by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt on 
14 August 1941.131  
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President Roosevelt continued throughout the war to condemn Nazi atrocities 
and his rhetoric included the use legal terminology. On 21 August 1942, Roosevelt 
declared  ‘that this Government was constantly receiving information concerning the 
barbaric crimes being committed by the enemy against civilian populations in 
occupied countries’ and said that ‘when victory is won the perpetrators of these 
crimes shall answer for them before courts of law’.132  On 7 October 1942, he spoke 
of  ‘barbaric crimes being committed’ and that ‘the American Government was 
prepared to cooperate with other Allied Governments in establishing a UNWCC for 
the Investigation of war crimes’.133 Roosevelt declared there would be postwar justice 
for the perpetrators: ‘It is our intention that just and pure punishment shall be meted 
out to the ringleaders responsible for the organized murder of thousands of innocent 
people and the commission of atrocities which have violated every tenant of the 
Christian faith’.134  
The ‘most decisive and far-reaching statement of the three major Allies,’135 
and the one with the most impact on the postwar trials, was the Moscow Declaration 
of November 1943.  It was part of an agreement drawn up by VW Molotov, Anthony 
Eden, and Cordell Hull, the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and 
the United States, at a conference during the latter half of October 1943. President 
Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin signed the ‘Declaration of 
Atrocities’ and announced that the ‘Hitlerites’ would be punished for their war 
crimes. It said that the three powers: 
…Solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows: 
At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set 
up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi 
party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the 
above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in 
which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and 
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punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of free 
governments which will be erected therein… 
Including the ‘wholesale shooting of Polish officers136 or in the execution of French, 
Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in 
slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland.’137  The document continued its warning: 
Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood 
beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three 
Allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will 
deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done. 
The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of German criminals 
whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be 
punished by joint decision of the government of the Allies.138 
The Soviet Union immediately put the statement into practice a month later with its 
first trial at Kharkov in December 1943.139  
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The Russians were the first of the Allies to try Nazis for atrocities before a 
military tribunal.  As one contemporary observer put it, ‘The Kharkov trial balloon 
was to test the reaction to this sort of procedure both at home and abroad, and to draw 
the attention of world public opinion to the truly monstrous nature of the German 
crimes’.140 The Kharkov trial took place between 15th and 18th of December 1943,141 
in a large auditorium in front of an estimated 6,000 audience members, by far the 
largest number of spectators for any Allied trial during or after the war. As one 
American journalist observed, ‘the atmosphere of that Kharkov trial room was 
distinctly reminiscent of the famous Treason Trials of 1936-1938. In fact, two of the 
defence lawyers, Kommodov and Kaznacheyev, had defended some of the figures in 
the treason trials. Their presence provided an element of direct continuity’.142 A 
correspondent for The Spectator wrote: ‘The forms of Soviet law were strictly 
followed, and the accused were defended by eminent lawyers… The staging of the 
proceedings recalls certain other trials famous in Soviet history’.143 
Four men, three Germans (Reinhard Redslav, Wilhelm Langfeld, Hans Ritz) 
and one Soviet collaborator (Mikhail Bulanov) were tried and hanged for crimes 
committed during the German occupation of Kharkov and the surrounding area 
including mass killings by shooting and using gas wagons.144  One newspaper 
reported, under the headline ‘German’s Evidence at Kharkov Trial: Details Of 
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Massacre Of 300 Civilians’ that Gestapo member Heinz Ritz admitted that he put to 
death 300 Russian men, women and children, including in ‘exhaust gas’ killing 
vans.145  
In Kharkov, ‘in contrast [to Nuremberg], much of the focus of the trial was on 
the murder of the Jewish population of Kharkov, although not identified as such. 
Instead, the victims were referred to in the generic as “Soviet citizens”’.146  Like in 
the later Allied trials, the defendants claimed the defence of ‘superior orders’. In 
court, defendant Hans Ritz, ‘cited Hitler’s direct orders for the inculcation of 
systematic cruelty and the doctrine of German race superiority, whence followed the 
advisability for exterminating inferior races, including the Russians’.147 
International journalists were invited to attend the trial, although difficulty 
with travel arrangements to this newly liberated area meant they only arrived on the 
last day for closing arguments and sentencing. Still, the trial and its outcome was 
widely covered in the press in the Soviet Union and internationally. The Soviet papers 
insisted, “the Kharkov trial is of great international significance. It proclaims the 
triumph of justice. It shows that arrogantly violated international standard of law will 
not go unpunished.”’148 The Western Allied press was inclined to agree. For example 
one wrote,  
The crimes which they were required to confess were black, but not so black 
as those committed by the arch-criminals who still control the destinies of 
Germany. The trial has taken place in accordance with the decision that war 
criminals shall be tried according to the law of the country in which their 
crimes were committed. In this first case to be heard the justice of the verdict 
and sentence is beyond all possible challenge.149  
Throughout the Soviet press, ‘the Kharkov executions were hailed as the “first 
realization” of the Stalin-Roosevelt-Churchill declaration on war criminals [The 
Moscow Declaration]’.150  
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Although summary executions by the Soviet forces certainly continued 
unabated during the fighting, after the end of the war the ‘policy and techniques first 
tested at Kharkov were resumed on a large scale by the Soviet Government’. A series 
of public trials was conducted in Kiev, Minsk, Riga, Leningrad, Smolensk, Briansk, 
Velikie Luki, and Nikolaev.151  Ten Germans were tried in Smolensk for wholesale 
atrocities against Soviet civilians and war prisoners: seven were hanged, one man was 
sentenced to twenty years at hard labour, one man to fifteen years and one man to 
twelve.152 Eleven Germans, including a Major-General, were tried at Leningrad. The 
General and seven others were sentenced to hang, two men received twenty years 
hard labour, one man to fifteen years.153 At Briansk, three, including a Lieutenant-
General, were sentenced to hang, one received 20 years of imprisonment.154  Seven 
Germans were convicted of war crimes and executed at Riga.155  From the sources 
available, it is clear that the Russians tried and executed more war criminals than any 
other member of the United Nations: ‘In May 1950, Soviet sources indicted that 9,717 
German prisoners of war were serving sentences for war crimes and 3,815 waited in 
custody while investigation continued’.156  
 
D.  Disagreements  
Despite their joint declaration at Moscow, Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt had 
differences of opinion over how to deal with Nazi war criminals, suggesting 
everything from show trials to summery executions carried out in the field. During the 
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Moscow conference, different views were expressed on the treatment of the major 
Nazi leaders: 
V.M. Molotov of the Soviet Union favoured “stern and swift justice”. 
Anthony Eden of Great Britain argued that all the legal forms should be 
observed. Cordell Hull of the United States took a position which would later 
be rejected as the American position. Hull said: “If I had my way I would take 
Hitler and Mussolini and Tojo and their accomplices and bring them before a 
drumhead court-martial and at sunrise on the following day there would be an 
historic incident”.157  
Disagreements persisted until the end of the war.158 When the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission (UNWCC), a United Nations agency created in 1943 with ‘the 
goal of identifying, classifying, and assisting national governments with the trials of 
war criminals,’159 the Soviet Union refused to join. Even after creating it, the 
American and British governments undercut the efforts of the UNWCC. The 
Americans and British worried that the UNWCC would step beyond its purview of 
making lists of war criminals and debating what should be done with them. These 
government leaders’ fears were justified when in late summer 1944 the UNWCC 
recommended creating a treaty court to try major Nazi war criminals. The British 
‘adamantly opposed the idea, contending that it was impractical, unnecessary, and too 
innovative’160 and asked the Americans to join them in rejecting the proposal.161  For 
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the Second Quebec Conference between the British and Americans in September 
1944 the Lord Chancellor Sir John Simon wrote a memorandum making the case for 
summary executions for top Nazi leaders to show to the Americans.  In it he wrote, ‘I 
am strongly of the opinion that the method by trial, conviction, and judicial sentence 
is quite inappropriate for notorious ringleaders such as Hitler, Himmler, Goering, 
Goebbels and Ribbentrop. Apart from the formidable difficulties of constituting the 
Court, formulating the charge, and assembling the evidence, the question of their fate 
is a political, not a judicial, question’.162  These major criminals should be executed 
immediately in the field. The Quebec conference ended with Churchill and FDR 
approving of both summary executions (sending Simon’s memo to Stalin for approval 
and to initiate a joint effort to draw up a list of war criminals who should be executed 
when captured) and the Secretary of the Treasury’s draconian economic plan for 
postwar Germany (Discussed in detail in Chapter 3). 
The idea of summary executions was particularly attractive to some in the 
Allied governments in light of fears of a repeat of the failures of the Leipzig (and the 
lesser-known Constantinople) trials.  The shadow of World War I hung over any 
potential plans for punishing war crimes offenses.  During the Great War, the Allied 
governments, particularly Great Britain under Prime Minister David Lloyd George, 
made the punishment of war crimes part of its war aims.163 The Allied public was 
whipped into a frenzy of anti-German sentiment with stories of German atrocities.164  
While there was some kernel of truth, most of these stories were highly exaggerated.  
During the Second World War many in the US government, and members of the 
public, believed that reports of the unfolding genocide were exaggerated, just as the 
‘Belgian atrocities’ had been in World War I.  Furthermore, the legacy of the failed 
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trials at Leipzig at the end of World War I haunted the Allies.165  Anthony Eden 
winced at ‘that ill-starred enterprise at the end of the last war’ while Henry 
Morgenthau Jr. called it a ‘fiasco’.166   
The Leipzig trials (1921) were intended to try German war criminals for 
crimes committed during the Great War. The trials were part of the provisions in 
articles 227- 230 of the Treaty of Versailles, which demanded that the Germans give 
over their suspected war criminals, including William II of Hohenzollern, formerly 
German Emperor, to the Allies to be tried before military tribunal.  The Allies initially 
provided the Germans with a list of some 900 suspects, but by May 1920 had whittled 
it down to forty-five war criminals and allowed them to be tried by the German 
Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) in Leipzig.  The trials were held from 23 May to 16 
July 1921.  The Reichsgericht either acquitted or gave inappropriately light sentences 
to all the men tried: for example, Sergeant Karl Heynen, accused of assaulting six 
British POWs, received a ten month imprisonment while Lieutenant-Captain Karl 
Neumann, accused of sinking the hospital ship, the Dover Castle, was acquitted 
because the court accepted his defence that he was following superior orders.  In June 
1921, Max Ramdohr, a German secret police officer accused of torturing Belgian 
children, was acquitted and Belgium, disgusted, withdrew its delegation.167 Britain 
and France followed, removed their delegations, and the trials at Leipzig ended. The 
Kaiser was never tried. The trials were seen then, and now, as a failure. Germany was 
defeated, but not occupied, and thus could resist turning over its suspected war 
criminals while the neutral Netherlands refused to extradite Kaiser Wilhelm II who 
was living in Doorn in exile. The Allied demands for the trials of German citizens was 
one issue that helped ‘to undermine the fledging Weimar Republic by galvanizing the 
nationalist right’.168 
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The Constantinople trials (1919-1921) were largely a British-led enterprise, in 
cooperation with the other Allies, to punish those responsible for war crimes and the 
1915 deportation and genocide of the Armenians.  While the British focused largely 
on postwar justice in Germany (the Leipzig Trials), in a ‘striking display of British 
idealism and universalism,’ there was significant pressure from the British public to 
try the actors in the Armenian genocide. As early as May 1915, France, Great Britain 
and Russia formally accused the Ottoman Empire of ‘crimes against humanity,’ the 
first time the phrase was formally used. The statement promised: 
In view of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization the 
Allied governments announce publicly to the Sublime Porte that they will hold 
personally responsible [for] these crimes all members of the Ottoman 
government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres.169 
After the war in April 1919 under massive pressure from the UK an Ottoman court 
charged ‘some of the most important leaders from the wartime Ottoman government: 
men who had once held the mighty titles of minister of foreign affairs, minister of 
justice (two of them), part secretary-general, and even grand vizier’.170  Thousand 
more trials were anticipated for those involved with war crimes. However, the tribunal 
project was slow, gathering evidence was difficult if not impossible and by 1920, the 
British demanded prioritization of the trials of those men accused of crimes against 
British soldiers. As at Leipzig, the Constantinople trials aroused nationalist 
sympathies in Turkey. In 1921, as Turkey descended into civil war, Ataturk’s 
Nationalist forces took a handful of British soldiers as hostages and ‘demanded a 
prisoner swap: all Britons in exchange for all the wars suspects in British custody’.171 
Britain agreed and the trials ended. 
 The negative experience of the botched Constantinople trials and the Leipzig 
trials remained in the consciousness of the Allies and remained a stern warning of 
how poorly large postwar trials could go.  The British, in particular, remained deeply 
sceptical of the idea of trials for the Nazis at the end of the Second World War. 
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Nevertheless the idea of judicial proceedings won out.  By the final wartime 
conference meeting of the three major Allies at Yalta, from 4 – 11 February 1945, 
major judicial trials became American policy (See Chapter 3 for detailed discussion). 
Although Winston Churchill arrived at Yalta with a proposal to execute top Nazis, 
President Roosevelt overruled him in favour of trials. Guy Liddell, head of counter-
espionage at MI5, recorded in his diaries that the ‘DPP [UK Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Sir Theobald Mathew] had recommended that a fact-finding committee 
should come to the conclusion that certain people should be bumped off and that 
others should receive varying terms of imprisonment’ and that ‘any military body 
finding these individuals in their area to arrest them and inflict whatever punishment 
had been decided on.’ This was a much clearer proposition and ‘would not bring the 
law into disrepute.’172 
Despite reservations on the British side, in the end, the protocol of the Yalta 
Conference contained a provision on ‘Major War Criminals’. It stated that ‘the 
Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject 
of enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of 
the Conference’.173  Thus the Allied powers agreed that something concrete must be 
done to prosecute and punish Nazis, but each government was left to its own devices 
to decide how to arraign captured Nazi criminals. The crimes committed within the 
Nazi concentration camp system would require particular attention, as they were the 
sites of grievous offences - 2.3 million men, women, and children passed through the 
German camp system between 1933 and 1945; 1.7 million lost their lives.174 
 It is important to note the distinction between the concentration and 
extermination camps from the outset. Extermination camps were largely separate 
institutions from the concentration camps – ‘no one was concentrated at Chelmno, 
Belzec, Sobibor or Treblinka, which together account for a little less than a third of 
the Holocaust victims’. These camps were purely killing facilities, ‘not administered 
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as part of the regular concentration camp system. The [former] are regularly referred 
to as concentration camps when in fact they were no such thing’.175  Majdanek and 
Auschwitz were exceptions in that they combined a killing facility with a 
concentration camp of slave labourers. Furthermore, despite the concentration camps’ 
overwhelming association with the crimes of the Holocaust (the concentration camp 
gas chamber become the primary symbol of the Nazis’ mass industrialized killing 
machine), a majority of Jews killed by the Germans were shot, deliberately starved to 
death, or left to die of preventable disease. During and after the war, there was a lack 
of understanding about the differences between these camps. As historian Stone 
argued 
This lack of clarity, combined with the chaos of war’s denouement, which 
brought the different camps crashing together, contributed to the confusion 
over the geography and operation of the Holocaust for years after the end of 
the war…it was only late in the war that the systematic murder of Europe’s 
Jews became entangled with the wider history of the concentration camps.176 
Even with the combination of camp populations at the end of the war, Waschmann 
estimated that at their peak only a third of the concentration camps’ population 
consisted of Jews.177 
 
E.  Conclusion 
When fully revealed, the crimes at the camps were shocking and horrific. The 
media blitz surrounding the liberation of Buchenwald on 12 April and Belsen on 15 
April on the western front caused immense public outcry and put pressure on the US 
government to come with a concrete plan to punish war crimes. Dachau was liberated 
by the United States 42nd and 45th Divisions on 30 April 1945.  Along with other 
horrors, the Americans found a train of coal wagons with hundreds of bodies.178 The 
camp and its victims were in bad shape; typhus was prevalent. On 5 May, American 
newspaper editors were allowed into Dachau. Unlike Buchenwald, which was opened 
to the press 10 days after liberation and somewhat cleaned up, Dachau was left 
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deliberately piled with dead bodies.  This ‘overwhelming evidence had been left for 
editors and congressmen to make sure there were no dissenting reports on those 
centres in which Nazi terror and extermination reached its peak of cruel 
perfections’.179 
While violations of existing international laws were widespread, in order to 
more easily prosecute the men (and a few women) responsible for the crimes 
committed at the camp, some legal innovation would be necessary.  The prevailing 
international laws of war did not envision the total war waged by the Germans, 
particularly on civilians and POWs in the camps. As discussed in the next chapter, a 
passionate debate about how to bring German criminals to justice was waged at the 
highest level of American government.  
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Chapter 2: Developing the Blueprint for the American War Crimes Tribunals, 
September 1944 - July 1945 
 
‘Nobody knew what a war criminal was – officially. Nobody knew what men 
were on the list of was criminals – officially. Nobody knew when they would 
be tried – officially’. Newsweek, May 1945. 
 
‘Because of the unprecedented developments in this war, this task was without 
parallel both from the standpoint of its magnitude and the novel questions of 
international law involved’. Lt. Col. Straight, Report of the Deputy Judge 
Advocate for War Crimes, July 1948. 
 
As early as 1940, the Polish government-in-exile requested that the French and 
British governments publicly commit to punishing German war criminals.  Before the 
United States entered the war, President Roosevelt, referring to reports of a retributive 
shooting of fifty hostages by German soldiers, ended a statement to the nation with a 
vague threat: ‘Frightfulness can never bring peace to Europe. It sows the seeds of 
hatred which will one day bring fearful retribution’.180 By the autumn of 1944, the 
government in Washington was under considerable pressure from members of the 
press and private interest groups within the United States, notably the American 
Jewish Congress, to punish war criminals.181  After United States forces landed in 
Western Europe (June 1944), troops increasingly reported uncovering German 
atrocities—for example, in mid-January 1945, American troops recaptured the site 
where SS troops had massacred captured American soldiers. The freezing 
temperatures had preserved the bodies. 182   In November 1944, in the Vosges 
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Mountains, the French 1st and American 7th army uncovered the abandoned labour 
camp of Natzwiller-Struthof, where captured Resistance fighters from Holland, 
Belgium and France (as well as Jews and Gypsies) were killed through over-work, 
disease, medical experimentation, and in a small gas chamber.183  This was the first 
concentration and labour camp, albeit abandoned and with no prisoners or corpses, the 
western Allies uncovered, the first of many. 
The other United Nations 184  had long discussed the German SS and 
Wehrmacht crimes and debated what was a proper response. In December 1942, in 
the midst of the largest mass killings of Jews during the war, members of the United 
Nations issued a ‘Joint Declaration by Members of the United Nations Against 
Extermination of the Jews’. The declaration, after condemning the ‘bestial policy of 
cold-blooded extermination’, finished with the promise ‘to overthrow the barbarous 
Hitlerite tyranny. They re-affirm their solemn resolution to ensure that those 
responsible for these crimes shall not escape retribution, and to press on with the 
necessary practical measures to this end.’185 
The Declaration was widely publicized – British Foreign Secretary Anthony 
Eden read the short text in full in the House of Commons on 17 December 1942 and 
the New York Times published a report on 18 December 1942.  But there remained 
debate among the United Nations as to how ‘to ensure that those responsible for these 
crimes shall not escape retribution’. At the major wartime conferences in Casablanca, 
Quebec, Tehran, and Yalta, Churchill, Roosevelt, and (at Tehran and Yalta) Stalin 
deliberated what form the United Nations’ justice would take. As well as an 
international effort, each United Nations country would need a plan for the treatment 
of alleged collaborators and German war criminals found in their own country and/or 
zone of occupation.  As we will see in Chapter 6, their vastly different experiences 
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during the war and divergent postwar political situations informed each nation’s 
response to Nazi criminality. 
This chapter focuses on the development of a blueprint for the American 
response to German war crimes and how it was complicated by debate and 
disagreement between proponents (mostly in the War Department, White House, and 
some in the State Department) of indicting Germans on the charges of criminal-
conspiracy and proponents (in the Army, Navy, and Judge Advocate General 
(henceforth JAG)) of prosecuting offenders using traditional military commissions 
and internationally recognized laws of war.  The form of the concentration camp trials 
at Dachau would develop into a mixture of both ideas; defendants were tried before a 
military commission and charged with ‘violations of the laws and usages of war’ as 
well as a criminal-conspiracy charge (participating in the ‘common design’ of the 
criminal organization of the camp). 
 
A.  Choosing Trials  
While publicly condemning war crimes throughout the Second World War, 
United States policy towards German war criminals was vague.  The American 
military primarily considered three options: summary executions, an international 
treaty tribunal, and national military tribunals. As discussed in Chapter 2, executions, 
suggested originally by Winston Churchill at the ‘Big Three’ conference at Yalta in 
February 1945, were quickly discarded in favour of some form of trial.186   
President Roosevelt asked the Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau 
Jr., Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and Harry 
Hopkins, former Secretary of Commerce and confidential adviser to the President 
(later, after he fell ill, replaced by Judge Samuel I Rosenman), to form a committee 
for the development of policy regarding postwar Germany.187  By the fall of 1944 into 
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the spring of 1945, the heads of Treasury, State, and War and their departments 
developed robust views about United States’ foreign policy in postwar Germany and 
how the United States army’s occupying force should deal with German war 
criminals.  The committee members searched for a response to German war crimes 
that would both punish war criminals to make Germany safe for American occupying 
forces, while also facilitating (or, at least, not hindering) a transition Germany from 
the criminal Nazi regime to a new democratic government. However, in the face of 
the extensive and brutal crimes committed under the Nazi regime, the committee 
debated fiercely about whether American policy towards war criminals should or 
could remain within (or at least bordering) the constraints present in existing 




Photo 3. Portrait of Henry Morgenthau Jr. at his desk in the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury. Courtesy of the USHMM Photo Archives. 
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Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau advanced an uncompromising response to 
German war criminals.  On 5 September 1944, in a memorandum sent to President 
Roosevelt, known as the ‘Morgenthau Plan,’ he stated his proposal for both (1) the 
economic deindustrialization of postwar Germany and (2) the immediate execution of 
war criminals.188  ‘Arch-criminals,’ he wrote: 
…Whose obvious guilt has generally been recognized by the United 
Nations…shall be apprehended as soon as possible and identified as soon as 
possible after apprehension, the identification to be approved by an officer of 
the General rank. When such identification has been made the person 
identified shall be put to death forthwith by firing squads made up of soldiers 
of the United Nations.189   
Morgenthau proposed that lesser war criminals be tried by military commissions in 
the field for one or more of the following crimes: (1) killing in violation of the rules 
of war, (2) killing a hostage in reprisal for the deeds of other persons, (3) killing a 
victim because of his nationality, race, colour, creed, or political conviction.  
Morgenthau’s plan did not consider whether the crimes had been committed against 
an Allied national or before America entered the war.  All violators would be 
punished. 
Morgenthau initially had support for his proposal from Secretary of State Hull, 
who supported some punishment for Germany; specifically, the arrest and interning of 
‘large groups of particularly objectionable elements, especially the SS and the 
Gestapo…[they] should be tried and executed’. 190  Hull would later show his 
ambivalence and outright hostility, when the uncompromising harshness of the 
Morgenthau Plan was revealed fully.  Morgenthau put enormous pressure on 
Secretary of War Stimson to formulate a tough war crimes policy to be carried out by 
the United States Army.  Stimson was not, at first, against summary executions; he 
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simply wanted ‘definite instructions’ for officers in the field.191  He noted that ‘if 
shooting is required it must be immediate; not postwar’.192   
President Roosevelt was largely silent about his opinion concerning war 
crimes policy throughout this planning period. He made few indications of any 
concrete plans for punishing war criminals beyond favouring their punishment in a 
general way.  The President seemed to indicate his support for Morgenthau when he 
sent Stimson a sharply worded memorandum on 26 August 1944 criticizing the 
army’s current occupation handbook.  He wrote, ‘this so-called ‘Handbook’ is pretty 
bad…The German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that the whole 
nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern 
civilization’.193  Morgenthau’s plan enjoyed a short-lived victory at the Quebec 
conference (12-16 September 1944) when Prime Minister Winston Churchill and 
President Roosevelt discussed and verbally agreed to deindustrialize Germany and 
conduct summary executions in the field.   
When the Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, heard 
of the verbal agreement, the men were furious. Furthermore, at the end of September 
and early October, ‘a fairly accurate summery of the Morgenthau Plan, [was] 
published by the Wall Street Journal, and another published by the New York 
Times’.194  The New York Times article reported the bitter disagreements between 
Morgenthau, Hull, and Stimson.195 Other newspapers followed the reports with there 
own articles and, ‘attempts to defend Morgenthau were lost in a chorus of American 
press criticism of what were seen as [Morgenthau’s] inhumane and unrealistic 
measures’.196  With an election coming up, President Roosevelt did not want a display 
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of a divided cabinet, ‘particularly when the dispute involved key members of his 
administration, such as Hull, who commanded great respect among the American 
electorate’.197 By the beginning of October, Roosevelt distanced himself from his 
previous support of Morgenthau’s Plan and minimized the importance of the decision 
in Quebec.  The president turned to the advice of Secretary of War Stimson. 
Stimson believed that a comprehensive legal programme to punish war 
criminals was necessary to make the country safe for the occupying forces and re-
educate the German people. In early September, before the Quebec conference, 
Stimson had responded to Morgenthau’s plan in a memorandum to the Secretary of 
Treasury, other committee members, and the President, stating his basic objections to 
Morgenthau’s proposal: The plan ‘would add the dangerous weapon of complete 
economic oppression. Such methods, in my opinion, do not prevent war. They tend to 
breed war’.198  Stimson advocated trials of German criminals and that ‘such procedure 
must embody in my judgment, at least rudimentary aspects of the Bill of Rights, 
namely the notification to the accused, the right to be heard and, within reasonable 
limits, to call witnesses to his defence’.  He continued, ‘I do not mean to favour the 
institution of state trials or to introduce any cumbersome machinery but the very 
punishment of these men in a dignified manner consistent with the advance of 
civilization will have all the greater effect on posterity’.199  He suggested that the 
chief German offenders be tried by an international tribunal and they should be 
charged with ‘offences against the laws of the Rules of War in that they have 
committed wanton and unnecessary cruelties in connection with the prosecution of the 
war’.200 Stimson admitted that his proposal lacked a procedure for prewar crimes and 
war crimes committed in Germany and/or against Germans:  
I have great difficulty in finding any means whereby military commissions 
may try and convict those responsible…I would be prepared to construe 
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broadly what constituted a violation of the Rules of War but there is a certain 
field in which I fear that external courts cannot move. Such courts would be 
without jurisdiction in precisely the same way that any foreign court would be 
without jurisdiction to try those who were guilty of, or condoned, lynching in 
our own country…201 
In order to create a concrete alternative plan to Morgenthau’s, Stimson and the 
Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy discussed the matter on the phone on 28 
August and agreed on four ‘propositions’202 outlining the major goals of the American 
war crimes programme. First, ‘swift punishment should be visited on the Nazi leaders 
in respect to war crimes’. Second, American investigators ‘should then go down by 
steps into the subordinates responsible for such crimes, beginning with the leaders of 
the Gestapo and investigating their individual responsibility and punish it 
accordingly’. Third, upon occupation, American forces should arrest and intern the 
entire Gestapo and begin investigating each individual. Fourth, investigators should 
‘institute at once an investigation as to the responsibility of the Storm Troopers and 
their leaders for similar war crimes’.  The trials and punishments ‘should be as prompt 
as possible’ to avoid making martyrs.  The goal was not retribution, but ‘this 
punishment is for the purpose of prevention and not for vengeance’.203  
At the time he prepared this plan (September 1944), Stimson believed that 
military commissions should try war criminals, operating under flexible rules of 
evidence.  Stimson received from support for his policy of trials from the Judge 
Advocate General Major General C. Cramer.  On 5 September 1944, the two men 
discussed the trials and the flexibility of military tribunal rules. Stimson advised that 
any military tribunal should be able to make its own rules for ‘it must be free from all 
the delays that would go with the technicalities of a courts-martial or the United States 
jurisprudence procedure…’ and that ‘the tribunal must be absolutely free of the 
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restrictions of courts-martial. I understand that’s so from experience with the Saboteur 
Case’.204 
Here Stimson was referring to the Supreme Court decision in the so-called 
Saboteur Case (Ex parte Quirin). The trial by military commission in August 1942 of 
eight German saboteurs205 raised questions about the use of military tribunals to try 
foreign nationals and/or unlawful combatants while the civil courts were operating, as 
well as the ability of courts to review decisions made by the president while acting as 
Commander-in-Chief.  In mid-June 1942, eight trained saboteurs landed by German 
submarine off the east coast (half in Long Island, New York, half in Ponte Vedra 
Beach, Florida) of the United States. The men were spotted almost immediately in 
Long Island and two of the defendants turned themselves into the FBI.  The rest were 
rounded up by 27 June 1942. None of the men ever carried out an act of sabotage. 
Francis Biddle, Attorney General of the United States and the man who 
prosecuted the case, received a memorandum from Judge Advocate General (JAG) 
lawyer Oscar Cox on 29 June 1942, concluding that the men could be tried either by a 
general courts-martial or a military tribunal. Cox argued that the Supreme Court 
precedent set out in Ex parte Milligan (1866), a case which restricted the use of 
military commissions for trying civilians and enemy aliens when civil courts were 
operating,206 did not apply in the case of the German saboteurs because they were 
unlawful combatants who came through enemy line out of uniform for the purpose of 
committing sabotage.  Cox compared the merits of the two types of military courts 
and suggested using a military commission because it would give the prosecution 
more flexibility in procedural form and rules of evidence. If Biddle tried the Germans 
using a general courts-martial, he would be required to ‘must follow statutory 
procedures presented in the Article of War, whereas the procedures of a military 
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commission are not necessarily governed by statutes’.207  For these reasons, Biddle 
recommended to President Roosevelt that the Germans be tried using a military 
commission. 
President Roosevelt agreed to use a military commission to try the Germans 
and issued Proclamation 2561, titled ‘Denying Certain Enemies Access to the Courts 
of the United States’.  The initial paragraph began by stating that ‘the safety of the 
United States demanded that all enemies who have entered the territory of the United 
States as part of an invasion…should be promptly tried in accordance with the laws of 
war’. Roosevelt’s reference to the ‘laws of war’ was crucial.  Had Roosevelt cited the 
‘Articles of War,’ he would have triggered the statutory procedures, established by 
Congress, for courts-martial.  The ‘laws of war,’ were ‘undefined by statute, [and] 
represent a more diffuse collection of principles and customs developed in the field of 
international law. A military tribunal could thus pick and choose among the principles 
and procedures that it found compatible…’208 In short, military commissions were 
more flexible– giving the court a carte blanche to accept any evidence it deemed 
relevant to the case. 
The government charged the eight men with four crimes: one against the ‘law 
of war,’ two against the Articles of War (81st and 82nd), and one involving 
conspiracy. The prosecutors thus combined a mix of offences that were non-statutory 
(‘law of war’) and statutory (Articles of War). The distinction is significant because in 
American federal law the creation of criminal offences is reserved to the legislative 
branch (Congress), not to the executive branch (the President). The Constitution of the 
United States, 
…Vests in Congress the power to ‘define and punish Piracies and Felonies 
committed on the high Seas, and Offences on Land and Water’. By enacting 
the Articles of War, Congress defined not only the procedures but also the 
punishments for the field of military law. Charging individuals with violations 
of the ‘law of war’ shifts the balance of power from Congress to the 
Executive.209   
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The defence attorneys, assigned to the German defendants from the Judge Advocate 
General, disputed the military commission’s jurisdiction and the case was referred to 
the Supreme Court.  On 29 July 1942 the Supreme Court heard the case, in a rare 
summer appearance, and handed down a decision dismissing the defence’s challenge 
on 31 June.  The court opinion (not filed until 29 October) catalogued the war powers 
bestowed upon the president including ‘the power…to carry into effect all laws 
passed by Congress for the conduct of war and for the government and regulation of 
the Armed Forces, and all laws defining and punishing offences against the law of 
nations, including those which pertain to the conduct of war’.210 The Articles of War 
enacted by Congress included Article 15 which recognized the president’s right to use 
military tribunals to punish offences ‘against the law of war not ordinarily tried by 
courts-martial’.211  In the light of this, ‘the Court decided that President Roosevelt had 
exercised authority “conferred upon him by Congress,” as well as whatever authority 
the Constitution granted the President [as Commander-in-Chief]’.212  The jurisdiction 
of the military commission over the German saboteurs was upheld. The military 
commission found all eight men guilty and sentenced them to death. Six of the men 
were executed.213   Ex parte Quirin laid the legal groundwork for the jurisdiction of 
military commission over enemy combatants –which were used by the United States 
military at the Dachau tribunals.  
 
B.  The Bernays’ Plan 
Although Secretary of Stimson had articulated an outline of general ideas for 
an American war crimes trial programme, he needed to devise concrete procedures 
based on legal precedent for his proposal.  The man who would help him, Lt. Colonel 
Murray C. Bernays, was an army investigator from a Lithuanian Jewish family.  Even 
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before Stimson officially requested his assistance, Lt. Colonel Bernays,214 with the 
encouragement of his friend Col. Mickey Marcus, an adjunct colleague in the Army’s 
Civilian Affairs Division, began formulating a counter-plan in the wake of the press 
leak and subsequent fall of Morgenthau’s plan.   
After the ground invasion at Normandy in June 1944, German forces began to 
take American soldiers prisoner.  In the European theatre, almost 94,000 Americans 
were held as prisoners of war (known as ‘Kriegies’, short for Kriegsgefangener—
German for POW.)215  Mostly they were held in Stalags throughout the Greater Reich 
and were treated relatively well. However, American soldiers who were identified as 
Jewish were often sent into the concentration camp system where they were afforded 
no protections reserved for other American POWs (for example at the Berga camp as 
discussed in Chapter 2).  Similar to the concentration camps, conditions in the POW 
camps worsened in the final months of the war as overcrowding and disease became 
rampant. At the end of the war, American POWs were subjected to death marches; for 
example between January and April 1945, to keep them ahead of the Soviet Army, the 
Germans marched almost 80,000 US and Commonwealth POWs westward, in what is 
now referred to as the ‘Black March’. As many as 3,500 US and Commonwealth 
POWs died as a result.216 
General Eisenhower was infuriated by the treatment of American POWs and 
ordered a full investigation of war crimes against Allied POWs. The Civilian Affairs 
Division of the Army, which was in charge of helping to formulate postwar policy in 
Germany, stepped up its investigation of war crimes.  Lt. Col. Bernays worked with 
the Civilian Affairs administration collecting evidence of crimes against American 
soldiers.  
Bernays was born in Lithuania and immigrated to the United States in 1900 
with his family when he was six.  He attended Harvard for his undergraduate degree 
and then Columbia and Fordham for law school. He served in the army during World 
War I and then practised law in New York City.  Furthermore, Bernays was well 
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connected; he was a close friend of Judge Samuel I Rosenman (who would take over 
Harry Hopkin’s position as a close advisor to President Roosevelt) and, as thus, was 
informed of the challenges the government was grappling with in responding to Nazi 
crimes. 
Bernays’ investigations of Nazi crimes against American servicemen led him 
to believe that National Socialism was both a system and conspiracy. He wrote,  
The crimes and atrocities were not single or unconnected, but were the 
inevitable outcome of the basic criminal conspiracy of the Nazi Party…This 
conspiracy, based on the Nazi doctrine of racism and totalitarianism, involved 
murder, terrorism, and the destruction of peaceful populations in violation of 
the laws of war.217 
He concluded, furthermore, ‘that from the beginning Hitler intended to eliminate the 
entire German opposition to the Nazis and that this involved the persecution of all 
opposing elements, including the Jews, both before and during the war’.218 Bernays 
believed that large scale trials were the only way to approach Nazi criminality. He 
wrote, ‘Not to try these beasts would be to miss the educational and therapeutic 
opportunity of our generation. They must be tried not alone for their specific aims, but 
for the bestiality from which these crimes sprang’.219 
Bernays was aware of the main problems facing any plan attempting to 
prosecute German war criminals.  The number of cases and offences was 
overwhelming.  Furthermore it might be difficult to establish the individual’s identity 
or to connect him with the particular act charged, witnesses could be dead and 
scattered, the gathering of proof would be tough and costly, applicable basic law, law 
as to justification (e.g. orders of duly constituted superiors), procedures, and rules of 
evidence will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and there would be massive 
amount of paperwork. Finally: 
Undoubtedly, the Nazis have been counting on the magnitude and ingenuity of 
their offences. The numbers of the offenders, the law’s complexities, and 
delay and war weariness as major defences against effective prosecution… 
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Trial on an individual basis, and by old mode and procedures, will go far to 
realize the Nazi hopes in this respect….220 
Finally, ‘many of the Axis atrocities were committed before there was a state of war 
[between Germany and the United States]. These cannot be categorized as war crimes 
under existing law…[and] some of the worst outrages were committed by Axis 
powers against their own nationals on racial, religious, and political grounds’.221   
Bernays chronicled the deficiencies of solutions suggested to deal with 
German war criminals. He dismissed the plan for summary executions, which its 
proponents supported for the ability to circumvent all the challenges of prosecuting 
German war criminals by skipping the law altogether.  Summary executions might 
work for certain well-known German leaders but would do nothing to punish lesser 
criminals and ‘…it would do violence to the very principles for which the United 
Nations have taken up arms, and furnish apparent justification for what the Nazis 
themselves have taught and done’.222 Summary executions were likely to elevate 
leading Nazis to martyrs. In his memorandum, Bernays discussed the possibility of 
pressuring successor governments in Germany and Italy to use their courts to punish 
their own nationals. However, he dismissed the idea concluding ‘…it is hardly likely 
that all of them can be counted on to be as vigorous and effective as they should be. 
Furthermore, such a course would not meet the demand that the United Nationals 
make good their apparent assurance that these acts would be stamped as criminal by 
international judgment…’223  
Furthermore, Bernays dismissed the idea of ‘streamlined trials’ as little better 
than summary executions, as they would cause similar problems.  He concluded that 
the old procedures and concepts of law would not work to catch and punish a great 
number of criminals.  For, in the face of new levels of criminality practised by the 
Germans, ‘the ultimate offence, for example, in the case of Lidice, is not alone the 
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obliteration of the village, but even more, the assertion of the right to do it’.224  As 
Bernays argued, using the law was important to satisfy Allied concerns and to move 
Europe towards a lasting peace. Barnays wrote, ‘To let these brutalities go unpunished 
will leave millions of persons frustrated and disillusioned…Strong pressure is being 
brought on the United States and British governments by organized groups [Jewish 
groups], representing their co-religionists and undoubtedly also expressing the views 
of many who are not of their faith, to have their act categorized and treated as war 
crimes’.225  
The ‘Bernays’ Plan’ proposed trials for German war criminals by charging the 
accused with criminal conspiracy, a legal concept used in the United States but 
virtually unknown in international law. A criminal conspiracy occurs when two or 
more people plan to commit an unlawful act and take steps towards planning that act.  
The offence of criminal conspiracy appealed to Bernays as a more efficient way to 
prosecute a large number of Germans, particularly the Nazi and Wehrmacht 
leadership, for committing a variety of crimes, while only needing to demonstrate that 
these men were part of planning an unlawful act. Bernays’ plan foreshadowed both 
the Nuremberg trials’ ‘aggressive war’ approach and the Dachau trials ‘common 
design’.  As Bernays argued, ‘This approach throws light on the nature of the 
individual’s guilt, which is not dependent on the commission of specific criminal acts, 
but follows inevitably from the mere fact of voluntary membership in organizations 
devised solely to commit such acts’.226 
The Bernays’ blueprint laid out the three basic objectives for the punishment 
of Axis war criminals:  
First, the establishment of a solemnly considered international judgment that 
alleged high interests of state are not acceptable justification for national 
crimes of violence, terrorism and the destruction of peaceful populations. 
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And third, arousing the German people to a sense of their guilt, and to a 
realization of their responsibility for the crimes committed by their 
government.227 
Bernays concluded that ‘if these objectives…are not achieved, Germany will simply 
have lost another war. The German people will not know the barbarians they have 
supported, nor will they have any understanding of the criminal character of their 
conduct and the world’s judgment upon it’.228  Reeducating the Germans by exposing 
war crimes and punishing criminals was the cornerstone to the American agenda of 
transitional justice. 
In order for the Bernays plan for the War Department to satisfy proponents of 
wide-reaching punishment for all German crimes, Bernays proposed that members of 
the Nazi government and other state organizations, including the SS, SA, and 
Gestapo, 
…Should be charged before an appropriately constituted international court 
with conspiracy to commit murder terrorism, and the destruction of peaceful 
populations in violation of ‘laws of war’ and that representatives should be 
chosen from each group for the court. Finally the proceedings should be 
published and ‘the evidence should be full enough to prove the guilty intent 
(Nazi doctrine and policy) as well as the criminal conduct (atrocious acts in 
violation of the laws of war).229   
Additionally, using the criminal conspiracy charge would allow prosecutors to include 
‘everything done in furtherance of the conspiracy from the time of its 
inception…including domestic atrocities against minority groups within 
Germany…’230 
Bernays explained,  
A conspiracy is criminal either because it aims at the accomplishment of 
lawful ends by unlawful means, or because it aims at the accomplishment of 
unlawful ends by lawful means. Therefore, such technicalities as the question 
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whether the extermination of fellow Germans by Nazi Germans was unlawful, 
or whether this could be a ‘war crime’ if it was perpetrated before there was a 
state of war, would be unimportant, if you recognize the basic crime the Nazi 
conspiracy which required for its success the killing of dissident liberal 
Germans and the extermination of German (and non-German) Jews before and 
after the war began. Therefore the thing to do [is] to try the organizations 
along with the Nazi leaders on the conspiracy charge; and having convicted 
the organizations, the conviction should serve as prima facie proof of the guilt 
of any of their members.231 
Suggesting charging German nationals for crimes against other Germans was to tread 
in tricky waters.  National sovereignty had long been the cornerstone of international 
relations – international forces could not intervene in a country’s domestic affairs. If 
Germans were prosecuting and killing other Germans, diplomatic tradition held that, 
for all intents and purposes, German actions were legal.  If Germans were killing 
Polish nationals, for example, the international community had the legal right to 
intervene.  To advocate for the Allies to try Germans for domestic crimes was 
Bernays’ most radical notion.  The courts of the military commissions at Dachau (and 
in most other national trials) rejected this idea – prosecutors charged the accused with 
crimes against Allied nationals only. 
 Many of Bernays’ other ideas were adopted by the Dachau courts. Bernays 
recommended that the judgment for the first major trial of war criminals should 
mention specifically ‘that the Nazi Government and its mentioned agencies are guilty 
as charged,’ and that every ‘member of the government and organizations on trial is 
guilty of the same offence’.232 After the judgment in the first trial was passed, all 
following trials would ‘require no proof that the individuals affected participated233 in 
any overt act other than membership in the conspiracy…Proof of membership, 
without more, would establish guilt of participation in the mentioned conspiracy, and 
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the individual would be punished in the discretion of the court’.234  The form of the 
concentration camp trials at Dachau directly mirrored the form presented in Bernays’ 
memorandum.  At Dachau, the ‘parent trial’ was used to establish the criminality of 
the camp enterprise using representatives of the membership of the camp 
establishment.  In subsequent trials, proof of membership in the camp’s organization 
was enough to convict any defendant.  
While the structure mirrored Barnays’ plan, it is important to note that the 
Dachau courts would use the charge of ‘common design’ against the accused – not 
‘conspiracy’.  Conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to engage 
jointly in an unlawful or criminal act. It is the intent to engage in a criminal act. 
Conspiracy is a crime separate from the criminal act for which it is developed. For 
example, one who conspires with another to commit Burglary and in fact commits the 
burglary can be charged with both conspiracy to commit burglary and burglary. 
United States Federal conspiracy statutes were first passed in 1909.  It is of 
fundamental importance that the prosecutor’s prove that each of the accused agreed to 
engage in a criminal act.  This is where conspiracy and ‘common design’ primarily 
diverge.  ‘Common design’ is a more flexible legal concept, developed to prosecute 
individuals who were part of an illegal activity even if they did not agree to 
participate in it.  ‘Common design’ allowed prosecutors at Dachau to focus on 
proving that an illegal act occurred (in this case, setting up and maintaining 
concentration camps and the torture, deprivation, and death that occurred therein) and 
then subsequently prove which individuals were involved in participating in the 
illegal act and were thus guilty of the entire criminal enterprise. 
His plan completed, Bernays presented his memorandum at a meeting on 24 
October to Secretary of War Henry Stimson. 
 
C.  Criticism and Support 
Secretary Stimson was enthusiastic about Bernays’ document. He wrote to 
Secretary of State Hull advising that Bernays’ memorandum ‘deserve [d] careful 
study’ and that Stimson planned to send it to the Secretary of the Navy in order to get 
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his opinion as well.235  Stimson wrote, ‘Punishment is essential, not as retribution, but 
as an expression of civilization’s condemnation of the Nazi philosophy and 
aggression which have relentlessly plunged the world into war. That condemnation 
must be achieved in a fair manner which will meet the judgment of history’.236 There 
continued to be some disagreements over Bernays’ plan within the War Department. 
Colonel Ammi Cutter, Assistant Executive Officer to Assistant Secretary of War John 
J. McCloy, wrote:  
The discussion in file (a) [Bernays’ memorandum] is ingenious. The proposal 
however, includes fairly radical departures from existing theories, i) of 
individual criminality and criminal responsibility and ii) of prosecution 
procedures. It also contemplates one (or a series) of grandiose state trials, 
which have obvious disadvantages in providing opportunities for the 
manufacture of national martyrs, giving the defence an effective public 
platform for use in propaganda etc.237 
Despite these reservations, Cutter recommended that Bernays’ plan be sent to the 
State Department and Navy Department for their suggestions.   
After a meeting on 9 November 1944 on the subject, the Departments of War, 
State, and Navy issued a joint statement on the ‘Trial and Punishment of European 
War Criminals’.  The statement agreed to Bernays’ proposal of prosecuting offenders 
on criminal conspiracy grounds because ‘the criminality with which the Nazi leaders 
and groups are charged does not consist of scattered individual outrages such as may 
occur in any war, but represents the results of a purposeful and systematic pattern 
created by them to the end of achieving world domination’. A trial based on 
conspiracy charges would ‘condemn the criminal purpose behind each individual 
outrage’ and allow the major war criminals to ‘be disposed of in a single trial’. The 
signatories believed ‘the proceeding will be judicial rather than political. It will rest 
securely upon traditionally established legal concepts’. They recommended to 
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President Roosevelt that he ‘approve this method of dealing with the basic war crimes 
problem’ and begin preparation and negotiation to create ‘a court constituted by 
international treaty’. The treaty should be of limited scope in order to ‘avoid long-
term and unforeseeable commitments’ and the court ‘may consist of military or 
civilian personnel, or both, and should be representative of the interested United 
Nations’.  War, State, and Navy officials held that the creation of such a court would 
‘not foreclose other available procedures for dealing with particular offences’. War 
crimes committed against American nationals ‘will remain subject to trial by United 
States military and naval commissions…These procedures present no new problems 
of law or policy, and are mentioned only for the sake of completeness’.238  The 
Dachau tribunals would fall into this final category of trials, as opposed to 
Nuremberg, which was a treaty-based international tribunal. 
Although the basic blueprint for an American response to German war crimes 
was agreed upon in theory, Barneys’ plan, now under the control of Assistant 
Secretary of War John J. McCloy, continued to face criticism.  Assistant Attorney 
General Herbert Wechsler sent a memorandum detailing his objections to parts of 
Bernays’ proposal.239 For example, he objected to using the accusation of common-
law conspiracy as it is known primarily only in American law.  He was joined in his 
criticism by Brigadier General Kenneth C. Royall, the army’s Deputy Fiscal Director 
and later Secretary of the Army. Royall proposed trying the leaders of the German 
government by a military commission, consisting of members of ranking European 
commanders from the United States, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union and other 
military legal personal, for, ‘the commission of war crimes and for the conspiracy to 
commit war crimes…the members of the organizations [SS, Gestapo etc.] would have 
to be specifically named in the charges but they would be permitted to have only class 
representation in the trial’.240  Royall recommended that Allied military courts or 
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national civilian courts try Germans for war crimes committed during occupation.  
German crimes committed before the war, the act of starting the war, and crimes 
committed in Germany against German citizens should not be tried at all – except in 
the civil courts of Germany.  Royall believed that his recommendations were 
‘consistent with history, represent the best policy for the future, and adequately 
effectuate the declarations heretofore made by the United Nations and by the 
President of the United States’.241 
Francis Biddle, the Attorney General, was another critic of the criminal-
conspiracy plan proposed by Bernays and his supporters.  Biddle wrote, ‘I doubt 
whether such a conspiracy is criminal under international law’.242 He rejected the idea 
of prosecuting crimes committed before the war or by Germans against other German 
nationals.  He recommended that the United States ‘should eliminate, at this point at 
least, any attempt to punish crimes committed before the war. We will have our hands 
full with crimes after the war [began]’.243  He doubted the practicality of trying a large 
number of criminals by an international court. He suggested instead that ‘devices 
should be worked out for the punishment of other criminals [besides a few leaders] by 
very many courts. Is there any way of establishing a group of mixed military tribunals 
to punish the large mass of criminals’?244  Biddle was one of the first government or 
army officials to raise the problem of what occupying American forces would do with 
the convicted German war criminals. He wrote, ‘I think the court should have no 
discretion on punishment and consider only cases punishable by death. Where would 
you find enough jails to imprison’?245  This problem was never adequately solved 
throughout the life of the American trial programme.   
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The Judge Advocate General, the head of the legal arm of the army,246 Cramer 
gave approval to the plan for an ‘a full-dress international trial of the ringleaders [He 
called this a ‘Stage A’ proceeding]…there is likewise agreement as to what I may call 
the Stage C trials, the individual proceedings against identifiable criminals before the 
military or civilian courts of the injured nations’.247  However, General Cramer found 
the proposal to prosecute individual offenders for serving as members of Nazi 
organizations  (‘Stage B’) problematic.  This was what can be called the ‘common 
design’ charge; if the accused participated in an organization deemed criminal, he was 
guilty of participating in the maintenance of a criminal enterprise.  General Cramer 
argued that the United States military commissions, despite having more relaxed rules 
of evidence and procedures, ‘can proceed to judgment of conviction only upon 
complete proof of the personal guilt of the individuals before them’.248  Bernays’ 
proposal seemed to push the concept of res judicata ‘beyond anything now known to 
our criminal law’.249 General Cramer suggested the plan be expanded to include 
stronger language about an international treaty and language indicating that the 
‘courts in the Stage B proceedings will, in addition to identifying the individuals of 
the groups and organizations whose criminality will have been adjudicated in Stage 
A, determine these individuals’ respective degrees of guilt, and award appropriate 
punishments accordingly’.250  The War Department redrafted the memorandum in late 
November following General Cramer’s suggestions.  This new draft was sent for 
approval to the State and Justice departments as well as the President’s Office. 
 
D.  Developments Abroad 
Developments in London at the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
threatened to complicate the United States’ blueprint by introducing the concept of 
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prosecuting aggressive war as a crime. Although political manoeuvring by the United 
States was able to stall this idea abroad, it gained an important supporter stateside.  
Colonel William C. Chanler, Deputy Chief of the Army’s Civilian Affairs Division 
and an associate of Secretary Stimson, sent a memorandum to Stimson suggesting that 
the offending German leaders be prosecuted under the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 
which had been signed by representatives of the Weimar Republic in 1928.  He 
suggested that ‘these defendants could be charged and convicted for the offence of 
attempting to overrun and annihilate Germany’s peaceful neighbours in violation of 
treaty obligations and attempting to destroy the peace of the world in an effort to 
conquer Europe’.251  The Kellogg-Briand Pact attempted to make war an illegal 
instrument of national policy and thus the ‘armed forces of a signatory State which 
enter the territory of a neighbouring signatory State and commit depredations therein 
stand on no better footing than a band of guerrillas who under established 
International Law are not entitled to be treated as lawful belligerents’.252  Thus ‘all 
hostile actions of the Axis armies are war crimes and could be punished as such by 
any Allied military tribunal…a count in the proposed conspiracy indictment charging 
all acts of the Axis Armies as constituting war crimes would seem logically to be 
tenable’.253 After making a long argument based on contemporary legal scholarship, 
Chanler finished with a pragmatic conclusion; ‘So far as legal objections are 
concerned, the answer is that once it is done, it will be International Law, regardless 
of possible present doubts. If it presents a possibility of contributing to the future 
peace of the world, legalistic objections should not be permitted to stand in the 
way’.254 Secretary Stimson was intrigued by Chanler’s arguments.  He commented, 
‘While his thesis is, I think, a little advance of the progress of international thoughts, 
it is nevertheless along lines of approach which thoughtful members of the 
international bar have been putting forward during the past twenty years’.255  
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Notwithstanding the Secretary’s support, Chanler’s paper, circulated 
throughout various government departments, drew significant criticism as being too 
radical.  Despite objections, President Roosevelt, with support from Bernays’ friend 
and new Roosevelt confidant Judge Samuel I Rosenman, moved forward with the 
proposal to prosecute German leaders for ‘aggressive war’ as a criminal act.  The 
President requested a written report in January 1945 on ‘the offenses to be brought 
against Hitler and the chief Nazi war criminals. The charges should include an 
indictment for waging aggressive warfare, in violation of the Kellogg Pact. Perhaps 
these and other charges might be joined in a conspiracy indictment’.256 
Another factor in moving forward war crimes trials in late 1944 was the 
‘Malmédy Massacre’ on 17 December 1944, which caused a shift in attitude in 
Washington. Members of the Sixth Panzer Army, First SS Panzer Regiment, led by 
SS Colonel Joachim Peiper, shot 84 disarmed American soldiers who had surrendered 
on the second day of the Battle of the Bulge.257  The American press picked up the 
story and made it a headline.  ‘Nazi Slaying of 100 Yanks Confirmed,’ read the 
Washington Post front-page story on 21 December 1944.258  The article noted that 
‘The story has spread up and down the entire First Army area, giving cold 
determination to the Yanks’ desire to finish off the attacking Germans’.259 On 29 
December, the Post printed an editorial entitled ‘Massacre as a Policy’ about the 
‘wanton German brutality reported in the course of the war’.260  The next day the 
American State Department issued ‘the strongest possible protest to the German 
government…in regard to the killing by German forces near Malmédy, Belgium, of 
all but 15 American soldiers and officers, who had been taken prisoners by a German 
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tank corps and stripped of their equipment’.261 As one historian opined, ‘This shift in 
attitude in favour of the basic principles of the Bernays’ plan came at a most 
opportune moment for its proponents, because only two months remained before 
Roosevelt was scheduled to meet with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin at 
Yalta, and war crimes might well be a topic of discussion by the Big Three’.262  
Despite the butchery at Malmédy, opposition remained in the Judge Advocate 
General to the criminal-conspiracy plan, particularly to the indictment of ‘aggressive 
war’ as a crime.  Because of the proposed central role of the Judge Advocate General 
in carrying out the war crimes investigations and tribunals, Bernays and the War 
Department took the criticism of the aggressive war charge into consideration and 
produced a new plan on 4 January 1945 and another redraft on 13 January.  In the new 
draft Bernays noted, ‘it is further commonly agreed that the launch of the war by itself 
by the Axis leaders does not constitute a ‘war crime’ in the strict legal sense in which 
this phrase is used in the literature on the subject’.263  However Bernays concluded 
that according The Hague convention of 1907, ‘the launching of the present war was 
criminal by reason of the fact that as against certain of the United Nations, it was 
launched in violation of treaties of friendship and non-aggression, and without any 
declaration of hostilities’.264  The 13 January draft strongly recommended the use of 
an international treaty to try German war crimes. ‘Such a treaty or convention,’ wrote 
Bernays, ‘would affirm the criminality of aggressive war…it would thus establish the 
legal basis of the proposed proceedings upon the most unimpeachable foundation’.265   
Bernays’ plan had gained enough momentum to be signed off by the War 
Department, State Department, and Attorney General Francis Biddle, although 
focusing on the criminal-conspiracy plan and not the aggressive war charges.266  The 
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Navy Department, with its strong preference for using a traditional military 
commission, abstained from supporting Bernays’ plan.  In January 1945, plans for 
what would become the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the military 
tribunals at Dachau begin to diverge. As planning went forward for an international 
trial of leading Nazis, the Army began developing its own processes for dealing with 
traditional war crimes (as defined by the Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907 and 
Geneva Convention of 1929).  
 
E.  Establishing the American Military Commissions at Dachau 
When it came to developing a blueprint for the American military war crimes 
commissions, the American military, led by the Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) 
staff, had two concerns: first, determining the legal status of German prisoners of war 
and second, developing the infrastructure to arrest, detain, and prosecute identified 
war criminals. The legal status of POWs was decided relatively quickly. Were POWs 
suspected of committing war crimes protected by the Geneva Conventions in respect 
of trial, punishment, and imprisonment?  Did the Articles of War as applied in the 
‘Manual for Courts-Martial, US Army’ (1928) apply to the proceedings before the 
war crimes tribunals?  JAG lawyers concluded that neither set of principles was 
applicable for war criminals.  The Supreme Court of the United States (In re 
Yamashita, 1945) and the United Nations War Crimes Commission reached the same 
conclusion.  
In November 1944, the Secretary of War ordered the Judge Advocate General 
to establish a war crimes office.267  The Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary 
Force (SHAEF) established a Court of Inquiry and army group leaders were instructed 
to report incidents of war crimes committed against Allied military personnel to the 
Court for investigation. In December 1944, the directive was expanded to include 
reporting ‘all war crimes, irrespective of the status or nationality of the victims’.268  In 
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late 1944 and early 1945, SHAEF planned to forward reports of war crimes to 
individual countries. The intention was for each country to investigate and prosecute 
crimes committed against its own nationals. The expectation was that a majority of 
war crimes had been committed ‘for the most part outside Germany’.269  However, 
‘the volume of such reports increased to numbers many times more than was 
anticipated. Consequently, only the more flagrant and heinous cases involving 
American or British military personnel were submitted to the Court of Inquiry for 
investigation’.270   
The American military worked with the other Allies (excluding the USSR) 
through the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC), as discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2. The UNWCC (later centralized under the Central Registry of War 
Criminals and Security Suspects, known as CROWCASS, after its establishment in 
April 1945) drew up ‘Wanted Lists,’ which were made available to all Allied troops, 
and American army commanders were instructed by SHAEF to focus on 
apprehending these criminals.271  The reporting system worked the other way as well; 
army commanders were instructed to fill out wanted reports and send them to 
CROWCASS with a copy to the United States’ military War Crimes Group.  
Suspected war criminals were not to be prosecuted until the end of hostilities in 
Europe. Extradition was similarly halted until the end of the war.272  Although these 
broad directives existed, on the ground in combat zones the war crimes process was 
unformulated and decentralized. As an army report stated in that ‘In combat zones 
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most commands assigned supervisory responsibilities [to report and investigate war 
crimes] to their Judge Advocate sections’ 273  as well as various other sections 
including Inspector Generals,274 the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2,275 or simply to 
undefined individual soldiers’. 276   Apprehension and detention was similarly 
decentralized and ‘no provision was made for the congregation of war criminal 
suspects’.277  Even after the War Department and army commanders had committed to 
investigating war crimes as a mission directive, the army showed hesitation and sent 
out mixed messages to commanders.  The Combined Chiefs of Staff278 and the War 
Department prohibited ‘the segregation of war criminal suspects and directed that 
they be handled in such a manner as to avoid disclosure that they were being held for 
future trials,’279 although suspects (officer and other rank) and ‘unfriendly’ witnesses 
were assigned to specific prisoner of war enclosures –temporary holding camps 
established by the army for German POWs.280 
By the end of 1944 and beginning of 1945, the American military began 
preparing its official investigation of war crimes committed in the European Theatre.  
In November 1944, in anticipation of eventual trials, the War Department amended 
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the ‘Rules of Land Warfare’ to eliminate ‘a provision in paragraph 347 providing that 
members of armed forces will not be punished for war crimes committed under the 
orders or sanction of their government or commanders’. 281   This reduced the 
effectiveness of the ‘Superior Orders’ line of defence to a consideration in mitigating 
punishment, not a defence against guilt in war crimes.  In February 1945, following a 
directive issued by the War Department in December 1944, the United States Army 
established war crimes branches in each army group that reported directly to the 
central Judge Advocate General War Crimes Group in Europe (hereafter ‘War Crimes 
Group’), located in Paris, France, but was under the operational control of the army 
group commanders.  These war crimes groups’ primary function was ‘the 
investigation of alleged war crimes, and the collection of evidence relating thereto, 
including, for transmission to the governments concerned, evidence relating to war 
crimes committed against nations of other United Nations’.282  A similar directive 
went out to Pacific Army commanders.283 These directives helped to establish direct 
communication between JAG’s war crimes branches as well as to attempt to 
centralize the investigation of war crimes.  This process of centralization would 
continue until July 1946 when the war crimes sections became consolidated under the 
responsibility of the Judge Advocate General and the European Theatre Command 
and all tribunals were moved to Dachau.284  To assist with the gathering of evidence 
of war crimes, the War Crimes Group, established an office and the records centre in 
Wiesbaden, Germany to centralize documentation. 
To begin gathering evidence of war crimes, the army commanders were 
instructed to screen and interview all military or civilian personnel ‘arriving at any 
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assembly or staging area in order to identify those in possession of information 
regarding war crimes’.285  This process was implemented to gather intelligence and 
sworn statements in chaotic end-of-war Europe before personnel or civilians left the 
area.  Although the original plans called for the organization of nineteen war crimes 
investigation teams to be in the field with the Twelfth and Sixth Army Group (the 
largest army groups in Europe), only seven were formed by the end of hostilities in 
May 1945.  Twelve additional teams were created in May and June 1945; two of these 
teams were assigned to Austria. 
On 8 July 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the first comprehensive 
directive, based on recommendations from the Judge Advocate General staff, 
outlining the functions of the War Crimes Group for the upcoming international and 
military tribunals.  Along with focusing on ‘the trial of the leaders of the European 
Axis powers by the International Military Tribunal,’ the directive ‘provided for the 
War Crimes Group to supervise the development and trial of cases involving 
American nationals as victims and mass atrocities committed in the US Zones of 
Occupation in Germany and Austria and areas overrun by the United States Armed 
Forces, irrespective of the nationality of the victims’.286  The directive further called 
for the investigation of offences on ‘racial, religious or political grounds, committed 
since 30 January 1933’.287 Although greatly broadening the scope of investigations, 
American tribunals would not prosecute offences occurring before 1941.  The 
tribunals would only try crimes that occurred after 1 January 1942, the date of the 
creation of the United Nations.288 The intention was to hand evidence over to German 
courts that had been invested with special power ‘to try individuals for the crimes in 
question and prescribing a procedure therefore’289 in the Law for the Liberation from 
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National Socialism and Militarism.  Less than two weeks later, a Joint Chiefs’ 
command removed the prohibition of the segregation of war criminal suspects and the 
prosecution of war crimes trials.290 
 
F.  The British Belsen Trial as a Prologue to the Dachau Concentration Trials 
After publicly condemning war crimes throughout the Second World War, the 
United States needed a concrete policy towards German war criminals. Members of 
the government decided any response to German war crimes needed to accomplish 
two primary objectives: (1) punish war criminals to make Germany safe for American 
forces, and (2) transition Germany from the criminal Nazi regime to a new democratic 
government.  After the use of summary executions had been ruled out in favour of a 
judicial response, the unprecedented scale of German war crimes ignited debate and 
disagreement between proponents of indicting Germans on the charges of criminal-
conspiracy and proponents of prosecuting offenders using traditional military 
commissions and the laws of war.  Using a plan written by Lt. Coronel Murray C 
Bernays, Secretary Stimson won the support of the President for large-scale trials in 
Germany. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the Subsequent 
Nuremberg Trials, and the Dachau concentration camp trials were the result of these 
plans. The procedure and form of the Dachau trials would be a mixture of both the 
criminal-conspiracy charge and the laws of war before a military commission. 
Although originally intended to be a completely separate legal process from the IMT 
and Nuremberg trials, based wholly on traditional military law, the lead prosecutor at 
Dachau, Lt. Col. William Densen, incorporated the criminal-conspiracy idea into the 
charges. 
What really put pressure on the Americans to begin the Dachau tribunals was 
the British trial at Belsen, which began on 17 September 1945 in Lüneberg at a British 
military court.291  The British were the first of the Western Allies to try the staff of a 
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concentration camp.292  Despite being planned separately, the First Belsen Trial (The 
Trial of Josef Kramer and forty-four others) and the Dachau concentration camp trials 
would have many things in common.  The Dachau and Belsen courts were both 
military tribunals; the Belsen court consisted of five members of the British military; 
there were two members on the prosecution team while the defence consisted of 
thirteen members of the armed forces (Twelve British; one Polish Lieutenant for the 
six Polish defendants – all prisoner-functionaries), each representing two to four 
defendants. A member of the Judge Advocate, a barrister, was also an official court 
member. All the accused were charged with committing war crimes against Allied 
nationals at Bergen-Belsen.  The charge was long, and took great care to name 
specific Allied victims along with unknown Allied victims, including British, 
Hunagairn, Polish, French, Italian, and Dutch nationals.293 Note that no German 
nationals were listed as victims. Thirteen of the defendants were also charged with 
‘violations of the laws and usages of war’ committed at Auschwitz Concentration 
Camp, Poland, again naming both particular Allied victims and unknown Allied 
nationals.   
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Of the forty-five defendants arraigned in the First Belsen trial, eleven were 
sentenced to death by hanging; nineteen to prison; and fourteen were acquitted. Like 
the Dachau courts, no opinions were written or released from the judges regarding 
how or why they came to their decision. Those defendants acquitted must have been 
found not guilty of either individual brutality or responsibility of the conditions of the 
camp. Those given lighter sentences must have been found innocent of personal 
killing but guilty to some extent of the state of the camp. 
The numerous similarities between the First Belsen trial and the Dachau 
‘parent trial’ are striking.  First, only crimes against Allied national victims were tried.  
The defence counsel Colonel Herbert Smith used the nationality of the victims as a 
defence, alleging that the crimes had been committed against Hungarians and Italians 
and they were not Allied nationals. He also argued that Poles and Czechs had in fact 
become Germans as a result of German annexation of their territory and, if so, 
Germans could not commit war crimes against other Germans.294 The prosecution 
counsel responded by quoting Article 46 of the Hague Convention, ‘which guaranteed 
respect for the lives of the inhabitants of occupied countries’.295 This was another 
similarity between the Dachau and Belsen trials: using The Hague and Geneva 
conventions to charge the accused with crimes against the laws and usages of war.296 
The defence argued that ‘war crimes, being violations of the recognized rules 
of warfare, could only be committed by members of the armed forces’.297 The 
prosecution responded by stating that ‘members of the SS considered themselves to be 
members of the armed forces and the problem created by the use of the words “armed 
forces” was that when the Hague Convention was written, no-one had anticipated a 
force such as the SS’.298 The prosecution also referred to the Treaty of Versailles in 
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which, ‘the German government had recognized the right of Allied nations to try 
individuals for war crimes rather than simply hold the belligerent state responsible’.299 
Just as the defence counsel at the Dachau trial would two months later, the 
defence team at the First Belsen trial protested the lack of specificities of charges for 
each of the accused as well as the format of a mass trial.  The defence protested that 
the Belsen and Auschwitz charges should be separated into different trials because 
they had no relation to one another, besides both being concentration camps 
administered by the Germans. The prosecution responded that it would try the 
defendants for:  
…A joint and collective offence by a group of people. Individual atrocities 
committed by individual persons were put forward to show that they were 
taking part in and acquiescing in the system which a group were carrying on. 
They were a unit acting in common, under a commanding officer, Kramer, 
who was the Commandant of that camp.300   
Although the British prosecutors did not spend any significant time during the trial 
developing the argument of ‘a joint and collective offence’ or the defendants acting as 
‘a unit acting in common’, this comment by the British prosecutor revealed striking 
similarity to the American prosecutor’s central charge of ‘common design’.  The idea 
of a criminal Nazi conspiracy, for example to start an aggressive war, was used at 
Nuremberg and developed during discussions in London in the summer of 1945.  At 
the Belsen trial, the conditions of the camp were discussed, but the focus of the 
prosecutors case was on individual murder and mistreatment of Allied civilians, not a 
common conspiracy at the camps. 
Although the trial only lasted 54 days, like the Dachau trial, speed was a major 
concern.  By the time the prosecution case came to a close in 6 October 1945, 
concerns about the slow pace of the trial were reported in the press. On 1 October, 
The Times of London observed: 
International observers, and certainly the Germans themselves, are no doubt 
impressed by the pains taken by the Court to extend all the privileges of 
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British justice to the accused, who in other circumstances might have been 
dealt with more summarily; but with a whole series of war criminal trials now 
pending…the Belsen case is probably also being watched for the possibility of 
reducing procedure to a less redundant form.301  
The constant pressure to speed up the trial programme would trouble the British and 
American trial programme. 
Just as their American colleagues would, the defence counsel entered the plea 
of superior orders. The defence further claimed that the accused were following 
municipal law, which was superior to international law.  Because the concentration 
camps were legal in Germany, the accused had not broken the law. The accused ‘had 
to obey German law before International Law’.302 The prosecution responded that 
‘many accused had said it was forbidden to ill-treat prisoners and they had acted 
against orders’.303 Like the Americans, the court would reject superior orders as a 
legitimate defence, although considered it a mitigating circumstance when handing 
out sentences.  
As we shall see in the next chapter, the Dachau trials would have many 
similarities to the British Belsen trial. The question of procedure and form, as well as 
issues that arose for the British at the First Belsen trial would plague the American’s 
Dachau concentration camp trials as well. The major difference between the two trials 
would be American concentration camp trials’ incorporation of the criminal-
conspiracy idea into the charges. 
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Chapter 3: The Military Tribunal Programme at Dachau and the Concentration 
Camp Trials: American Precedents and Overview 
In September 1945, the staff of the Judge Advocate General at the 
Headquarters of the Third Army received an inquiry from USFE (United States 
Forces, Europe) enquiring as to why no war crimes trials for concentration camp 
personnel had been held in the Third Army area. 304   In the former Dachau 
concentration camp, now the United States Army’s primary prison for those suspected 
of war crimes, at least 32,000 camp administrators and workers were awaiting their 
fate.305  The British Army had already begun to prosecute personnel from the Bergen-
Belsen camp in their military court at Luneburg on 17 August 1945.306  Lt. Col. 
William Denson, a member of the staff of JAG Third Army, reported that 
‘immediately wheels started turning and we were ordered to get a concentration camp 
case prepared and presented by the beginning of December’307 at the latest. 
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Figure 1. U.S. Army occupation zones, 1945. Source: United States Third Army, 
Mission Accomplished; Third United States Army occupation of Germany, 9 May 
1945-15 Feb. 1947 (Engr. Repro. Plant, 1947), 22.  
 
On 2 November 1945, the prosecution team, headed by Lt. Col. William 
Denson, chose forty defendants to represent the Dachau concentration camp system 
for the first American concentration camp trial before a military tribunal.  The 
accused, who were being held prisoner along with 30,000 other internees308 in the 
former prison barracks at the Dachau camp, included the following: nine camp 
commandants or deputy commandants, twenty-three non-commissioned officers, four 
labour officers or their deputies, five medical officers, two medical orderlies, three 
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administrative staff, four Blockfuhrers,309 one head of a political department and one 
adjutant, one officer of the guards, one officer in charge of supplies, three guards from 
prisoner transports, and three prisoner functionaries (Funktionshäftling, or more 
commonly known as, kapos).310  The men were chosen by the prosecution team to 
represent both the administrative aspects of the camp as well as its functional 
aspects.311  The men were told that they would stand trial and were informed of their 
rights as accused.  
Two days later, on 4 November 1945, the formal charges were delivered and 
read to the defendants in English and German by Lt. Col. Denson. The gathered men, 
‘were ignorant of the purpose for which they had been summoned and apprehension 
was visible in every expression until the Army translator gave them the context of 
Colonel Denson’s statement’.312  The first charge was that the accused had: 
Acted in pursuance of a ‘common design’ to commit acts hereinafter alleged 
and as members of the staff of the Dachau Concentration Camp, and camps 
subsidiary thereto, did at or in the vicinity of Dachau and Landsberg, 
Germany, between about 1 January, 1942, and 29 April, 1945, wilfully, 
deliberately and wrongfully aid, abet and participate in the subjection of 
civilian nationals of nations then at war with the German Reich, to cruelties 
and mistreatments including killings, beatings and tortures, starvation, abuses 
and indignities, the exact names and numbers of such victims being unknown 
but aggregating many thousands.   
The second charge was the same except directed towards victims who were ‘captured 
members of the armed forces of nations then at war with the German Reich’.313  
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General Truscott, who had succeeded General Patton as the Commanding General of 
the Third Army, called the prosecution team together for a lecture before the Dachau 
‘parent trial’ began.  As Denson remembered, ‘The lecture was about the importance 
of being fair…I had just finished preparing a case with the most mind-boggling 
evidence of the most brutal mistreatment by some human beings against others. Of 
course I would be fair, I thought. But I would also do whatever I had to do to lawfully 
get convictions’.314 Thus began the American concentration camp trials. 
The American military held trials at the former concentration camp at Dachau 
from the autumn of 1945 through the winter of 1947.  The camp had undergone a 
change since its liberation on 29 April 1945. The camp was left relatively untouched 
for a week so that visitors (Allied military brass, newsmen and women, members of 
US congress, and local German residents forced to tour the camp) could see the 
atrocities of the site for themselves.  On 7 May, clean up of the camp began with local 
townspeople and captured SS guards forced to bury the 2400 corpses found at the 
camp at liberation, as well as clean the camp of garbage.  The surviving inmates, over 
31,000 of them, were given medical treatment, and the process of relieving the 
overcrowding of the camp through repatriation, if possible, began for those well 
enough to travel.315 An International Information Office was set up in early June 
‘upon orders of the US Military Government by the city of Dachau’ in order to care 
for the needs of the liberated inmates.316 By the end of June, the former ‘protective 
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custody compound’ housed ‘about 1000 German POWs who were being used “on an 
extensive programme of cleaning up the premises”’.317  
By the beginning of July 1945, the Dachau complex was ‘officially 
transformed into a “War Crimes Enclosure” with a capacity of 30,000 prisoners.’ As 
Marcuse reported, ‘Thus…it was converted from a makeshift camp for survivors who 
could not be repatriated (so-called “displaced persons”) into an internment camp for 
Germans active at higher levels of the SS, Nazi Party, and army’.318 Different parts of 
the camp were used for different categories of prisoners. The largest, the former 
‘protective custody’ camp,  became the so-called ‘SS Compound’ and housed mainly 
former concentration camp guards and members of the Waffen-SS.  
 
 
Photo 4. American troops guard a prison for former SS troops on the site of the 
Dachau concentration camp. Courtesy of the USHMM Photo Archives. 
 
The ‘SS Compound’ was divided into subsections – the Freilager and the 
Sonderlager—the latter ‘was reserved for persons suspected of committing 
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particularly heinous crimes’.319  JAG requisitioned a large former prisoner service 
building within the former ‘protective custody’ camp to be used as the courtrooms for 
the Dachau tribunal programme. 
The entire Dachau tribunal programme can be separated into four categories, 
based on differences in defendants and approach to traditional military law: (1) trials 
against German civilians and soldiers who had shot downed American pilots, (2) SS 
soldiers who participated in the Malmédy Massacre, (3) personnel from the Hadamar 
euthanasia centre, and (4) trials of former concentration camp personnel.  While 
providing a brief exploration of the other sets of trials, the focus of this chapter is this 
last category – the trials of the men (and a few women) from the ranks of the camp 
personnel at Dachau, Mauthausen, Flossenbürg, Buchenwald, and Dora-Mittelbau. 
This category consisted of 240 trials and involved 1,045 defendants.320   
For the concentration camps trials at Dachau, the American military lawyers 
chose to frame their prosecution of Nazi criminals primarily in the tradition of 
international warfare law, not based on the new ideas in criminal law - such as the 
notion of ‘crimes against humanity’ developed for the International Military Tribunal 
(known popularly as The Nuremberg Trial) and Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
(known as the Subsequent Trials). The goals of the American war crimes trial 
programme at Dachau, as well as at Nuremberg, were conflicted and added 
complications to the prosecution of the accused. The United States government 
wished to fulfil its wartime promises to punish the perpetrators of war crimes.  Trials 
were to serve as an appropriate reaction to the discovery of particularly gross war 
crimes, including the treatment of inmates at the concentration camps.  Thorough and 
fair trials were thought to educate the German population about the criminality of the 
Nazi regime, while functioning as an example of the fairness of democracy. Trials 
would serve to discourage future war criminals by setting a legal precedent of 
American reaction.  Furthermore, any trial programme should reinforce the stability 
of the American occupation of Germany (and not interfere with the decisions of the 
US army commanders). Eventually, in their closing years, the trials were to assist, or 
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at least not deter, the economic and political unification of Germany by quickly 
processing the criminals of the old regime so Germany could be ‘cleansed’ and retake 
its place among the (American-allied) nations in Europe. The Dachau Trials, and 
specifically the concentration camp trials, were to be swift and efficient punishment 
of war crimes and, more broadly, demonstrate the effective use of transitional justice 
to end the Nazi culture of impunity and re-establishing the rule of law by holding 
perpetrators accountable to traditional internationally recognized ‘usages of war’.  
The Nazi concentration camp system required particular attention, as they were the 
sites of grievous crimes.  
Although held at a major concentration camp site, the trials mostly skirted 
discussing victims of Nazi racial policies and concentrated instead on crimes against 
victims who could be categorized as POWs under established international criminal 
law (i.e. Hague and Geneva Conventions). It was not just law that stood in the way of 
recognizing the particular mistreatment of Jews. Even years later, Denson believed 
the Jews in the camps had been treated ‘not worse than the others’.321  He continued 
to emphasize the international character of the prisoners.  He believed the 
mistreatment of Jews was due to individual kapos’ hatred that could easily have been 
directed against another nationality or racial group.  
If you had one kapo that didn’t like Jews if there were any Jews in that detail 
then they got Hell, If you had a kapo that didn’t like Czechs and he had 
Czechs in that detail they didn’t have to be Jewish at all they could be just as 
Aryan as Czechs could ever be and they were always mistreated in the same 
way. So it depended on who it was that was the kapo rather then there being 
an organized plan to set the Jews apart as objects of persecution.322  
This misrecognition of the particular suffering of Jewish victims, although common 
during the first decades after the war, was an unfortunate trait throughout all the 
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an examination of the Holocaust to be at the centre of the Dachau trials - what is now 
a central memory of the 20th century; the Holocaust was not given the prominence it 
gained later on and, furthermore, it lacked the cultural power it would accrue over 
time in the post-Eichmann era.324 
 
A.  The Military Tribunal Programme at Dachau, 1945-1947 
About 25,000-30,000 men were held on automatic arrest at Dachau by the 
autumn of 1945. Security concerns focused above all on the anticipated armed 
resistance of underground organizations and on neutralization of the ability of Nazi 
leaders to organize popular support against the occupiers.  General Eisenhower’s staff 
prepared a Handbook for the Military Government in Germany, which included 
categories encompassed in the automatic arrest of individuals who, because of the 
level of their stature in the Nazi party organizations, were felt to be certain security 
risks. Mandatory automatic arrest also applied to all members of certain security and 
police formations such as the Gestapo, SD, SA, and SS. In all, approximately 250,000 
individuals fell into these categories. Automatic arrest, and ensuing internment 
without trial, was practised by all the occupying Allied powers. In addition to 
automatic arrest, the Allies were actively seeking individual war crimes suspects, who 
were also arrested upon identification as potential defendants for trials of major war 
criminals (what became the International Military Trial at Nuremberg). Their arrest, 
of course, was predicated upon suspicion of individual responsibility for particular 
war crimes rather than, as was the case with automatic arrest and internment, their 
status and affiliation within certain specified organizations. This entire process of 
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weeding out of Nazi sympathizers from German life became known as the policy of 
‘denazification’ (Entnazifizierung).325 
A directive issued on 7 July 1945 created the first manifestation of 
denazification policy in the American zone of occupation. It provided for the 
automatic dismissal of a wide range of individuals from their jobs. This included all 
members of the Nazi party who had joined before 1 May 1937 and all functionaries of 
the Nazi party and its associated functions as well as ‘all SS men and officers of the 
Waffen-SS; in addition, all senior government and administrative personnel, together 
with prominent military and business persons if they actively participated in the 
regime, were to be removed’.326 Only non- or nominal Nazis were allowed to work to 
senior positions. As a result, hundreds of thousands of former Nazi party members 
lost the right to most forms of employment besides manual labour. 
The American denazification policy was widely criticised within Germany 
from the beginning of its implementation in the summer of 1945. Both ex-Nazis and 
anti-Nazis held, as Neil Gregor recounted: 
…the widespread conviction that party membership in itself was not a 
watertight criterion for judging guilt: both former party members and 
opponents pointed to the fact that many figures in elite circles in particular had 
been active in sustaining the regime in power or facilitating its criminal acts. 
For ex-party members, this reinforced the self-pitying belief that 
denazification was focusing excessively on the “little man”, rather than on the 
regime’s more powerful backers.327  
In response to this criticism, in order to target the elite members of society who had 
supported the Third Reich, the military government introduced Law No. 8 on 29 
September 1945. The law aimed at intensifying the denazification of the economy. 
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Law No. 8 forbade party members from managerial and supervisory roles, placed 
companies owned by former Nazi members in the hands of trustees, and threatened 
sanctions and closures of companies that employed party members.328  
The American occupation forces introduced a new denazification law for their 
zone in March 1946 called ‘The Law for the Liberation from National Socialism and 
Militarism’. The ‘Liberation Law’ (Befreiungsgesetz), as it was known, was processed 
through German political organs and presented as originating from the Germans’ 
themselves. The aim of the law was stated thusly: 
To liberate out people from National Socialism and Militarism, and to secure a 
lasting base for German democratic national life in peace with the world, all 
those who have actively supported the National Socialist tyranny, or are guilty 
of having violated the principles of justice and humanity, or of having 
selfishly exploited the conditions thus created, shall be excluded from 
influence in public, economic, and cultural life and shall be bound to make 
reparations.329  
According to the law, every adult had to fill out a questionnaire about his or her 
employment, income, and membership in Nazi organizations. Those found to be party 
members:  
…Were barred from all but menial labour pending their appearance before a 
tribunal. Officials allocated them into one of five categories: (I) Main Guilty 
Party, (II) Guilty/Incriminated, (III) Moderately Guilty/Incriminated, (IV) 
Fellow Traveller, (V) Not Incriminated. These assessments formed the basis 
for the tribunal hearings, usually conducted by local representatives of the 
main political parties, appointed by the Ministry for Special Tasks, which 
oversaw denazification.330  
The tribunal either confirmed or altered the classification and gave out punishments. 
Most were classified as ‘Fellow Travellers,’ given a small fine and, with that, 
rehabilitated into society. 
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Although the denazification programme and the Dachau trials were operating 
at the same time, the difference between the Dachau trials programme and the 
denazification programme is captured in the statement of objectives in Control 
Council Law No. 38, issued in October 1946, which provided concrete and regular 
form to the denazification process. It stated: 
The object of this paper is to establish a common policy for Germany 
covering: 
(a) The punishment of war criminals, Nazis, Militarists, and industrialists who 
encouraged and supported the Nazi Regime. 
(b) The complete and lasting destruction of Nazism and Militarism by 
imprisoning and restricting the activities of important participants or adherents 
to these creeds. 
(c) The internment of Germans, who, though not guilty of specific crimes are 
considered to be dangerous to Allied purposes, and the control and 
surveillance of others considered potentially so dangerous.331 
Internment was thus conceptualized as a preventative security measure rather than as 
punishment, but the conditions in many camps, particularly through the winter of 
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The numbers of those interned in the occupied zones of Germany as of January 1, 
1947, were as follows: 
 American Zone British Zone Soviet Zone French Zone 
Interned 51,006 34,500 59,965 10,923 
Released 44,244 34,000 7,214 8,040 
Total 95,250 68,500 67,179 18,963 
Table 1. The numbers of those interned in the occupied zones of Germany as of 
January 1, 1947.  Source: Jon Elster (ed.), Retribution and Reparation in the 
Transition to Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 70. 
 
With the exception of the ‘major’ war criminals (Goering etc.), those POWs 
suspected of committing war crimes were sent to the former Dachau concentration 
camp. A questionnaire, written by a Lieutenant Paul Guth, was given to every person 
interned at Dachau.  He was a ‘very astute, able young man,’ as Denson recalled, ‘and 
the questions that were asked were formulated by Paul Guth and were very adroitly 
done, and I think on a number of occasions we were able to pluck up from the 
answers and responses that were given in this questionnaire those who had been 
detained as automatic arrestees who also actually were war criminals’.332  In general, 
the POWs answered the questionnaires truthfully because of the fear of denunciation 
from others in their own questionnaires or revelations from captured records. Slowly, 
a distinction was made between the 1500-1800 suspected war criminals (most of 
whom admitted in their questionnaires to committing crimes or had been accused as 
such in others’ answers  – this is how a majority of war criminals tried at Dachau 
came to the attention of the Americans) and automatic arrestees. These men were 
separated from one another.333  
The courts of the Dachau tribunals would only try crimes that occurred after 1 
January 1942, the date of the creation of the United Nations (the formal name of the 
Allies).334  The entire Dachau trial programme included trials against members of the 
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German army or German civilians who had shot downed American airmen (and one 
curiously-misplaced case of American POWs at a subcamp of Buchenwald called 
Berga who were used as slave labourors), the trial of the Waffen-SS men accused of 
shooting American POWs during the ‘Malmédy Massacre’ and the trial against the 
staff of the Hadamar euthanasia centre (held at Wiesbaden, Germany), and - the focus 
of this study - trials against personnel from the main camps of Dachau, Buchenwald, 
Flossenbürg, Mauthausen, and Dora-Mittelbau, as well as their subsidiary camps.  
All of the American trials relied on The Hague (1907) and Geneva 
Conventions (1929) for precedent and legality. However, the trials grew increasingly 
complicated in their approach to law as prosecutors confronted larger Nazi crimes. 
The ‘Fliers Cases’ required a relatively straightforward interpretation of the traditional 
legal provisions against mistreatment of POWs as established by international law as 
early as 1899 (the First Hague Convention).  The legal issues in the Malmédy 
Massacre case were similar to the Fliers cases, although concerns were raised during 
the trial as to whether soldiers would be acquitted by using ‘superior orders’ as a 
defence. The Hadamar ‘Murder Factory’ Trial was more complicated: in order to stay 
within established international law, the accused could only be tried for crimes against 
Allied victims—with the consequence that thousands of German civilian victims were 
ignored during the American prosecution of this case. The concentration camp trials 
had the most complicated relationship with traditional international law: the 
nationalities of the victims was problematic as well as connecting each individual 
defendant to the crimes committed in the camp—particular if the defendant, although 
helping to run the camp, did not personally kill or injure any inmates. Legal 
innovation was required to prosecute concentration camp personnel effectively. 
 
B.  Downed Allied Airmen, the Berga Trial (U.S. vs. Erwin Metz, et al.), the 
Hadamar Trial (Trial of Alfons Klein and Six Others), and the Malmédy Trial 
(U.S. vs. Valentin Bersin, et al.) 
 
1. Downed Allied Airmen: The ‘Fliers’ Cases’, 1945-1947 
The ‘Fliers’ Cases’ made up the bulk of the trials held by the American armed 
forces in Europe. Throughout the American participation in the air war in Europe, 
there were widespread reports of the illegal killing of surrendered American airmen 
by shooting and beating ‘at isolated and remote points, by planned and instigated 
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mobs in populated areas, and by participants in the execution of widespread “common 
designs” to kill such airmen’.335  The first trials held by the American military of 
German (and Austrian) civilians began as early as June 1945.  These cases had the 
oldest and clearest international legal basis of the American trials. The laws of war as 
stated in The Hague and Geneva Conventions specifically outlaw the killing of 
surrendered soldiers. The Hague Convention of 1899 stated, ‘Prisoners of war are in 
the power of the hostile Government, but not in that of the individuals or corps who 
captured them. They must be humanely treated’.336  The Geneva Convention of 1929 
specifically stated, ‘They [POWs] shall at all times be humanely treated and 
protected, particularly against acts of violence, from insults and from public curiosity. 
Measures of reprisal against them are forbidden’.337 
 
The most famous Fliers’ Case was the Rüsselheim Case (United States v. 
Hartgen, et al.), which involved the killing of six American airmen by a mob of 
townspeople at Rüsselheim.338  On 24 August 1944 a B-24 Liberator aircraft was shot 
down. Nine crew members bailed out of their damaged bomber and made it safely to 
the ground.  All men were captured and brought together; although one, who had 
stomach shrapnel wound, was separated out for medical treatment and eventually sent 
to a POW camp.  The eight other airmen were being transported to an interrogation 
centre in southern Germany by train on 26 August, when they were forced to 
disembark in the town of Rüsselheim because of rail damage.  The damage had been 
caused by an RAF air raid the night before on the Opel manufacturing plant in 
Rüsselheim.  During that raid, 198 people had been killed (21 Germans and the rest 
forced labourers who were not able to go into the town’s air raid shelters) and around 
90% of the town had been damaged by this raid and others.  Three Luftwaffe guards, 
unfamiliar with the town, escorted the 8 airmen through the town.  During this 
transfer, townspeople watching the men began to form a mob instigated by two 
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sisters, and pelted the airmen with bricks, and eventually, beat them with sticks.  All 
eight airmen were beaten severely and eventually dumped into a wooden wagon and 
taken to the town cemetery.  A later report read, ‘Two of the victims of the mob 
action, although thought to be dead, through an act of Providence escaped from a 
wagon loaded with ostensibly dead bodies during a second air raid alert, scaled the 
cemetery wall and survived to tell the story’.  They were captured four days later and 
survived the war in POW camps.  The other six men were buried in the town 
cemetery. 
The War Crimes Branch brought 11 townspeople to trial, held in Darmstadt, 
Germany, in July 1945 under charges that they had violated the Geneva Convention 
of 1929.  The two primary prosecutors for the case were Col. Leon Jaworski (later 
famous as the Watergate prosecutor) and Luke Rogers.  American officers and several 
German civil attorneys represented the German townspeople.  Jaworksi wrote that this 
was the first trial after the war that used the Geneva Convention.  (Technically, it was 
the first trial prosecuted after combat ended in Europe, but there were six military 
commissions that held investigations and charged defendants prior to Rüsselheim.  
Two involved the lynching of fliers by German citizens.) The prosecutors sought the 
death penalty for all 11 defendants whom pleaded ‘not guilty’.  Verdicts of the 
defendants as follows: 5 men were sentenced to hang, 1 man was sentenced to 25 
years (he was paroled in February 1954), 2 were sentenced to 15 years (both were 
paroled in December 1953), and 1 not guilty.  Two women (named Witzler and 
Reinhart) were found guilty and sentenced to hang, but upon review their sentences 
were changed to life imprisonment. They were paroled in December of 1953.  In 
1947, another man, named Stolz, who administered additional death blows to the 
fliers at the cemetery was also tried, convicted and hanged in 1948. One of the 
Luftwaffe guards, named Umstatter, was also found after the war and tried, convicted 
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Table 2. Characteristics of the Fliers’ trials 
 
The peak of the Fliers’ trials occurred in late 1946 and early 1947. In total 582 
defendants were tried in 202 separate trials. The most common sentence presented 
was a death sentence, which was given for 187 defendants out of 582 in total (32%).  
In general there was suggestion of a bimodal distribution focused on the extremes of 
sentencing as 269/582 (46%) were given sentences of death or life imprisonment 
while 246/582 (43%) were either given sentences of less than 10 years or were 
acquitted.  
 
2. The Berga Trial (U.S. vs. Erwin Metz, et al.) 3 September – 15 October 
1946 
During the successful beginning of the German counter offensive in the 
Ardennes Forest in December 1944 (the ‘Battle of the Bulge’), thousands of 
American POWs were captured. Around 2,000 were interned at Stalag IX-B, a POW 




themselves at roll call. Anywhere from 80-130 did and were separated from their 
comrades and placed in a segregated barracks. 339  On 9 February 1945, these 
American-Jewish soldiers, long with at least 200 more American POWs chosen 
because they looked Jewish or were ‘troublemakers’, were shipped to Berga, a 
subcamp of Buchenwald.   The journey was horrendous as the men travelled packed 
into boxcars without food or water for four days.  Once at Berga, the POW joined 
inmates from Buchenwald digging tunnels for an underground munitions factory.  The 
Americans were housed in a separate barracks from the other prisoners, but treated 
with the same brutality as the others.  Disease, hunger, thirst, and beatings caused the 
American POWs to grow sick and die. By April 1945, twenty-five men had died and 
twenty-five others were hospitalised. Twenty others had escaped.340  
With the American army approaching the camp, the remaining 280 of the 
original 350 American POWs, were forced, along with other inmates, on a death 
march from 3 April-23 April towards nowhere in particular.341 The inmates left 
behind at Berga were liberated by 90th Infantry Division on 20 April 1945. The 11th 
Armoured Division liberated the men on the death march three days later near the 
town of Cham. 342  The men liberated were incredibly sick and weighed 36-40 
kilograms. 
Upon liberation and through the trial that followed (US vs. Erwin Metz, et al.), 
Berga’s purpose, and the crimes committed there against American POWs, was 
immediately obfuscated. Whether a mistake on the part of war crimes investigators 
(although this hard to believe as surviving American soldiers could have testified 
differently) or a deliberate cover-up of the fact that American POWs were used as 
slave labourers. Before their return to the States each soldier had to sign a ‘Security 
Certificate for Ex-Prisoners of War,’ stating that, in order to protect ‘”the interests of 
American prisoners of war in Japanese camps” and any future wars, they would never 
“reveal, discuss, publish or otherwise disclose to unauthorized persons information on 
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escape from enemy prison camps” and that “the authorship of stories or articles on 
these subjects is specifically forbidden.”’343 The survivors interpreted this a signal that 
their government did not want them to ever talk about Berga.344 
Two men were brought to trial, from 3 September – 15 October 1946, over the 
crimes against the America POWs at Berga:  Erwin Metz, a non-commissioned 
officer of the Volkssturm and particularly cruel man, who was in charge of the 
American work detail, and his superior, Hauptmann Ludwig Merz.345  The trial took 
place before the Dachau military commission courts, but was part of the POW (or 
‘Downed Fliers’) cases, not the Buchenwald cases.   This meant the ‘common design’ 
charge was not used and the two men were charged with specific ‘violations of the 
laws of war’: Metz was charged with killing an ‘unknown member of the US Army’ 
(Charge I) and assaulting others (Charge II). Both Metz and Merz were charged with 
mistreating unknown members of the United States Army ‘by failing to provide 
adequate food, adequate drinking water, adequate medical care, adequate clothing, 
and adequate housing and sanitary facilities, said failure resulting in the death of 
several unknown members of the United States Army’ (Charge III)346. 
In the trial (and Army review), although correctly identifying Berga as a ‘work 
camp’, Berga was misinterpreted as a sub-camp of the prisoner of war camp Stalag 
IX-B – not Buchenwald.  At the trial, no mention of Buchenwald inmates working 
alongside the Americans was made.  The former American POWs themselves, were 
not invited to testify in court.  Though dozens of survivors were willing to testify, 
‘none was called in person to the Dachau trial, and only 12 of the prisoners’ written 
testimonies were used to supplement the information gathered on Berga by the U.S. 
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War Crimes Investigating Team’.347 Roger Cohen correctly noted that within the trial, 
‘the prosecution drew little attention to the ample evidence that the Nazis chose the 
POWs to labour and die at Berga specifically because they were Jewish or otherwise 
“undesirable”.’348 
Both Metz and Merz were sentenced to death by hanging and their sentences 
were  upheld under initial review in September 1947. However, by June 1948, the 
Civil Affairs Division of the War Crimes Branch approved the commuting of Metz’s 
sentence to life imprisonment and Merz’s to five years. By 1955, both men were 
paroled.349 
 
3. Hadamar (Trial of Alfons Klein and Six Others), October 8–15, 1945 
The so-called ‘Hadamar Murder Factory’ trial (Trial of Alfons Klein and Six 
Others) ran from 8 – 15 October 1945.  It helped lay the foundation for the mass-
atrocity trials held at Dachau.  As one scholar wrote, ‘The Hadamar case introduced 
the novel concept of a common intent to commit war crimes. The success of this 
prototypical approach persuaded Dachau prosecutors to build future concentration 
camp cases on a similar model’.350  Furthermore, the prosecutors did not attempt to 
charge the Germans with the deaths of fellow Germans (in excess of 15,000 people)—
the lawyers focused on crimes against the Allied nationals, Russian and Polish forced 
labourers (approximately 476 people).351  This kept the military trial within the 
confines of established international law.  Furthermore, the Hadamar case established 
‘the jurisdiction of American commission courts over crimes committed against 
stateless victims’ and ‘affirmed the right of American military courts to try 
civilians’.352 
Located near Limburg on the Lahn in west central German, the Hadamar 
euthanasia centre, active as part of the T4 Euthanasia Programme from 1941 – 1945, 
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was discovered by American troops in late March 1945.353  The United States military 
was unsure whether international law permitted a trial of the Hadamar staff as, 
‘international law restricted them to prosecute crimes committed against their own 
service personnel and civilian nationals, and those of their allies, in the territories that 
they held’.354 The prosecution, headed by Col. Leon Jaworski, whom also headed the 
prosecution for the Rüsselsheim Case, ‘initially hoped to try staff members for the 
murders of some 15,000 German mental patients killed at Hadamar but could not, 
since military commissions of the occupying armed forces were empowered solely to 
try cases involving crimes against Allied nationals under international law’.355 
However, at least 476 Polish and Russian labourers had been killed by lethal injection 
at the centre between 5/6 June 1944 and 13 March 1945 and this allowed the 
American to begin prosecutions. The accused were charged with ‘violations of 
international law’. The wording of the charge bore similarity to the charge used in the 
concentration camp cases at Dachau in the following years, specifically the reuse of 
the phrase ‘deliberately and wrongfully, aid, abet, and participate ‘ in the crime.356  
The accused were not members of the German army, ‘but personnel of a 
civilian institution. The decision of the Military Commission [was], therefore, an 
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application of the rule that the provisions of the laws and customs of war are 
addressed not only to combatants but also to civilians, and that civilians, by 
committing illegal acts against nationals of the opponent, may become guilty of war 
crimes’.357  This was controversial, because in common practice, an occupying power 
can try offences against civilians by military commission only if the offence was 
against their own forces and occurred during the occupation (not before).  None of 
Hadamar’s victims was American and all the offences had happened before American 
occupation of the region.  Indeed, during the trial, the defence counsel Lt. Col. Juan 
Sedillo argued that the military commission did not have jurisdiction over the 
accused.  Col. Jarwarski argued that because the Soviet and Polish workers were in 
Germany as part of the German war effort, ‘the murder of those deported aliens 
represented a war crime;’358 a view upheld by the court.   
The defence pleas of ‘superior orders, of alleged legality under German Law, 
and of coercion and necessity were held not to free the accused from 
responsibility’.359 The head of the prosecution, Col. Jaworski used a similar strategy 
to that which he first used in the Rüsselshiem trial, stressing that ‘each of the 
defendants had played an integral role in the killing process’.360 Furthermore, he 
emphasised the ‘assembly line’ nature of the Hadamar institution in killing its 
inmates.  In order to avoid discussion of Hitler’s authorization of the murder of 
thousands of German mental patients at Hadamar–‘which might be construed as a 
state directive’361 and thus used by the defence council as proof that the accused acted 
within the law, Col. Jaworski sought to prove that the Soviet and Polish workers did 
not suffer from mental illness or incurable tuberculosis.  
After a seven-day trial, the military commission sentenced Hadamar chief 
administrator Alfons Klein, and two male nurses, Heinrich Ruoff and Karl Willig, to 
death by hanging. Chief physician Adolf Wahlmann received a life sentence, which 
was eventually commuted due to his old age. Two Hadamar administrative staff 
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received sentences of 35 and 30 years, respectively. Irmgard Huber, the only female 
defendant, received 25 years imprisonment.  




Photo 5. Former U.S. Army sergeant Kenneth Ahrens demonstrates how he 
surrendered to SS soldiers, during his testimony at the trial of 74 SS men charged with 
perpetrating the Malmédy atrocity. Courtesy of the USHMM Photo Archives. 
 
The trial of the Waffen-SS soldiers responsible for the ‘Malmédy Massacre’ 
was held from 12 May to 16 July 1946 at the Dachau concentration camp.362  The 
soldiers of the First SS Panzer Regiment were charged with twelve different incidents 
of massacring approximately 350 American soldiers and 100 Belgium civilians 
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throughout Belgium.363  The worst incident, which became known as the ‘Malmédy 
Massacre,’ took place on 17 December 1944. Members of the Sixth Panzer Army, 
First SS Panzer Regiment, led by SS Colonel Joachim Peiper, shot 86 disarmed 
American soldiers who had surrendered on the second day of the German Ardennes 
offensive, the so-called ‘Battle of the Bulge’.   Defendants in the trial included the 
commander of the Sixth Panzer Army, General Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich, commander of 
Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler, and Col. Joachim Peiper, the commanding officer of 
the armoured battle group ‘Kampfgrüppe Peiper,’ which led the German Ardennes 
offensive. The trial was one of the most publicized of the Dachau trial programme. 
Like the Dachau concentration camp trials, an eight-man court sat in judgment 
(following a two-thirds majority rules), the 73 defendants were all tried at once, and 
each defendant was assigned a number to make them easier to identify by the court. 
The defendants were prosecuted and represented by American military lawyers. 
  Like the concentration camp trials, the Malmédy trial dealt with ‘violations of 
laws and customs of war long recognized as such; specifically, the murder of 
prisoners of war and noncombant civilians’ based on the Geneva conventions of 1929, 
and the Annex to Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 which ‘sets out a positive duty to 
protect prisoners of war against acts of violence and prohibits the killing or wounding 
of an enemy who had laid down his arms and no longer has a means of defending 
himself’.364 After deliberating for approximately 2 hours and 20 minutes (less than 2 
minutes per defendant), the court found all defendants guilty and 43 were sentenced to 
death including Col. Peiper.365  
As part of an established post-trial procedure the Malmédy trial sentences 
were reviewed.  Because of complaints of the use of torture to procure confessions, 
made on behalf of the accused men by defence attorney Lt. Col. Willis M. Everett, the 
standard review procedure was supplemented by a special commission created by the 
Secretary of the Army, Kenneth Royall, to review the proceedings of the Malmédy 
trial and other military tribunals in Europe.  Commission members, Judge Gordon 
Simpson (the commission was subsequently know as the Simpson Commission), 
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Judge Edward Van Roden and Lt. Col. Charles Lawrence Jr., reviewed the Malmédy 
trial and 65 mass trials of German war criminals. The Simpson Commission wrote a 
report recommending the commutation of a total of 29 death sentences to life, 
including 12 Malmédy defendants, due to pre-trial investigations being improperly 
conducted. The Commission showed considerable bias in favour of the accused, 
interviewing defence counsellors and even American and German religious leaders, 
while neglecting to interview a single member of the pre-trial investigation team or of 
the prosecution staff at the trial.  Despite this bias, the commission could not 
definitely prove that torture took place, although the report fastidiously neither 
disputed nor denied Everett’s accusations of torture of the Malmédy defendants. 
Within 16 months of the trial, all the Malmédy defendants had withdrawn their 
confessions. 
A subsequent United States Congressional investigation of the trial, led by 
Ray Baldwin, Lester Hunt and Estes Kefauver, rejected the charges of beating, 
torture, mock executions and starvation, but approved the commutation of sentences 
because of ‘procedural irregularities’—misconduct by members of the prosecution 
team and that the defence team had not represented the men to the best of their ability 
(Defence attorney Lt. Col. Willis M. Everett encouraged the men not to testify on 
their own behalf, so many did not, although he continued to advocate for the men and 
helped to bring their case before Congressional review).  During the Congressional 
investigation of alleged mishandling of the case, a young Senator McCarthy, who 
represented Wisconsin, a state with a large contingent of German-Americans, 
supported the defendants’ accusations of torture to elicit confessions.  Incidentally, 
‘no Malmédy defendant mounted the scaffold, and by the end of 1956 the last convict 
had been released as the result of a controversy that reverberated in the halls of 
Congress and helped start the climb to national prominence of McCarthy’.366  
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C.  Overview of the Concentration Camp Trials, November 1945 – December 
1947 
The concentration camp trial courts at Dachau were in session from the 
autumn of 1945 through the winter of 1947. The selected camp personnel who 
became the defendants were charged with ‘violating the laws or customs of war’ and 
tried by a rotating, eight-man commission made up of ranking military officers who 
voted on conviction and sentencing with a two-thirds majority rules.  One member of 
the court was required to be a ‘law member’, learned in the rules of general courts-
martial.  The form of the Dachau trials was different than a court-martial or a criminal 
civilian prosecution.  The main difference was that in a military tribunal the rules of 
evidence were relaxed.  The court members could chose to hear any evidence they felt 
was reliable and relevant to the case, evidence that would normally be considered 
hearsay and thus ineligible for consideration in a court-martial or civilian court.  The 
concentration camp trials were conducted according to the ‘Procedure for Trial before 
a Military Government Tribunals’ and the ‘Technical Manual for Legal Officers’ 
prepared by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).367  The 
manual contained a guide to procedure in military government courts. The following 
quote from the manual highlights one of the basic differences between the procedure 
followed by the Dachau military commissions and that normally followed by 
American civilian or military courts: 
9. Evidence.—Rule 12 does not incorporate the rules of evidence of British or 
American courts, or of courts martial. The only positive rules binding upon the 
military government courts are found in rule 12 (3), rule 17, and rule 10(5).  
Hearsay evidence, including the statement of a witness not produced, is thus 
admissible, but if the matter is important and controverted, every effort must 
be made to obtain the presence of the witness, and an adjournment may be 
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ordered for that purpose. The guiding principle is to admit only evidence that 
will aid in determining the truth.368 
The spirit of the trial was meant to be the same as an American court-martial or 
criminal trial; ‘guilty had to be established beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral 
certainty’.369  Denson strove, as he later said, ‘to attempt to present these cases in the 
same way that I would in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York and the Northern District of Alabama’.370 
The concentration camp trials introduced legal precedent in the charge of 
‘common design,’ which was used to convict personnel of the camps on the 
assumption that the concentration camps were criminal organizations and anyone 
participating in their upkeep was guilty of all the abuses therein.  The phrase 
‘common design’ was a product of Lord Wright, Lord Chancellor of England, who 
suggested the concept as an expansion of the more strictly interpreted charge of 
conspiracy. As William Denson recalled, ‘In order to justify the receipt in evidence of 
testimony which came from the lips of witness who were there [at the camps] at 
various periods of time, it was essential to have some mechanism that would justify 
the receipt in evidence of that type of testimony…In other words, there was a design 
which may be something less, if you please, than a conspiracy’.371 
Despite this innovation, the concentration camp trials were military trials, in 
which soldiers and support personnel were prosecuted for violating the rights of other 
nations and their citizens during a time of combat. This basis in the older legal 
tradition was a point of pride for the men involved. Years later Lt. Col. William 
Denson, chief prosecutor at Dachau, felt uncomfortable when he was mistakenly 
known for participating in the Nuremberg Trials. ‘…I’ve always had the feeling…that 
I could in my heart and soul condemn [the charges at Nuremberg] because of the ex 
post facto nature of some of the charges that were made. I would rather much more to 
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be affiliated with or associated with the trials at Dachau, than at Nuremberg’.372  The 
American military tribunal programme at Dachau has avoided charges by 
contemporaries and historians of ex post facto law that plague the Nuremberg Trial 
(IMT), with its innovative charges of ‘waging aggressive warfare’ and ‘crimes against 
humanity’.  In contrast, the concentration camp trials were predicated upon the 
conventions of traditional laws of war, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, part of the 
general body of law in both the United States and Germany.  The Hague Convention 
of 1907, of which Germany was a signatory, outlawed the ill treatment of civilians in 
occupied territories.  Thus the military trials were an expected outcome for German 
soldiers and leaders as they engaged in such behaviour during the war. 
In order to process such a large number of defendants as efficiently as 
possible, the war crimes trial process was largely centralized under the responsibility 
of the European Theatre Command and the major war criminal prison established at 
Landsberg, Germany with a further enclosure at Dachau. By November 1945, all war 
crimes tribunals were moved to Dachau. By 1947 eight war crimes tribunals were in 
session simultaneously at Dachau. 
 
Photo 6. Headquarters of the War Crimes Group of the Dachau concentration camp. 
Courtesy of the USHMM Photo Archives. 
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Although the ‘parent trials’ started at different times, the subsequent trials for the rest 










Dachau Dec 1945 Sept 1947 124 540 
Mauthausen May 1946 Oct 1947 66 330 
Flossenbürg Jan 1947 Dec 1947 19 90 
Buchenwald Aug 1947 Dec 1947 25 60 
Dora-Mittelbau  Dec 1947 Dec 1947 6 25 
Table 3. The five concentration camp war crime tribunals at Dachau. 
  
The number of staff involved in the prosecutions at Dachau grew rapidly, reaching its 
peak in December 1946 through June 1947. The Dachau trials were run by a separate 
detachment under the Judge Advocate General (JAG). The specially-created War 
Crimes Group and had its own administration, counsel, tribunal, and screening 
sections, although it used evidence and records collected by other sections of the army 
and relied on soldiers in charge of processing, to imprison wanted men, and the war 
crimes enclosure sections in order to gather material and men needed for the trials.373
  
The concentration camp trials’ proceedings for each camp followed a similar 
pattern, designed by JAG for efficiency.  First was a ‘parent trial’ over-viewing the 
camp and the atrocities that occurred within using evidence including documents and 
eyewitness reports.   The ‘parent trials’ included a thorough examination of the 
evidence and the charges made against individuals chosen to stand for this first case, 
usually the highest ranking members of the camp staff and defendants representing as 
many sections of camp administration as possible.  All other accused from the same 
camp were tried at ‘subsequent trials’. At the ‘subsequent trials’ for a particular camp, 
the court would be furnished with ‘the charges and particulars, the findings and the 
sentences pronounced in the original parent case’374 and once the court had taken 
																																																								





judicial notice of these findings, no examination of the original trial materials or 
witnesses was deemed necessary. Thus the burden of proof was passed on to the 
defendant, who was left with the option to prove whether he was not at the camp for a 
significant amount of time to participate in its criminal activity or that he had been 
mistaken for someone else whom had worked at the camp. The defence counsels 
complained that these subsequent trials were, in effect, ‘trials in absentia’ because the 
defendants and their counsellors were not given a chance to review or cross-examine 
evidence or witness statements given at the ‘parent trial’.  Despite this obvious 
problem, US occupation authorities believed the speed with which the trials could 
take place was the major positive aspect of this judicial system. 
 
1. Chronological overview of the ‘Parent trials’ and their ‘Subsequent 
trials’ 
Like all of the concentration camp ‘parent trials’, the Dachau ‘parent trial’ 
took place in a makeshift courthouse inside the south entrance of the camp.  Over the 
courthouse’s main door a ‘large wooden sign read Dachau Detachment War Crimes 
Group, then in smaller letters, Judge Advocate Division, United States Forces 
European Theatre’.375  The Dachau campsite was chosen as the American military 
tribunal headquarters because it had not been bombed heavily during the war so it 
contained a large number of spacious building with heating and plumbing 
(particularly in the SS barracks and training sections of the old camp)376 and it was 
close to JAG headquarters in Munich.  It is possible that the camp was chosen to fulfil 
the Allied promise stated in the 1943 Moscow Declaration that perpetrators of war 
crimes would be returned to the scene of their crimes to be judged. 
 
																																																								
375 Greene, Justice at Dachau, 28-29. 
376 Marcuse, Legacies of Dachau, 69-70. 




Photo 7. View of the judges bench of the Dachau trial. A large American flag hangs 
behind them. Courtesy of the USHMM Photo Archives. 
 
The courtroom had space to seat 300 people.  Behind the raised platform 
where the eight-member court sat was a large American flag.  The order to form the 
court stated that, ‘pursuant to the authority delegated to the Commanding General, 
Third United States Army by Commanding General, United States Forces, European 
Theatre, a General Military Government Court consisting of the following officers is 
hereby appointed to meet at the time and place designated by the President thereof for 
the trial of such persons as may be properly brought before it’.377  This Court’s 
president was Brig. Gen. John M. Lenz.  The other court members were all full 
colonels: George E. Brunner, G.R. Scithers, Laird A. Richards, Wendell Blanchard, 
John R. Jeter, Lester J. Abele, and Peter O. Ward.  The judges were chosen by Third 
Army Headquarters, with help from the War Crimes Branch, and were selected on the 
basis of ‘their experience in combat and other activities which equipped them for this 
assignment, including temperament’.378 
																																																								
377 2 November 1945, HQ Third Army and Eastern Military District APO 403 Order, Records 
of United States Army, Europe (RG 549). The United States National Archives and Records 
Administration, College Park, Maryland, USA. 




The authorization document then lists the defence and prosecution counsels 
appointed by Col. Straight.  The defence team sat on the right of the courtroom.  Lt. 
Col Douglas T. Bates, an investigator of war crimes since May 1945, led the defence 
team.  The other defence lawyers were Maj. Maurice J. McKeown, Capt. John A. 
May, and Capt. Dalwin J. Niles. Reporters were appointed by court. A German 
lawyer, and interestingly, a former Mauthausen prisoner, Baron Karl von Posern, was 
allowed as an additional defence counsel.379 An old armchair sat in front of the 
judges’ platform and served as the witness stand. 
On the opening day of the first concentration camp trials, the ‘Dachau parent’ 
trial, the courtroom was packed with over 400 spectators and members of the press.   
 
Photo 8. View of the courtroom of the Dachau trial as seen from the back of the room 
on opening day. Courtesy of the USHMM Photo Archives. 
 
Observers included Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, chief of staff to General Eisenhower, 
and Lt. Col. Lucien B. Truscott Jr., 3rd Army commanding general.380   Because of 
unforeseen delays in refurbishing the Nuremberg courtroom as well as delays in 
																																																								
379 von Posern so impressed the American lawyers that he was recruited to serve on the 
prosecution team for the Mauthausen ‘Parent’ Trial. He also testified for the prosecution in 
that trial. 
380 Greene, Justice at Dachau, 19. 
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evidence gathering by the prosecution, the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg had not started yet and Dachau was the first high profile trial held by the 
Americans.  Originally, the American authorities planned that the Nuremberg trial 
would start four months before the Dachau case so the Dachau trial could serve as a 
specific case study of the overall criminality of the Nazi regime.  This did not happen 
and the two cases remain largely separated in contemporary and historical memory.  
The press coverage and overflowing audiences would not last at Dachau.  Most of the 
Dachau trial (and, indeed, all other trials at Dachau) was conducted in front of a very 
small audience.  The Nuremberg Trial drew most onlookers away by the end of the 
week. 
The prosecution based its case against all the defendants on the charge of ‘'’.  
To prove this charge, ‘the prosecution adduced evidence that Dachau Concentration 
Camp was run according to a system which inevitably produced the conditions 
described by all witnesses, and that the system was put into effect by the members of 
the camp staff and that every accused was at one time, though not all at the same time, 
a member of this staff’.381  Throughout the trial, the defence, which never happily 
accepted that ‘common design’ was a legitimate charge/crime, would not argue 
against the statement that Dachau was a system designed to ill-treat prisoners or that 
the accused were not aware of this system.  The defence focused on defending 
connections between the accused and the ‘common design’ of the camp. 
Lt. Col. William Dowdell Denson led the prosecution team for all of the 
concentration camp ‘parent trials’.   
																																																								
381The United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports on the Trial of War Criminals: 





Photo 9. Close-up portrait of William Denson, chief prosecutor for the Dachau, 
Mauthausen, Flossenbürg, and Buchenwald parent trials. Courtesy of the USHMM 
Photo Archives. 
 
After earning his law degree, he received his orders in January 1942 to serve as an 
instructor in the Law Department at West Point and as an Assistant Staff Judge 
Advocate to the Superintendent of the United States Military Academy.382  He was 
sent to the Headquarters of the Third Army at the end of January 1945 as a member of 
staff at the Judge Advocate’s office charged with reviewing Court martial records.  At 
the end of August, Lt. Col. Denson was assigned to serve as a legal member on a 
military commission to try a German citizen who had killed a downed American 
																																																								
382 William D. Denson interview by Horace R. Hansen, Esq., William Dowdell Denson 
Papers: Series I, Box 2, Yale University Library Manuscript Collections, New Haven, 
Connecticut, USA. 
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airman.  In the last week of September 1945, Denson was assigned to be the Chief 
Counsel and Prosecutor of the ‘parent trial’ at Dachau.383 
Approximately 1,045 defendants were tried at the concentration camp trials at 
Dachau. The leading prosecutor for the army at Dachau, Lt. Col. William Denson, 
prosecuted 177 individuals: the defendants in the ‘parent trials’ of the Dachau, 
Mauthausen, Flossenbürg, and Buchenwald cases.384  Defendants were chosen as 
‘representatives [of] those people who really had an influence over the conduct of the 














18 25 43 11 
97 
(55 %) 
Kappos 3 13 3 4 
23 
(13 %) 





40 45 61 31 177 
Table 4. Defendant rank/position according to associated camp. 
Ninety-seven out of 177 (55%) defendants in the ‘parent trials’ could be considered 
non-commissioned soldiers (including the ranks of private, SS-Mann, through 
sergeant major, Hauptscharführer386). Thirty percent, or 53/177, of defendants were 
																																																								
383 Ibid. 
384 According to Denson, the Russians were initially supposed to try the Buchenwald and 
Mauthausen cases because the camps were located in the Russian zone of occupation. He 
wrote, ‘While Mauthausen and Buchenwald were both in the Russian zone and the Russian 
liaison had stated that, sure, they would prosecute those two cases by they wanted the United 
States to prepare them.  Col. Cheever and others in the Third Army and in USFET determined 
that if we were going to prepare the cases, we should try them’. See William D. Denson 
interview by Horace R. Hansen, Esq., William Dowdell Denson Papers: Series I, Box 2, Yale 
University Library Manuscript Collections, New Haven Connecticut, USA. 
385 Ibid. 
386 Non-commissioned ranks in the SS are as follows: SS-Mann (private), Strummann (Private 




commissioned officers, 13% (23/177) were kappos, and 2% (4/177) were civilians. 
While there was a stronger consistency among the sentencing patterns for all 
commissioned officers and non-commissioned soldiers who were tried, the vast 
majority of which were given a death sentence, there was more variation among the 
sentences of the Kapos who were tried (See Figure 3).  
 
D.  Dachau (United States of America v. Martin Gottfried Weiss et al), 15 
November - 13 December 1945 
‘For many Americans, Dachau concentration camp, like Bergen-Belsen for the 
British, came to symbolize the horrors of National Socialism. Opened in March 1933, 
it was the first official camp set up by the Nazis, and one of the first liberated by the 
Americans forces’.387 At the ‘parent trial’ for the Dachau camp (formally known as 
United States of America v. Martin Gottfried Weiss et al.) forty men were charged. 
They all pleaded ‘not guilty’.  
 
Photo 10. Former camp commandant Martin Gottfried Weiss testifies at the trial of 
former camp personnel and prisoners from Dachau. Courtesy of the USHMM Photo 
Archives. 
																																																																																																																																																														
Sergeant), Oberscharführer (Technical Sergeant), and Hauptscharführer (Sergeant Major). 
See Nikolaus Waschmann, KL, Appendix  629. 
387 Jardim, The Mauthausen Trial, 44. 




Defendant Number 1 was the last commandant of Dachau, Martian Gottfried Weiss. 
No. 2 was Friedrich Wilhelm Ruppert (who had also worked as a camp administrator 
at Majdanek); No. 3 was Joseph Jarolin, the deputy camp commandant at Dachau and 
‘one of the most vicious now in custody’.388 No. 4 was Christof Ludwig Knoll, who 
‘repeatedly bragged that he had hanged ninety-eight Jews as well as many Russians, 
Poles, etc’.389 
 
Photo 11. View of the defendants in the Dachau trial wearing identifying number tags 
seated in the dock. Courtesy of the USHMM Photo Archive. 
 
Other notable defendants included: Franz Xavier Trenkle, a sergeant who was 
particularly abusive; Engelbert Valentin Niedermeyer, who ‘liked to attend to the 
various tortures imposed on the inmates’;390 Johann Kick, the head of the political 
department who selected the punishments for inmates; and Vinzenz Schoettle, ‘a tall 
robust youth characteristic of the SS bullies, [who] found himself being interrogated 
in the preparation for the prosecution by a former victim he had often beaten but who 
																																																								






was now wearing the uniform of a lieutenant in the United States Army’.391 The 
single civilian arraigned was Dr. Klaus Karl Schilling. Dr. Schilling, who had 
conducted research on prisoners to study possible vaccinations against malaria, was 
committed to his work to the end. While on trial, ‘he begged on the witness stand to 
be allowed to go on with the paperwork on the results [of his malaria experiments], 
saying he needed only a desk and a chair’.392 After deliberating for one hour and thirty 
minutes, less then three minutes per defendant, the court declared all 40 defendants 
guilty; thirty-six were sentenced to death – twenty-three were hanged on the 28-29 
May 1946, including the commandant, Martin Weiss and the camp doctor Karl 
Schilling.393 Four hundred and eighty-one defendants were tried in 120 subsequent 
trials.394 
 
E.  Mauthausen (United States of America v. Hans Altfuldisch et al): 29 March – 




392 New York Sun, ‘Dachau Nazis All Convicted of Atrocities’ 12 December 1945. 
393 Robert Sigel, Im Interesse der Gerechtigkeit. Die Dachauer Kriegsverbrecherprozesse 
1945-1948 (Frankfurt: Main 1992). 
394 For more see Ludwig Einer and Robert Sigel (eds.), Dachau Prozesse. NS-Nerbrechen vor 
amerikanischen Militärgerichten in Dachau 1945-1948. (Verfahren Ergebnisse: 
Nachwirkungen 2007). 




Photo 12. The American Military Tribunal hears the testimony of a witness at the trial 
of 61 former camp personnel and prisoners from Mauthausen. Courtesy of the 
USHMM Photo Archive. 
 
In 1995, Denson wrote, ‘At the start of the Mauthausen trial, the defendants’ 
attitudes were substantially different from the attitudes of the Dachau defendants 
before their trial…The word had spread like wildfire. When we convened the trial at 
Mauthausen, the accused already knew that they were in serious trouble’.395 Although 
Denson may or may not have been correct as to the state of mind of the soon-to-be 
Mauthausen defendants (no proof is available as to their inner thoughts and feelings), 
Denson felt confident about his prosecution strategy and success. William Denson 
considered Mauthausen the worst concentration camp of those he tried.396  The army 
investigation conducted shortly after liberation mistakenly categorized Mauthausen as 
an extermination camp and estimated that as many as 1.5 million died there (current 
scholarship estimates that around 95,000 inmates were killed).  This misrepresentation 
was due largely to the deathbed confession of the last commandant of Mauthausen, 
SS-Standartenführer Franz Ziereis, who was shot while trying to escape the 
																																																								
395 Denson, Justice in Germany. 
396 William D. Denson interview by Horace R. Hansen, Esq., William Dowdell Denson 





Americans on 23 May 1945. Brought to an American hospital in Gusen for treatment 
and questioning (conducted by former inmates), Ziereis greatly exaggerated the 
number of inmates killed at Mauthausen.397 Thus the prosecution at Dachau argued 
that Mauthausen ran a ‘planned scheme of extermination’.398   
Sixty-one former personnel were tried in the Mauthausen ‘parent trial’ 
(formally United States of America v. Hans Altfuldisch et al.). 399  Some major 
defendants included: the commandant of the SS death’s head unit August Eigruber, 
SS-Obergruppenführer, Gauleiter of Oberdonau and Landeshauptmann of Upper 
Austria; and Eduard Krebsbach the chief physician of Mauthausen camp, as well as 
the deputy preventive detention camp commandant Hans Altfuldisch.  Like every 
defendant at all the trials, on the first day of the trial, each defendant was asked for his 
full name, age, residence, nationality and whether he was a member of the armed 
forces for the Third Reich (including the distinction between Allgemeine SS or Waffen 
SS). Each defendant was assigned a number one to sixty. They were advised of their 
rights (entitled to copy of the charge, present at trial, examine evidence and witnesses, 
to call witnesses, have a United States force lawyer or lawyer or the defendant’s 
choice). The charge against them was read. All of the defendants plead not guilty. The 
defence argued that some of them were insane, although this was not proven by the 
defence and no independent psychiatrist or psychiatric commission was convened to 
investigate the claim of insanity. 
More than 100 witness testified over the six weeks of the trial.400 After ninety 
minutes of deliberation, all sixty-one of the Mauthausen ‘parent trial’ defendants were 
																																																								
397 The prosecution team at Nuremberg, privy to this same confession, also exaggerated the 
number of deaths at Mauthausen. 
398 New York Herald Tribune, ‘All 61 Mauthausen Defendants Convicted by US Army Court’ 
12 May 1946. 
399 The Mauthausen Tribunal consisted of Major General Ray B Prickett, Col. J.C. Ruddell, 
Col. Garnett H. Wilson, Col. John B. Smith, Col. Lyman D. Judson, Col. Laird A. Richards, 
Col. Raymond C. Conder, Col. John G. Howard and a ninth member who served as the law 
member, Col. A.H. Rosenfeld.  The prosecution was William Denson, Lt. Col. Albert Barkin, 
Capt. Charles Mathews, Capt. Myron N. Lane, Second Lt. Paul Guth, and Col. William G. 
Holder. The defence was lead by Lt. Col. Robert W. Wilson as chief counsel.  The team also 
included Maj. Ernst Oeding, Capt. Francis W. McGuigan, First Lt. Charles B. Diebel, First Lt. 
Patrick W. McMahon, Mr David P. Hervey (an American civilian), and Mr. Alexander Wolf 
(an American civilian). 
400 Greene, Justice at Dachau, 215. Also see, Florian Freund, "Der Lachauer 
Mauthausenprozess' in Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes (Jahrbuch, 
2001) 35-66. 
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convicted. Most of the defendants snapped to attention when the court called their 
name during sentencing, although two, upon hearing their death sentence, collapsed 
and had to be helped from the courtroom.401  On 13 May 1946, fifty-eight were 
sentenced to death and three to life imprisonment. Forty-nine of the death sentences 
were carried out.  In sixty-six subsequent trials, 330 men were tried over the next 
seventeen months. 
 
F.  Flossenbürg (United States of America v. Joseph Becker et al), 12 June 1946-22 
January 1947 
Lt. Colonel Robert J. Shaw, the original prosecutor for the Flossenbürg case, 
died of a stroke in June 1946. Lt. Col. Denson took over.  The case lasted until 22 
January 1947. Col. Shaw, Denson noted, had ‘prepared the case as though he had 45 
separate murder cases. And those cases just didn’t admit [sic] that type of 
presentation. For that reason the cases dragged on from June until January of 1947’.402  
Denson introduced a similar strategy to those he had used at the Dachau and 
Mauthausen ‘parent trial’.  Forty-six Flossenbürg personnel were brought to trial.403 
The defendants included kapos, SS men, and a civilian leader Konrad Blomberg, age 
47, the civilian chief of the Political Department at Flossenbürg and a column leader 
on the evacuation march.  He admitted to recommending execution as a punishment 
for prisoners and participating in the execution of Russian and Polish nationals. 
Christian Eisbusch, age 28, was witnessed beating Belgian inmates to death with a 
pick handle. Willi Olsschewski, a (rare) Dutch citizen put on trial, age 43, was the 
kapo of the road building and quarry details and had been witnessed severely beating 
inmates including beating one to death. Another defendant was SS Capt. Ludwig 
																																																								
401 Daily News, ‘US tribunal Sentences 58 Nazi Murderers to Gallows’,14 May 1946. 
402 William D. Denson interview by Horace R. Hansen, Esq., William Dowdell Denson 
Papers: Series I, Box 2, Yale University Library Manuscript Collections, New Haven, 
Connecticut, USA. 
403 The Court Members for Flossenbürg were as follows: Col. Don E. Carleton, Major Clyde 
B. Lanham (the law member), Col. Walter A. Elliot, Col. Edward B. Jackson, Lt. Col. James 
W. Smyly, Lt. Col. Lewis S. Sorley, Lt. Col. Clyde A. Burcham, and Lt. Col. Walter H. 
Skielvig. Lt. Colonel Robert J. Shaw, the original prosecutor for the Flossenbürg case, died of 
a stroke in June 1946. Lt. Col. Denson took over. Lt. Col. Technical Sergeant Henry L. 
Newell, Mr Henry Berkowitz, and Mr Stephen Pinter rounded out the prosecution team.  
Robert W. Wilson led the defence council.  Other defence members were Dr. Richard Wacker 
(German), Dr. Wolfgang Engelhorn (German), Mr. Charles E. O-Connor (US Civilian), Mr. 




Buddensieg, age 61, who was the guard company and battalion leader who admitted 
to giving furloughs to guards who shot inmates near the barbedwire border of the 
fence.  
The defence had three weeks of preparation for the Flossenbürg case (31 July 
– 19 August). Major Oeding was initially assigned but was relieved 8 October 1946 
because his time of duty was up and he returned to the United States.404 The 
Flossenbürg defence counsel decided to divide the accused between them, so each 
council was in charge of defence for ten to twelve of the accused. The defence called 
143 witnesses and thirty-four accused testified on their own behalf.  Forty-one 
defendants were found guilty.405 Fifteen were sentenced to death by hanging, eleven 
received life sentences and the remaining fourteen received various jail terms. Those 
sentenced to death were executed on 2 October 1947. In the subsequent trials for the 
Flossenbürg camp personnel, the charges were much more particular then in the 
‘parent trial’.  The men were accused of specific crimes such as ‘killing 40 non-
Germans near Flossenbürg in February 1942’ or ‘using a handle of a shovel to beat a 
Russian inmate to death in the quarry in March 1944’.  Just under 100 defendants 
were tried in eighteen subsequent trials. 
 
G.  Buchenwald (United States of America v. Josias Prince of Waldeck et al), 11 
April – 14 August 1947 
Around the time the Buchenwald ‘parent trial’ began on 11 April 1947, a 
closing date for the American tribunal programme was set – 31 December 1947—just 
nine months away.406 Pressure on Denson and the prosecution teams to start, and 
finish, prosecuting the more then fifteen hundred men still left in custody was 
enormous. Buchenwald was a high profile camp in American minds—it was to 
Ohrdruf, a subcamp of Buchenwald, that General Eisenhower, General Omar Bradley, 
and General Patton had taken a high profile visit on 12 April 1945. Congressional 
Senators and reporters, including the famous Edward R. Murrow, followed.  Like the 
																																																								
404 ‘Flossenbürg Defence Report,’ William Dowdell Denson Papers: Series II Box 13, 
University Library Manuscript Collection, New Haven, Connecticut, USA. 
405 Rudolf Schlaffer, GeRechte Shüne? Das Konzentrationslager Flossenbürg: Möglichkeiten 
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other ‘parent trials’, Denson chose thirty-one defendants to be representative of the 
camp’s departments as a whole. The highest ranking defendant was SS-General Josias 
Erbprinz (hereditary prince of) Waldeck und Pyrmont, the Higher SS and Police 
Leader for Weimar, who thus had authority over the district where Buchenwald was. 
Waldeck-Pyrmont was convicted for his role in the ‘common design’ of the camp and 
sentenced to life imprisonment – he was released after serving three years for health 
reasons and given amnesty by the West German government in 1953. Other 
defendants included SS-Oberfuhrer Hermann Pister, the camp commandant of 
Buchenwald from January 1942 until liberation; SS-Unterstrumführer Hans Eisle, a 
notoriously brutal doctor at the Ohrdruf subcamp; and a former American citizen-
turned German kapo and then medical officer, Dr. Edwin Katzen-Ellenbogen. 
The most notorious defendant at the Buchenwald trial was also the only 
woman tried in the ‘parent trials’—Ilse Koch, ‘The Witch of Buchenwald,’ the 
notorious wife of the former commandant. She was witnessed hitting inmates with her 
riding crop on several occasions after enticing them to look at her, as well as reporting 
inmates for punishment to her husband for breaking glassware when they were 
working in her house.  She was alleged to have a photo album and gloves made of 
human skin – although neither were found in her possession, and noticing tattoos on 
inmates who were later killed and their tattoos removed. Koch’s presence in the court 
room caused a stir, not only because of her notoriety but also because was pregnant 
during the trial. She protested her complete innocence, presenting herself as a simple 
mother and housewife with nothing to do with the camp’s operations. She was 
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.  
The other thirty defendants tried in the ‘parent trial’ were all found guilty; 
twenty-two received death sentences, four got life imprisonment sentences, three 
received fifteen years imprisonment, and one received ten years. In twenty-four 
subsequent trials, thirty-one defendants were arraigned; seven were acquitted, five 
received the death sentence, three received life imprisonment, two got twenty years, 
three got fifteen years, five for ten years, and the rest received four to seven years 





H.  Dora-Mittelbau (United States vs. Kurt Andrae, et al.), 7 August – 30 
December 1947 
The chief reason for the existence of Dora-Mittelbau, and its sub-camps, was 
to provide workers for a Vergeltungswaffen factory housed in one of the neighbouring 
Harz Mountains. 407  However, very few of the men responsible for the camp 
associated with the V-2 factory ever came to trial.  The Dora-Mittelbau408 ‘parent 
trial’ (formally United States vs. Kurt Andrae, et al.) and ‘subsequent trials’ were the 
smallest of the concentration camp trials.  Twenty-four men were tried in six trials.   
The trials ran from 7 August to 30 December 1947.  Nineteen men were tried in the 
‘parent trial;’ one man was sentenced to death, seven to life imprisonment, seven to 
various terms of imprisonment, and four were acquitted.  The four acquittals in the 
Dora-Mittelbau ‘parent trial’ were the only acquittals in any of the concentration 
camp ‘parent trials’.  
 The small number of those trials and defendants was partly because the 
military trial system was shut down shortly after the Dora-Mittelbau trials began 
(discussed in full in Chapter 6).  Another reason for the small number of defendants 
was the American desire to secure cooperation with the scientific minds that worked 
on the V-2 and other Nazi weapons programmes.  A product of the early Cold War 
arms-race, Operation Paperclip, the procurement of Nazi scientists and their research, 
run by the OSS, eventually brought over 1600 men and their families to live and work 
in the United States.  For example, as early as September 1945, Dr Wernher von 
Braun, a major in the SS and lead scientist on the V-2 project, and six other scientists, 
had arrived in the United States to continue their work on the V-2 and other rockets.  
The American military had no interest in digging up the scientists’ Nazi pasts and thus 
the Dora-Mittelbau trials were a paltry affair with few defendants available for trial.  
In five subsequent trials, five men were tried; two received twenty-five year 
																																																								
407 For more on the move of V2 weapons production underground See Michael Neufeld, The 
Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era (Harvard 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
408 In the records of the US National archives the camp is referred to as ‘Nordhausen 
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imprisonment sentences, one man to two years, one man to four years, and the last 
man was acquitted. 
 
I.  Sentencing 
I never asked for the death sentence for any defendant. I simply told the court 
that each of the accused had “forfeited this right to live and to move among 
other human beings” and left it at that…I did not prosecute a single man who I 
was not willing to hang by personally putting the noose around his neck and 
pulling the trap.  
- Chief Prosecutor, Lt. Col. William Denson409 
 
The Dachau concentration camp cases were plagued by inconsistent 
punishment. For example, in the subsequent Flossenbürg trials, the following three 
men were accused of either directly shooting an inmate or encouraging others to do 
so:  a 56 year old German SS technical sergeant and deputy camp leader at out-camp 
Plattling, witnessed shooting and killing three prisoners including a Polish inmate 
during the evacuation march as well as beating a man who later testified against him, 
received a sentence of fifteen years; SS Master Sergeant Karl Keiling, also a guard on 
the evacuation march, although he was in charge of an inmate evacuation column, 
witnessed shooting a Czech inmate, and was sentenced to death (although the 
reviewing authority recommended a life sentence instead);  SS Captain Ludwig 
Buddensieg, a guard company leader who admitted to encouraging his men to shoot 
inmates near the barbed wire fence by offering them vacation time as an incentive, 
and admitted that over 100 inmates were shot during his time as guard leader, was 
sentenced to life imprisonment. 
 
																																																								





Figure 2. Variations in number of total defendants and those receiving death sentences 
in the five ‘parent’ concentration camp trials 
 
Historians can only speculate on how the judges came to their sentencing 
decisions. Unlike American civilian court judges, or the judges at the IMT at 
Nuremberg, the military commission judges at Dachau did not publish or even read 
their judgements into the record. How they came to their decisions remain a private 
matter. However, some educated inferences can be made. Differences in sentences 
must have emanated from the court’s assumptions about how brutal the camp or how 
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Figure 3. Variations in sentencing according to rank for the Dachau ‘parent trials’. 
 
Commandants, doctors, and commissioned officers were given harsher 
sentences, in most cases resulting in the death sentence (Figure 3). Non-
commissioned soldiers were also often convicted with a death sentence, however 
there is slightly more variation in the sentencing with approximately one-fourth of 
these soldiers receiving a sentence other than death.  An important factor also appears 
to be the perceived criminality of the camp itself. For example, perhaps the 
defendants at the Mauthausen trials (see Figure 2) were given the most death 
sentences because both army reports of the camp and the prosecution described 
Mauthausen as an extermination camp like those found in Poland—thus personnel 
who worked at Mauthausen were judged to be more criminal then personnel at other 
camps like Dora-Mittelbau or Flossenbürg.  Former kapos, who were, in general, 
repeat-German-criminal offenders, often received harsh sentences. However, there 
was more variability in their sentences overall. All three of the inmate-kapos tried at 
Mauthausen ‘parent trial’ were sentenced to death as were the two inmate-kapos in 
the Dachau ‘parent trial’. Nevertheless, the sentences were uneven for the three kapos 
at Dora-Mittelbau  (Life, twenty-five, twenty, and five years), for the three inmate 




thirteen kapos tried at Flossenbürg (three given death sentences, four given life 
sentences, five given from 10 to 30 years, and one acquitted).  Without written 
judgements, it is hard to surmise why sentences were so different for these kapos.  
The same unevenness arises with doctors/medical officers – all (five) Dachau and 
(six) Mauthausen medical personnel defendants were sentenced to death, while the 
four Buchenwald, one Flossenbürg, and two Dora-Mittelbau medical personnel were 
given a wide-variety of sentences from death to acquittal.410 Some of this variation in 
sentencing was likely due to the camp at which the accused had worked.  
Although all five ‘parent trials’ were prosecuting the highest-level personnel at 
each camp, the percentage of individuals subsequently sentenced to death varied 
widely between the five trials.  Figure 2 details the number of defendants tried and 
also sentenced to death at the five ‘parent trials’. At the Dachau and Mauthausen 
trials, over 90 percent of the defendants were sentenced to death. At the ‘parent trials’ 
at Buchenwald, Flossenbürg, and Dora-Mittelbau, the percentage of defendants 
sentenced to death was seventy percent, thirty-three percent, and five percent 
respectively. A significant variation can also be seen when looking into the number of 
defendants tried, both in the ‘parent’ trials (Figure 1) and in referring back to the trials 
in their entirety (Table 1).  
A series of explanations has been presented to account for such variations. The 
most common explanation is that the emerging politics of the Cold War and changing 
goals in American politics affected the trials leading to declining commitment to 
punish Nazi crimes.  Tomaz Jardim, one of the few scholars who has written on the 
subject, correctly declared that ‘uneven punishment was [common and was] due to the 
flexibility of trial procedure at Dachau, in particular to the absence of sentencing 
guidelines.  Because American army judges were not required to explain their 
																																																								
410 Doctors’ sentences are as follows: All five doctors at Dachau were sentenced to death; At 
Mauthausen, sixe doctors were sentenced to death (the chief post physician Entress, chief 
dental officer Henkel, Chief Dental officer Haehler, Camp Physician at Ebensee subcamp 
Jobst, Chief post physician at Gusen Krebsbach, and Medical non-com officer at Ebensee 
Kreindl); At Buchenwald, four doctors received varying sentences–camp physician Bender 
got ten years, second camp physician Eisele received a Death sentence, Assistant Doctor at 
Buchenwald and chief doctor at subcamp Ohrdurf Greunuss got a life sentence, chief doctor 
at the ‘small camp’ and Kapo Katz-Ellenbogen received Life; Flossenbürg’s chief pharmacist, 
Reupsch, received twenty years; Dora-Mittelbau’s medical assistant Maischein received five 
years while Doctor Schmidt was acquitted. 
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verdicts, previous trials involving similar crimes did not provide a good source of 
precedent when sentencing’.411   
The Cold War played more of an effect during later commuting of sentences, not 
during the initial trials or even the first review of the sentences.  If the Cold War was 
the major driving force behind more lenient sentencing, it would be expected that 
there would be a significant increase in lenient sentences in the latter half of the trials 
as this effect became more prominent.  However, analysis of the subsequent Dachau 
trials, which ran from October 1946 through November 1947, does not support this 
hypothesis. As seen in Figures 4 and 5, the reverse was seen when comparing trials 
during 1946 to trials in 1947.  
 
 
Figure 4. Variations in sentencing for Dachau subsequent trials during 1946.412 
																																																								
411 Jardim, The Mauthausen Trial, 185. 
412 Source of numbers is Lt. Straight’s Report of the Deputy Judge Advocate for War Crimes 
European Command, June 1944 - July 1948. All Dachau trials, excluding ‘parent trial,’ were 
randomly sampled and 20 per cent of trials were included in the analysis.  Samples were 





Figure 5. Variations in sentencing for Dachau subsequent trials during 1947.413 
All individuals tried in the later months of 1946 received a sentence of ten years or 
less, with a majority of them receiving a sentence of less than two years or a full 
acquittal by the court.  In contrast, for the trials of 1947 almost one in four defendants 
received sentences of twenty years or more.  In fact, the court handed down nearly all 
of the most severe sentences of this period in the last few months of 1947.  While the 
Cold War played a role, and definitively affected overall American policy towards 
occupied Germany, these data support the explanation that some crimes and criminals 
were viewed more leniently then others without regard to when they were tried. 
With their large number of defendants, 1,045 defendants in 240 trials, the 
Dachau concentration camp trials played a central role in the American prosecution of 
Nazi crimes.  The next chapter will further assess the ‘parent trials’ through the lens 
of several themes found in the trials including establishing jurisdiction over the crimes 
committed by the defendants, as well as the form of the trials, the use of the ‘common 
design’ charge for persecution, the use and rejection of ‘superior orders’ as a legal 
defence, the interaction between the press and the trials, and finally some unevenness 




413 Source of numbers is Lt. Straight’s Report of the Deputy Judge Advocate for War Crimes 
European Command, June 1944 - July 1948. All Dachau trials, excluding ‘parent trial,’ were 
randomly sampled and 20 per cent of trials were included in the analysis.  Samples were 
generated randomly to maintain the characteristics of the whole group. 







Chapter 4: Legal Arguments, the Press, and Politics in the Courtroom. 
 Compared to the International Military Tribunal (22 defendants), and all of the 
Subsequent Nuremberg trials (185 defendants), the Dachau trials dealt with the vast 
majority of American prosecution of Nazi criminals—1,045 in 240 trials in all.  For 
example, the largest of the concentration camp trials, the Mauthausen ‘parent trial’, 
tried sixty-one defendants, lasted a mere thirty-six days, and produced the most death 
sentences, forty-nine, handed out in one trial in American history.414 With their large 
number of defendants the Dachau concentration camp trials played the numerically 
central role in the American prosecution of Nazi crimes and further assessment is 
useful as it can challenge the dominant Nuremberg archetype. The Dachau trials, and 
its legal arguments, interaction with the press and politics, represent the ‘norm’ of the 
American attempt to prosecute Nazi crimes. 
Although each concentration camp trial had its own idiosyncrasies (after all as 
each dealt with a different camp and different defendants), the ‘parent trials’ as a 
whole had similarities. Each of the ‘parent trials’ of the concentration camp personnel 
of Dachau, Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Flossenbürg, and Dora-Mittelbau contended 
with the following challenges: establishing jurisdiction over the crimes committed by 
the defendants as well as the form of the trials, using the ‘common design’ charge for 
persecution, using and rejecting ‘superior orders’ as a legal defence, the interaction 
between the press and the trials, and finally some unevenness in administering justice 
due to external politics.  
 
A.  Legal Arguments, I: Jurisdiction and Trial Structure 
At the ‘parent trials’ prosecutors portrayed the crimes committed at the 
concentration camps as excessive manifestations of traditional war crimes. This 
strengthened the military court’s jurisdiction over the defendants under traditional 
rules of warfare.  In particular, the primary legal foundation, which both established 
the Dachau military courts and governed its processes, consisted of the rules of 
warfare as stated in The Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 
1929. The countries involved in the creation of the Hague convention attempted to 
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codify the ‘Rules of Land Warfare,’ a broad term describing the conduct of 
combatants towards each other and their relationship to their occupied territories.  The 
‘First Hague Peace Conference’ of 1899 was convened to revise a declaration 
elaborated in an earlier conference (1874) in Brussels concerning the laws and 
customs of war. The Convention was revised at the ‘Second International Peace 
Conference’ in 1907, with very few changes. Germany and the United States, along 
with many other countries, were signatories to these conventions and bound by these 
terms.415 The Geneva Convention of 1929 mainly concerned the standards of conduct 
to be followed for victorious nations as well as by the conquered, particularly the 
treatment of Prisoners of War and citizens of occupied countries. Again, Germany and 
the United States signed and ratified the Geneva Convention, vowing to be bound by 
its tenets.  In fact, the Geneva Convention of 1929 was ratified by Germany in 
February 1934 by the Nazi government. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, it was clear that the conduct of the personnel at the 
Nazi concentration camps towards the (Allied) inmates violated most of the tenants of 
both treaties. What was not made clear in the conventions was the precise means by 
which the enforcement of the conventions was to be carried out. This left the method 
and form of the enforcement largely to the discretion of the signatories at the end of 
hostilities.  Lt. Col. William Denson, lead prosecutor for the concentration camp trials 
at Dachau, argued that not only had Germany signed the Geneva and Hague 
Conventions, but also that German civil and domestic law corresponded with the 
conventions’ edicts against ill-treatment. Denson wrote, ‘Germany had laws against 
committing murder, Germany had laws against committing mayhem, and assault and 
battery was always an offense under the civil law of Germany…so that these offences 
committed individually by the accused in Dachau, Mauthausen, Flossenbürg, and 
Buchenwald were all condemned by German law’.416   
The use of The Hague and Geneva Conventions at the Dachau trials contrasted 
directly to the indictment at Nuremburg, which used the Kellogg-Briand Pact and 
other non-aggression treaties Germany had with its neighbours to charge individuals 
with waging aggressive war as a crime. However, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the 
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non-aggression treaties made no mention of prosecuting individuals for breaking the 
treaties, only nations. In contrast, the Geneva and Hague Conventions were directed 
against individual perpetrators of war crimes.  Despite this strength, there arose 
problems when using the conventions as a legal basis to prosecute crimes committed 
by the Nazis in the concentration camps. 
A challenge for the US prosecutors in using The Hague and Geneva 
Conventions was the specificity with which the treaties were written concerning over 
whom military courts had jurisdiction and which individuals might be considered 
‘prisoners of war’. In addition to the persons listed in the Hague Convention of 1907, 
Geneva Convention Article 1 added that prisoners of war included ‘all persons 
belonging to the armed forces of belligerents who are captured by the enemy in the 
course of operations of maritime or aerial war’.417  Despite the precedent set at the 
Hadamar trial (see Chapter 4), at the beginning of every ‘parent trial’ the prosecution 
and defence argued over whether the court had the jurisdiction to try German 
concentration camp personnel as war criminals as defined by the treaties.  The 
defence alleged the court did not have jurisdiction over the defendants because they 
were members of the Wehrmacht or the Waffen-SS and thus prisoners of war, not war 
criminals.418  To this challenge, the prosecution argued that all major conventions, 
and, by the Mauthausen ‘parent trial’ in the spring of 1946, a recent Supreme Court 
decision, each contended that men who had committed war crimes were classified as 
unlawful belligerents and thus not entitled to the protections afforded to soldiers. 
Furthermore, in defending the court’s jurisdiction over the accused, the 
Mauthausen prosecution team referenced the Dachau ‘parent trial’ as a precedent for 
this case saying:  
‘There has been tried between November 15 and December 15, 1945, here in 
the Third Army at Dachau the Dachau concentration camp case and the same 
question that is presented here at this time was presented in substantially the 
form, almost exactly the same form as was presented in that case.  The court 
held that these people were unlawful belligerents and as such were not entitled 
to the protection of the Convention. That decision of the court has been 
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affirmed on review by the Judge Advocate General of the Third United States 
Army’.419 
A further objection, regarding the legality of trial structure and form, was the use of a 
mass trial – in which many defendants were tried at once. Mass trials were used 
because of the scarcity of officers and the time elements involved in trying so many 
accused in a short amount of time, which made it extremely difficult to conduct large 
numbers of trials for separate defendants. However mass trials caused objections 
among the defence attorneys. At the Mauthausen trial, for an example, the defence 
moved for severance of the accused as defendants because it ‘is a basic right of the 
accused [sic] when the defence of certain alleged offenders at joint trial would be 
antagonistic to that of others’.420  With so many accused of varying ranks being tried 
together on a single charge there was bound to be some conflict of interest, 
particularly between superiors and their subordinates. Furthermore, because so many 
men were being tried, they were required, for practicality’s sake, to wear numbers to 
make identifying them easier. The defence took objection to the numbers during the 
Mauthausen trial to the defendants.  Lt. McMahon, of the defence argued that ‘from 
time to time these witnesses of the Prosecution on this stand will remember not the 
face of the defendant but will merely remember the defendant or accused number and 
will merely look for the number, and not the person or identity of the accused’.421 
This objection was overruled and the trial got underway. 
A further objection, regarding the jurisdiction of the concentration camp trials, 
made by the defence to the trial at Dachau was the form of the trial and the rules of 
evidence allowed. Each defence team argued that the court was illegally constituted 
because it did not follow the same form and rules of evidence of the regular US army 
courts (‘the detaining power’, in Convention parlance). For example, as soon as the 
court for the Mauthausen ‘parent trial’ was constituted, the able lawyer and leader of 
the defence team, Major Oeding, cited section V (‘Prisoners’ Relations with the 
Authorities’), chapter 3 (‘Penalties Applicable to Prisoners of War’), section 3 
(‘Judicial Suits’) of the Geneva Convention of 1929 and moved that the case be 
dismissed on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction over the accused because 
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the rules of the court were illegal. The section of the Geneva Convention Major 
Oeding cited assured POWs certain privileges’ including the right to counsel, the right 
to defend himself, the right to not indict himself through his own testimony, and the 
right to the same judicial procedure as the detaining power’s own soldier enjoyed. 
This was the sticking point.  As already discussed, the procedures for the 
concentration camp trials at Dachau differed from those of an American army court 
martial.  Mainly, the rules of evidence were significantly relaxed for the concentration 
camp trials, allowing hearsay evidence. Major Oeding argued that because the rules of 
evidence differed, the court did not meet the requirements set out by the Geneva 
Convention for judicial proceedings against POWs; thus the court did not have 
jurisdiction over the accused.  This basic argument was made at the beginning of 
every ‘parent trial’. In every case, the court overruled this defence motion. 
The inclusion of certain ‘inflammatory’ and hearsay witness testimony and 
evidence, particularly photograph evidence, was problematic throughout the trial. The 
defence and prosecution had many a heated exchange about the nature of the evidence 
being presented.  In one case a witness mentioned the horrors he saw upon visiting 
Buchenwald concentration camp, as a way of comparing with his visit to Dachau 
concentration camp. The defence objected:     
Major Oeding: If it pleases the Court, evidence of this type is definitely 
inflammatory. I don’t want to detract from the intelligence of any member of 
the Court of the Prosecution or the Defence, but we are all human beings and 
subject to emotions, and I can’t see how any human being can listen to 
evidence of this type without being emotionally aroused, myself included.  
Prosecution: I agree with that statement may it please the Court. It certainly is 
inflammatory. The whole nature of the subject this Court is trying is 
inflammatory. 
Defence:…We are digging into a terrible state of affairs, but we are trying to 
find out and mete out justice to the various defendants. I think the Court might 
even take judicial notice that the entire concentration camp situation is a 
frightful thing, but unless the testimony has some bearing on the guilt or 
degree of guilty of an individual accused, we submit that it is not relevant to 
the functions of the court—to the trial.422 
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The unprecedented nature of the crimes at the concentration camps made it difficult 
for the military tribunal members to remain cool and impartial. Military tribunals had 
never had to deal with crimes of this magnitude before. 
While Commander Jack H. Taylor was testifying, the defence objected. Major 
Oeding held, ‘If it please the Court, we request that the last two answers of the 
witness be stricken out of the grounds that they are conclusions and that they refer to 
the intention of someone, some unknown persons which the witness is incapable of 
determining’.423  The Court overruled the defence objection.  The defence later 
objected to any photographic evidence showing the camp as ‘it does not involve any 
of these defendants’.424 The court allowed all of the pictures into evidence.  While 
interviewing another witness, the defence insisted that the witness clarify for each 
event he was describing whether he witnessed it personally or heard about it.  They 
would insist on this with most other witnesses.  
If the Court please, in the interests of time and expediting this trial, may we 
have the record reflect that the Defence objects to all testimony which is along 
the lines of expectations, which reports to give the intent of the minds of 
personnel unknown, and which does beyond single hearsay; in other words, it 
wasn’t told to me by the man who saw it, but it was told to me by somebody 
who heard it from somebody else, and on down the line.425  
 
 
B.  Legal Arguments, II: Challenging and Defending the ‘Common Design’ 
Charge 
Central to the proceedings of the concentration camp trials was a robust, and 
often contentious, discussion regarding the ‘common design’ charge. Lt. Col. William 
Dowdell Denson, the chief prosecutor for all the concentration camp ‘parent trials,’ 
introduced the concept of ‘common design’ at the Dachau ‘parent trial’. In practice at 
the concentration camp trials, the prosecution team sought to prove that the 
concentration camps were criminal organizations and any defendants participating in 
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the upkeep of the camp was guilty of all the abuses therein because they were acting 
in the ‘common design’ of the camp.  
‘Common design’ was similar to the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg (IMT) use of ‘conspiracy’.  The two charges accomplished a similar 
objective – it highlighted the alleged criminal nature of the entire Nazi or 
concentration camp enterprise and allowed prosecutors to introduce evidence or 
planning to commit criminal acts. ‘Common design’ charge was more elastic then the 
conspiracy charge. Conspiracy required a conscious collaboration among individuals 
gathered for the purpose of committing an illegal act but ‘common design’ allowed 
for the arraignment of individuals who never met at the same time or place and were 
involved in a crime committed over the course of years. Their crime would not meet 
the legal definition for conspiracy, but Denson and the prosecutors insisted that no 
person could work at Dachau (or any of the other camps) and remain ignorant of the 
torture, beatings, and killings that took place within.426  This provided a challenge to 
the defence team of each trial, as they could not seriously contend that anyone in 
contact with the camp, much less an employee, was not aware of the deprivations 
happening inside – emaciated and suffering inmates were everywhere. 
The Dachau defendants were arraigned with two charges, the first read: 
In that Martin Gottfried Weiss…[et al.], acting in pursuance of a common 
design to commit the acts hereinafter alleged…did at or in the vicinity of 
Dachau and Landsberg, Germany, between about January 1, 1942 and about 
April 29, 1945, wilfully, deliberately and wrongfully encourage, aid abet and 
participate in the subjugation of civilian nationals of nations then at war with 
the German Reich427 to cruelties and mistreatment, including killings beatings, 
tortures.428 
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The second was the same crimes except towards ‘members of the armed forces of 
nations then at war with the German Reich’.  These are the same two charges used to 
prosecute all 1,045 defendants in the 240 ‘parent’ and ‘subsequent’ concentration 
camp trials at Dachau.  
The ‘common design’ charge was simpler to prove than conspiracy.  As one 
scholar noted, ‘common design’ required prosecutors to demonstrate that the accused 
had participated in the maintenance of a criminal enterprise that resulted in the deaths 
of inmates; furthermore:  
As with the Hadamar case, the underlying principle was that of vicarious 
liability. There was no need to prove that the actions of each defendant 
resulted in the death of a specific individual, but only that the defendants were 
aware of the ultimate purpose or product of the institution they helped to 
maintain. At least in theory, the camp cook was therefore as criminally 
culpable as the hangman, and could be caught within the same judicial net.429 
To prove ‘common design’ the prosecution had to prove that the Dachau camp was a 
criminal operation, so Denson choose representatives from each of the camp’s 
functional divisions (the political department, the commandant’s office, productive 
custody, labour allocation, medical, crematory, and administration) to be defendants 
in the ‘parent trial’.  The prosecution’s strategy consisted of three steps: first, to prove 
all the accused were guilty of administering and executing a ‘common design’ to 
support the functioning of Dachau by presenting the general conditions in the camp; 
second, that the accused were part of the organization responsible for running the 
camp; third, that the accused were all guilty for the murderous conditions of the camp.  
Finally, the prosecution focused on proving specific instances of ill treatment. 
The defence in all the ‘parent trials’ argued that the defendants could not 
understand the charges against them, in particular the charge of ‘common design’. 
Capt. Dalwin Niles, defence attorney at the Dachau ‘parent trial’, argued:  
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I am not exactly sure just what is to be said on behalf of these defendants. As 
the court will recall, at the beginning of this case we asked what the charge 
against the defendants was. I find myself wondering the same thing at the 
conclusion of the case. Where is the alleged ‘common design’? Who made it? 
Where did it take place? When? If that ‘common design’ has not been proved, 
how can we prove that ‘common design’ has not been made?430  
This is not entirely true; the defendants were charged not with ‘common design’ but 
with violating the laws of war – the prosecution strove to prove that all the accused 
had acted ‘in pursuance with a “common design” to violate the laws and usages of 
war’—as stated in the particulars of the charge. But the ‘common design’ charge was 
fundamental to the prosecution’s strategy and the defence attacked this. 
In later trials, such as the Mauthausen ‘parent trial’, the defence continued to 
object strenuously to the ‘common design’ charge. Major Oeding of the defence team 
at Mauthausen said:  
The day before yesterday defence counsel stated to the accused that they were 
charged with the “common design”, that it was the opinion of defence counsel 
that by “common design” was meant that the accused were part of a gigantic 
machine, some of them large cogs and some of them smaller cogs. Defence 
counsel further stated that to date they had been unable to find a legal 
definition of the phrase “common design”, and that they could endeavour in 
the near future to find such a definition.431  
In response, Denson pointed to the definition of ‘common design’, which was 
mentioned in association with conspiracy law, in several standard works of legal 
philosophy.432  The sources stated, ‘”common design” in criminal law has been 
defined as a community of intention between two or more persons to do an unlawful 
act’.433 The prosecution and defence had a heated debate about whether ‘common 
design’ should be explained to the defendants. 
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Prosecution: May it please the Court, it’s the function of the defence counsel 
so far as possible, to explain to their accused the meaning and interpretation of 
the Charge with which they stand before this Court. 
Major Oeding: If it please the Court, defence counsel feels capable of 
explaining the meaning of the words ‘common design’, but defence counsel 
does not feel capable of defining any crime named ‘common design’. It is the 
contention of defence counsel that all crimes contain certain elements and 
defence counsel has been unable to determine what elements are contained in 
the so-called crime of ‘common design’. 
Prosecution: In reply to that may it please the Court, I would like to say this, 
that the crime is not ‘common design’. The crime is acting in pursuance of a 
‘common design’. They did certain acts; namely, torture those people, beat 
those people, kill them…as set forth there in the Particulars. There is no crime 
in and of itself that goes by the name ‘common design’. Those are words that 
are merely descriptive of the type of conduct with which these men are 
charged. 
Major Oeding: Prosecution has just stated if I interpret correctly, that certain 
acts were a crime. Defence still cannot understand what crimes are charged. If 
the crime is murder, then let the Charges so state. If the crime is indignities, 
then let the Charges so state. 
Prosecution: If it pleases the Court, I would like to add one thing, and that is 
this, that this is identical with modifications that are not pertinent here, the 
identical Particulars that were use in the trial of the Dachau Concentration 
Camp case, which has been affirmed on the review by the Third Army. 
Major Oeding: Modifications however change the pleadings. Was the question 
brought up at this point in the trial at the Dachau case? Did any of the accused 
state they did not understand the so-called crime of ‘common design’?434 
The prosecution then suggested that the definition of ‘common design’ be read aloud 
in the court and be translated into German for the defendants.  The defence 
grudgingly agreed to this. 
The defence filed a further motion to quash the charges and particulars saying, 
‘”Common design” is not a crime and has never been a crime…it is well settled that 
																																																								




“common design” is one of the elements of a conspiracy, but it is not in itself 
conspiracy’.435  The defence argued, ‘Gentleman, the defence submits that exactness 
in definition of crimes is not an unnecessary technicality. It’s not a mere legal quibble, 
It’s a very vital thing that a man know what is a crime and what is not a crime and it is 
only by exactness of definition that this standard can be obtained’.436  Major Oeding 
accused the prosecution of ‘making new law instead of interpreting the present 
law’.437 The Court denied the motion. Finally, the defence made a long plea that the 
Court direct the prosecution to make more definite and certain the particulars as to the 
accused. The Court denied this motion. 
 ‘Common design’ remained controversial for the involved parties long after 
the Dachau trials ended. After returning home, and until his death, Chief Defence 
Counsel for the Dachau ‘parent trial’ Douglas T Bates, ‘maintained the position he 
had taken during the Dachau trial: if the Germans were guilty of a “common design”, 
so was every citizen of Germany who had contributed to waging total war’.438  
 
C.  Legal Arguments, III: Rejection of Superior Orders as a Defence 
Intertwined with the discussion regarding ‘common design’ was the heated 
debate regarding the acceptability of the ‘superior orders’ defence – this was a 
repeatedly used defence in the Dachau ‘parent trial’, as well as the other ‘parent 
trials’. The defence did not try to disprove the prosecution’s evidence of the basic 
conditions in the camp.  Instead their defensive strategy was to try to disprove (or 
minimize) their clients’ responsibilities at the camp by exercising a ‘superior orders’ 
defence; i.e. the concentration camp was run by Heinrich Himmler and the Reich 
Main Security Office in Berlin and thus the men at Dachau had little control over the 
conditions of the camp.  Furthermore, the defence lawyers used a variety of strategies 
when defending their clients against charges of specific abuse, including introducing 
mitigating circumstances and questioning the intensity or truthfulness of the alleged 
ill-treatment.  Overall, however, the defence most stalwartly employed the ‘superior 
orders’ defence for the defendants arraigned at the ‘parent trials’; this despite the 
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American (and German) legal precedent of rejecting this defence as a legitimate 
reason for acquitting a defendant. 
As early as the Mexican-American war (April 1846 – February 1848), the 
Supreme Court, the highest court in the United States, refused to consider the plea of 
‘superior orders’ as a reason for acquittal. In this early case, an American officer 
seized property from inhabitants in an occupied area (an illegal act under the U.S., 
and international, ‘laws of war’), claiming that he was acting under orders of his 
superior officer to do so. The court ruled that the soldier could not justify his trespass 
by showing the orders of his superior officer. In his decision for Mitchell v. Harmony 
(1851), Chief Justice Taney wrote, ‘It can never be maintained that a military officer 
can justify himself for doing an unlawful act by producing the order of his superior. 
The order may palliate, but cannot justify’.439 Although settling the matter of the 
criminality of following an illegal order in American military-legal tradition, Taney’s 
decision left the door open for using ‘superior orders’ as a mitigating factor in 
sentencing.  
German law, as established in the Leipzig trials, agreed with the American 
view. In the HMHS Llandovery Castle case (1921), a captain and the lieutenants of U-
86 were charged with ‘war crimes’ for firing on lifeboats from a sinking hospital ship 
during the First World War.  The highest German court, the Reichsgericht (or 
Imperial Court of Justice), declared: 
Military subordinates are under no obligation to question the order of their 
superior officers, and they can count upon its legality. But no such confidence 
can be held to exist if such an order is universally known to everyone, 
including the accused, to be without any doubt whatever against the 
law…They should, therefore, have refused to obey. As they did not do so, they 
must be punished.440 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the court at the Leipzig trials was notoriously soft on the 
accused and despite killing over 200 people, the men were only sentenced to four 
years in prison.  But the legal precedent of rejecting the defence of ‘superior orders’ 
remained. Interestingly, British law, although seeing ‘superior orders’ as a possible 
mitigating factor, differentiated in degree to German and American law. As 
established by Regina v. Smith (1900), a case arising from the Boer War in which a 
soldier shot an uncooperative native under the direct orders from a superior. The 
British court afforded a soldier more protection from ‘illegal’ superior orders. The 
leading justice of the special court wrote: 
I think it is a safe rule to lay down that if a soldier believes he is doing his duty 
in obeying commands of his superior, and if the orders are not so manifestly 
illegal that he must or ought not to have known they were unlawful, the 
private solder would be protected by the orders of his superior officer.441 
A United States Supreme Court case decision that affected the Dachau trials from 
1946 onwards was the case known as In re Yamashita442 (1946). This case established 
several precedents for the American military commission war crimes programme 
including: supporting the military commission jurisdiction over war criminals, and 
holding officers responsible for the actions of those under their command. General 
Tomoyuki Yamashita was the Commanding General of the 14th Army Group of the 
Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands. After his surrender, he was charged 
with violations of the ‘laws of war’ before a United States military commission in the 
western Pacific. The essence of the accusation was that ‘the petitioner had failed in 
his duty as an army commander to control the operations of his troops, "permitting 
them to commit" specified atrocities against the civilian population and prisoners of 
war’.443  General Yamashita was found guilty, and sentenced to death. Yamashita’s 
military lawyers appealed his case to the Supreme Court. Upon review the Supreme 
Court upheld the right of the military commission to try war criminals (‘A violation of 
the law of war, committed before the cessation of hostilities, may lawfully be tried by 
a military commission after hostilities have ceased -- at least until peace has been 
officially recognized by treaty or proclamation by the political branch of the 
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Government’.444) and that a superior officer was legally responsible for the actions of 
those under his command. The justices wrote in their opinion: 
The law of war imposes on an army commander a duty to take such 
appropriate measures as are within his power to control the troops under his 
command for the prevention of acts which are violations of the law of war and 
which are likely to attend the occupation of hostile territory by an uncontrolled 
soldiery, and he may be charged with personal responsibility for his failure to 
take such measures when violations result’.445  
Validating the responsibility of a superior over his men may at first glance to 
strengthen the defence of superior orders. But instead it strengthened the case for 
personal responsibility of individual soldiers for crimes they committed.446 
At the Dachau ‘parent trial,’ the defence attorneys sought to shift their clients’ 
guilt to the accused’s superiors. For example, when a prosecution witness, Dr. Blaha, 
was cross-examined by lead defence attorney Lt. Col. Bates, Bates attempted to 
establish who exactly had given the orders to punish Dr Blaha. His line of question 
was meant to imply that the soldiers in the camp were at the mercy of orders from 
above: 
Lt. Col. Bates: You said this man Jarolin was present when you were hung by 
your wrists. Did he hang you up by your wrists? 
Dr Blaha: No. 
Lt. Col. Bates: Then he was merely a spectator. 
Dr Blaha: Yes. 
Lt. Col. Bates: Did Jarolin give the order to hang you up? 
Dr Blaha: No, that was done at headquarters. 
Lt. Col. Bates: In other words, Jarolin was only following orders from 
someone else, is that correct? 
However, the prosecution, on redirect, shattered Bates’s argument that the accused 
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Col. Denson: You stated that Jarolin was present at your hanging by the 
wrists. Did Jarolin give any orders? 
Dr Blaha: Several of us were hanging slightly low, and our shoes touched the 
floor. Jarolin gave the order that we should be hung up higher. 
Col. Denson: No further questions.447  
Another example from the Dachau ‘parent trial’ came when former camp commander 
Wiess was under cross-examination by Denson: 
Col. Denson: During your time here, Weiss, how many prisoners did you ship 
out of Dachau? 
Weiss: By order of the Reich Security Main Office several thousand were 
transferred to other camps and armament industries. 
Col. Denson: Is it not a fact, Weiss, that requisitions for prisoners had to be 
approved for you before those prisoners were made available to Dr Schilling?’ 
Weiss: It was an order from Berlin that the prisoners were to be given to 
him… 
Col. Denson: Just answer my question, Weiss. Did you have to approve the 
requisitions? 
Weiss: Yes. 
Col. Denson: The same was true for Rascher’s experiments, was it not? 
Weiss: Yes.448  
Still, perhaps in the hope it would be considered a mitigating circumstance when it 
came time to sentencing, the defence team continued throughout the trial, and into 
closing arguments, to emphasize the men were acting under ‘superior orders’. In his 
closing arguments for the Dachau ‘parent trial’, German defence counsel von Porsen 
(speaking in rudimentary English):  
May it please the court, Befehl ist Befehl—an order is an order. It had to be 
obeyed; however its quality was. This was not only a custom in the Third 
Reich, where the duty to obedience was more severe, but the USA seems to 
have great attention to this. Studying the country was order of the USA, I 
found the following text: “individuals of armed forces will not be punished for 
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these offenses, violations and customs and laws of war, in case they are 
committed under the orders or sanction of their government or 
commanders.”’449 
This is a slight misquote from an out-of-date Rules of Land Warfare 347 by the 
Department of the Army. 450  This part of the manual is meant to clarify that 
commanders can be punished. ‘The commanders ordering the commission of such 
acts, or under whose authority they are committed by their troops may be punished by 
the belligerent into whose hands they may fall’.  The manual was revised on 15 
November 1944 and stated that: 
Individuals and organizations who violate the accepted laws and customs of 
war may be punished therefor…the fact that the acts complained of were done 
in pursuant to the order of a superior or government sanction may be taken 
into consideration in determining culpability, wither by way of defence, or in 
mitigation of punishment. The person giving such orders may also be 
punished. 
Although this rule originally was intended to allow for the punishment of superiors 
who gave orders but had not necessarily dirtied their own hands, defence counsellors 
used the rule to present ‘orders’ as a defence, particularly to argue that mitigating 
circumstances should result in a reduced sentence. 
Despite his mistaken reading of the Rules of Land Warfare 347, von Porsen 
continued; ‘If the USA gave their GIs the upper-mentioned protection, it must appeal 
as equitable and fair to give the same protection to the victims of National Socialism, 
those who had to keep quiet and obey, for they too were the victims’.451 Von Porsen 
argued that the court should acquit the men, or, at the very least, give them light 
sentences, because they were simply soldiers obeying orders. Although the Dachau 
court rejected ‘superior orders’ as grounds for acquittal, it most likely played a role in 
lightening the sentences given to some men during the concentration camp trials. 
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D.  The Press and the Courtroom: The Case of Ilse Koch 
The press played an important role in shaping public perceptions of the 
American postwar trial programme. While the prosecution at the IMT at Nuremberg 
had a comprehensive press strategy for engaging and modelling coverage, the 
attorneys at the concentration camp trials at Dachau trial did not – leaving coverage of 
the trials, and which subjects they chose, to the whims of individual press men.  
Press engagement with the postwar trials varied from day to day and trial to 
trial.  Because the International Tribunal at Nuremberg was delayed beyond its 
original start time, the international press flocked to the opening of the Dachau ‘parent 
trial’. The opening day of the Dachau ‘parent trial’ saw more then 400 spectators, 
including General Water Bedell Smith, chief of staff to General Eisenhower and Lt. 
Col. Lucian B Truscott, the commanding general of the Third Army, and members of 
the press, who were allowed to film and take photographs.  The press would return for 
the opening days of Mauthausen and Buchenwald as well.452 Press interest in the trials 
at Dachau would wax and wane throughout the two years of trials. In general, very 
little attention was paid to the trials.  Part of the reason that the press abandoned 
covering the Dachau trials was the tediousness of endless translations.  Not many of 
the translators spoke both German and English well enough to translate directly 
between them. Thus sentences spoken in the courtroom in German were translated to, 
say Polish, which was translated to English. 
American journalist Walter Lippmann, co-founder of the weekly the New 
Republic, came to listen in. His secretary had wired ahead that he planned to 
stay for three days…Lippman arrived at nine o’clock the first day. By ten 
thirty, he was gone. Then Margaret Higgins arrived. Her reports of liberation 
of the camps, filed as she followed Allied forces across Europe, had made her 
one of America’s most popular war correspondents. Her assistant had written 
to say she might stay as long as a week. Within two hours, she, too, had left 
the courtroom.453 
Journalists covering the IMT on a daily basis complained of the Nuremberg 
courtroom as a ‘citadel of boredom boredom on a huge, historic scale’454 as Jackson 
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produced document after document, and joked that journalists assigned daily coverage 
of the trial were ‘the last victims of Nazi persecution’.455  Journalists were apparently 
not satisfied with either listening to the evidence of victims – which made up a 
majority of the Dachau trial testimony – or with documentary evidence in the 
Nuremberg courtroom. However the International Military trial at Nuremberg drew 
reporters from more than twenty nations, ‘with over eighty representing American 
publications’.456   
Lead American prosecutor, Robert Jackson, went on a press offensive, aiming 
to legitimize the trial through public support. Pre-trial Gallup polls indicated that ‘as 
few as 1% of the [American] population favoured judicial proceedings over summary 
executions’.457 In the face of the public’s feelings, Jackson chose to emphasize the 
IMT’s higher aim – criminalizing aggressive war – both to the press and in the court 
room. His opening speech on 21 November 1945 was a masterful stroke to set the 
tone for the American prosecution at that trial, and the press coverage: 
In the prisoners’ dock sit twenty-odd broken men. Reproached by the 
humiliation of those they have led almost as bitterly as by the desolation of 
those they have attacked, their personal capacity for evil is forever 
past…Merely as individuals, their fate is of little consequence to the world. 
What makes this inquest significant is that these prisoners represent sinister 
influences that will lurk in the world long after their bodies have been returned 
to dust. They are living symbols of racial hatreds, of terrorism and violence, 
and the arrogance and cruelty of power, They are symbols of fierce 
nationalisms and of militarism, of intrigue and war-making which have 
embroiled Europe generation after generation, crushing its manhood, 
destroying its homes and impoverishing its life.458 
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Jackson’s press strategy worked. The American press coverage of IMT focused 
largely on the higher/noble effort to criminalize war.  By the end of the IMT, a Gallup 
poll established that 90 per cent of Americans had heard or read about the trial’s result 
and 53 per cent agreed with the verdicts of the trial, a huge change from the 
unsupportive, unforgiving population before the trial.459 
In contrast, the Dachau trials lacked this cohesive higher aim. It was the 
carrying out of traditional military justice, albeit in the context of the horrific crimes 
of the camps.  There was no concerted press effort on the part of the prosecution to 
frame Dachau as part of a larger goal. This is partly to blame for the Dachau trials’ 
inability to capture the public imagination. Press coverage, when there was any, 
focused almost exclusively on salacious details of crimes or individuals, such as the 
horrors of the railroad car full of corpses outside the Dachau camp. Verdicts were 
written as informative pieces without editorialisation praising their successes (or 
failures).  However Ilse Koch entered the public’s imagination as the ‘Bitch of 
Buchenwald,’460 a rare exception to this rule, while the concentration trials at Dachau, 
as a whole, did not. 
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Photo 13. Ilse Koch on the stand in the Mauthausen ‘parent trial’. Courtesy of the 
USHMM Photo Archives. 
 
Ilse Koch garnered the most press of all the defendants at the Dachau 
concentration trials. In most press reports, she is the only defendant named.461 When 
she took the stand in her own defence over 200 spectators filled the usually empty 
Dachau courtroom.462 The press alternatively called Ilse, ‘The infamous mistress of 
the Buchenwald concentration camp,’463 the ‘Beast of Buchenwald’464 ‘…a degraded, 
sadistic specimen of humanity…’, the ‘Butcher’s Wife,’ the ‘Hexe von Buchenwald’ 
(Witch of Buchenwald), or simply ‘The Bitch’.465 Ilse Koch (neé Margarete Ilse 
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Köhler) was the wife of Buchenwald commandant Karl Otto Koch (served as 
commandant 1 August 1937 – September 1941). She was a secretary who had joined 
the Nazi party in 1932 before marrying Karl in 1936. They had two sons together. Ilse 
accompanied her husband, first to Sachsenhausen in 1936, and then to Buchenwald, 
where she remained when her husband was sent to establish and command Majdanek 
concentration and extermination camp (September 1941 until August 1942).  While at 
Buchenwald, Ilse became notorious among the prisoners for her excesses and cruelty.  
In 1940, Ilse used Buchenwald inmates (and 250,000 Reichsmarks stolen from 
inmates) to build an indoor riding arena. Prisoners later told of her riding through the 
camp, or walking around her gardens (staffed by inmates) in revealing clothing and 
ordering any inmate beaten who looked at her.   Even among the ranks of the SS, Ilse 
and Karl were excessively criminal in their behaviour – they were arrested on 24 
August 1943 by the SS police and charged with private enrichment through 
embezzlement and the murder of prisoners for personal reasons (namely to hide 
Karl’s case of syphilis, treated by two inmate-doctors at the camp, who were killed 
immediately after treating Koch). Karl was convicted and imprisoned in early 1944 
and, eventually, executed in April 1945. Ilse was acquitted by the SS court due to lack 
of evidence. She moved, with her children, to live with her family.  
After being recognized and reported by a former inmate, Ilse was arrested by 
US forces in Ludwigsburg on 30 June 1945. During her trial, Ilse was 8 months 
pregnant.  This revelation, clear as she took the defence stand in court, caused a 
sensation in the courtroom and ‘German inmates snickered, photographers snapped 
away’.466  A month later The New York Times reported the birth of her baby with the 
sensationalist headline ‘Isle Koch Has Baby: Buchenwald Camp Persecutor Bears 
Illegitimate Son’.467  How she came to be pregnant was the subject much speculation 
as she had been kept in solitary confinement by the Americans, only interrogated by 
American officers. Who was the father?  An American officer? An old lover, Fritz 
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Schäffer, who was being confined at Dachau? Although the latter possibility is most 
likely, Ilse never revealed the answer publicly.  
One of the most salacious and widely reported crimes was that Ilse alleged to 
have collected tattooed skins from inmates, whom she had killed if she saw and liked 
a tattoo they had, for lamp shades, gloves and book covers. Despite doubts about the 
claim, the rumour that Frau Koch had lampshades made from the tattooed skins of 
murdered inmates persisted in the American press for years after her trial.468  The 
skins were most likely all for the use of Dr Erich Wagner, a physician in the 
pathology department of Buchenwald, who was working on a dissertation about 
tattoos and both photographed and collected samples from dead inmates (most likely 
killed for his project on his orders) for his work.469 
The evidence given at the trial as to Ilse’s involvement in the procuring of 
human skin for souvenir objects was circumstantial at best, and based on camp 
rumours. Lampshades and other items made of tattooed skins were never found in her 
procession and she always denied being involved. The SS Judge Konrad Morgen, who 
investigated the Kochs during their wartime trial for embezzlement and murder, 
testified that the stories of Frau Koch's human skin lampshades were merely a legend: 
he had personally searched Koch's home near Buchenwald and found nothing of the 
kind. This did not stop the press from obsessively reporting about Ilse Koch and the 
skins. For example The Chicago Tribune led their story about the convictions at the 
Buchenwald Trial under the subtitle: ‘Used Skins for Shades’. It goes on: ‘Frau Koch, 
41, who became pregnant while in prison, was accused of sending tattooed camp 
inmates to death chambers so she could use their skins for lamp shades and purses’.470 
Purses made of human skin were never found or even mentioned in evidence. Two 
days later, The Tribune wrote again about Ilse Koch’s sentence along with publishing 
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a picture of her: ‘Frau Ilse Koch, 41, red haired widow of a former commander, who 
was said to have collected tattooed skins of inmates for lampshades, received a life 
sentence’.471  The Los Angeles Times covered the human skins writing: ‘Denies 
Lampshades: Frau Koch was accused of having shared the camp rule with her 
husband and of ordering tattooed prisoners killed so she could make lampshades, 
purses and bookbindings of their decorated skins. This she denied’.472 As can be seen, 
the accusation of using human skin was the focus of press coverage, mentioned every 
time Koch was covered in the press, even after the trial-where no definitive evidence 
was presented that the skins were Koch’s.473 
Koch’s case is an interesting comparison to the press coverage of defendant 
Irma Grese, who was tried at the First Belsen Trial by the British. Twenty-one of the 
defendants at the First Belsen Trial were female, a much higher number then any 
Dachau trial, where Ilse Koch was the only female tried at a major concentration 
camp trial. Like Ilse Koch, Irma Grese was a young woman and press favourite. For 
example The Times breathlessly covered her testimony (The Times, ‘Irma Grese in the 
Box’, 17 October 1945, and The Times, ‘Irma Grese’s Whip’ 18 October 1945). Grese 
was 22 during the trial and described as the ‘Beautiful Beast’ (compared to camp 
commandant, Josef Kramer, who was known in the press as ‘The Beast of Belsen’). 
Grese, known not only for her meticulous grooming but also for her cruel beatings of 
prisoners and taking part in selections at Auschwitz and Belsen, was sentenced to 
death and executed.  As one scholar notes, the press focus on Koch and Grese, ‘may 
have stifled a more nuanced discussion of women’s participation and culpability. The 
trials generated sensationalistic stories of female sadism’.474   
In her defence, Ilse Koch maintained that she was simply a housewife and 
mother and had no knowledge of what was happening in the camp.  The Court did not 
believe her. She was sentenced to life imprisonment. Controversially, General Lucius 
Clay, Military Governor of American occupied Germany (1947-1949), reduced 
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Koch’s sentence to 4 years upon review. This caused a press fury, which led directly 
to a Congressional review of the Buchenwald ‘parent trial’ and the Dachau trial 
programme as a whole (further discussed in Chapter 6). Ilse Koch continued to 
dominate press reports whenever the Dachau trial programme was mentioned. 
Because Denson and the prosecutors at Dachau did not have a press strategy to shape 
public perception to the Dachau trials, the pressmen and women themselves chose for 
the public what to focus on—namely individual, female sadism that was not in any 
way representative of the trial programme or defendants as a whole. 
 
E.  Politics and the Courtroom: The Case Study of Dora-Mittelbau and 
‘Operation Paperclip’ 
 External politics, particularly the needs of the growing intelligence apparatus, 
did not have a large impact on the performance of the ‘parent trials’ or the initial and 
first review of sentencing. Nevertheless, both before and after the trial, the American 
concentration camp trials were subject to external political pressure. This caused 
complications in the carrying out of justice – particularly in the availability of 
defendants to stand trial. One of the most obvious breakdowns of the American 
programme of concentration camp trials was exemplified by the Dora-Mittelbau trial. 
Despite the horrific work conditions of the camp for the 60,000 inmates who passed 
through the camp, which caused the death of at least 20,000 inmates, the trials held 
for personnel of the Dora-Mittelbau were the smallest set of trials at Dachau.475 In six 
proceedings from 7 August – 30 December, one civilian, eighteen members of the SS, 
and five Kapos were tried for engaging in a ‘common design’ to violate the ‘the laws 
and usages of war’, mainly killing, beating, and torturing prisoners. 19 men were tried 
at the Dora ‘parent trial,’ most of low ranks.476  The highest-ranking member tried of 
the personnel responsible for conditions at Dora was the Director General of 
Mittelwerke GmbH (from May 1944 to liberation), a civilian, Georg Rickhey. 
Although originally moved to Ohio in the United States as part of an American 
intelligence programme design to bring German scientists to the United States to work 
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for the US government (Operation Paperclip), he was sent back to Germany to stand 
trial at the Dora trial. Rickney was acquitted for lack of evidence. 477  No other 
technical or scientific members of staff of the Dora-Mittelbau camp were tried.  These 
scientist and technical staff were largely protected by the Americans’ desire to use 
their expertise to advance the American’s own rocket programme. 
The American urgency to acquire German technology, equipment, and the 
people responsible for developing and manufacturing these technologies began in 
1940 and continued at a frenzied pace for roughly the next 10 years.478  Even before 
the beginning of the Second World War the US feared German scientific 
advancements; fleeing German (Jewish) physicists had warned the US government 
that Germany was developing an atomic bomb and the American (and Allied) 
intelligence community was worried about other ‘wonder weapons’. In 1944, as the 
armies of the Western Allies invaded Europe and moved towards Germany, the 
American intelligence community’s top priority was recovering atomic and aeronautic 
technological material and scientists.479  By late 1944 the hunt for German scientists 
and technicians involved thousands of Allied soldiers and officers.480  
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The American intelligence operation was partly fuelled by a race against the 
Soviets for German scientific spoils.481 For example, when the Americans arrived in 
Nordhausen in April 1945, they found the factories at Dora-Mittelbau largely intact, 
with thousands of weapons, and hundreds of sick and dying workers. Americans 
stripped Mittelbau as fast as they could before the Russians would arrive—Dora-
Mittelbau was to be in the Soviet zone of occupied Germany.  The hunt for Nazi 
scientists was the cause of some of the earliest operations against the Soviets in what 
would come to be called the Cold War. As early as a few weeks after Germany’s 
surrender, American and British agents were mounting clandestine missions into the 
Russian sector of Berlin and the Russian zone of Germany to smuggle out scientists 
and their families.482 
The man in charge of the American effort to find and recruit German scientists 
was Lt Colonel Rozamus, the deputy director of JIOA (Joint Intelligence Objectives 
Agency).  He knew the moral cost of his decision to recruit these men. At the end of 
the war, he had participated in the liberation of the Dora complex used to manufacture 
rocket and jet engines and was well aware of the thousands of prisoners who had died 
in building and maintaining the facilities.  Still, in his duties, Lt Colonel Rozamus 
routinely asked that reports from denazification tribunals and postwar interrogations 
with incriminating information on individuals be sent back with requests for ‘a 
different interpretation.’  Usually the bit that needed ‘reinterpretation’ was related to 
Nazi activities.  The ‘Paperclip Operation’ takes its name from the process of paper 
clipping new backgrounds on the US entry applications and documents of German 
scientists.483 
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 The Americans’ top priority recruitment was Werner von Braun, a pioneer of 
rocketry, obsessed with space travel, and the mind behind the V-2 rockets. A brilliant 
man by all accounts, in his mid-20s Von Braun found the German military an 
interested and deep-pocketed patron and, in a Faustian deal (there rockets were for 
weapons, not for travelling to the moon) he was offered an unlimited budget from the 
military to design missiles.484 By 1940, von Braun was a member of the Nazi Party 
and the SS. At the Peenemunde Rocket Centre on 3 October 1942, von Braun and his 
team launched the first man-made object to reach outer space, a V-2 rocket.485 In 
order to secure further funding, he personally showed Hitler the film of the successful 
launch. After the bombing at Peenemünde, rocket production was transferred to the 
Harz Mountains into a huge underground factory complex built and staffed by slave 
labourers. The conditions were terrible, and as head of rocket research and 
production, von Braun and other top rocket men must have known about the use of 
slave labour.  
Von Braun, and his team members, were highly sought after by all the Allies. 
At the end of the war, von Braun decided to surrender himself, his team, and his 
knowledge, to the Americans.  He was immediately dispatched to the US to continue 
his research.  The US Justice Department chose to overlook his membership in the SS 
and his use of slave labour.486  Von Braun had an enormously successful career in the 
US; he became a leader in the American space programme,487 including designing and 
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building the Saturn V rocket that carried Apollo 11, the first-manned space flight to 
the moon.  In 1977, he died, a celebrated man. Upon his death, President Carter 
released a statement:  
To millions of Americans, Wernher von Braun's name was inextricably linked 
to our exploration of space and to the creative application of technology. Not 
just the people of our nation, but all the people of the world have profited from 
his work. We will continue to profit from his example.488 
No mention was made of his SS status or connection with his crimes at Dora-
Mittelbau. He was never charged with war crimes. 
Another man implicated in the use of slave labour at Dora-Mittelbau and a 
close associate of von Braun, Arthur Rudolph, was also recruited through Operation 
Paperclip and was never prosecuted for war crimes. Rudolph was a rocket engineer 
who worked on the V-2 for Germany during the war. Specifically he helped to design 
the production plant at Peenemünde and, starting in 1943, at Dora-Mittelbau. After 
the Dora plant and camp was created, Rudolph became operations director of V-2 
production at Dora.489 
By November 1945, Rudolph and his family (along with von Braun) were 
brought to the US to continue work on rocket development and production through 
Operation Paperclip.  At the time of his entry into the United States,  
Mr. Rudolph was described by the American military government in Germany 
as an "ardent Nazi," but he was not classified as a war criminal. Army 
documents from two years later showed, however, that Mr. Rudolph had 
indeed been classified as a war criminal by West German and United States 
officials.490 
Despite this, Rudolph went to work for NASA and was granted US citizenship. At 
NASA, Rudolph worked to develop the Saturn V Moon rocket, which put the first 
man on the moon. In November 1983, after catching the attention of the OSI for his 
work at Dora-Mittelbau, Rudolph entered a deal with the Justice Department to 
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renounce his US citizenship in return for not being prosecuted for war crimes (as well 
as being allowed to keep his social security benefits). He returned to Germany where, 
in 1987, the West German government ruled there was insufficient evidence to justify 
trying Mr Rudolph for war crimes. He lived in Germany until his death in 1996. He 
was never prosecuted for war crimes. 
 It was not just the Dora-Mittelbau trials that were affected by Operation 
Paperclip. For example, Dr Hubertus ‘Strugi’ Strughold was never tried for war 
crimes despite being implicated in human experimentation, particularly at Dachau. Dr 
Strughold, an expert on aviation medicine, was director of the Aeromedical Research 
Institute in Berlin, an organization controlled by the Luftwaffe beginning in 1935. His 
major research interests were high altitude and supersonic speed flight and their 
effects on the human body and later the physical and psychological effects of manned 
spaceflight.491 
Evidence implicating Strughold in the human experimentations at Dachau was 
presented at the IMT. A memo showed that Dr Strughold attended a 1942 medical 
conference in Germany in which there was a presentation about the results of the 
hypothermia experiments on inmates at Dachau.  
In minutes from the conference, Dr. Strughold was recorded as saying: "With 
regard to the experimental scientific research, but also for the orientation of 
the Sea Distress service, it is of interest to know what temperatures are to be 
counted on in the oceans concerned during the various seasons." Critics of Dr. 
Strughold and his award argue that his participation at the conference shows, 
at a minimum, that he was aware of some of the most perverse activities of the 
Third Reich.492 
At the end of the war, Dr Strughold was never tried for war crimes, despite the fact 
that several physicians associated with him, including Strughold's former research 
assistant Hermann Becker-Freyseng, and the Institute for Aviation Medicine were 
convicted of crimes against humanity in connection with the Dachau experiments at 
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the 1947 Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial.493  In the fall of 1945, Dr Strughold returned to 
academic life working as director of the Physiological Institute at Heidelberg 
University. Around this same time, he began working for the US Air Force at the 
Aeromedical Centre, located on the campus of the former Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for 
Medical Research. In 1947 Strughold was brought to the US by the Americans 
through Operation Paperclip and eventually named chief scientist of NASA’s 
Aerospace Medical Division in 1962.494  He played a central role in designing the first 
pressure suit for astronauts and on-board life support systems for the first manned 
space flights. He also directed the training of the medical staff of the Apollo 
programme for the mission to the moon.495 
In recent years, German scholars have disclosed that Dr Strughold’s institute 
in Berlin ‘conducted experiments on young children from a psychiatric asylum’.496 
Nevertheless, even today, Dr Strughold is revered as the ‘Father of Space Medicine’ 
in his research community. Every year since 1963, the Space Medicine Association 
has given out the Hubertus Strughold Award to a top scientist or clinician for 
outstanding work in aviation medicine.497 
The ‘Paperclip’ process became top secret after 1948.  By early 1948, The US 
Congress, afraid of the communist-inspired labour strikes that had toppled Eastern 
European governments and the rumours of communist coups suggested that Moscow 
was either masterminding the early stages of a revolution or was on the brink of 
launching an invasion of Europe, approved a $500 million budget for scientific 
military research. German scientists were needed; as one anonymous senator stated, 
‘Hefty principles and solemn promises, the Pentagon argues, must no longer be 
allowed to stand in the way of defending the nation’.498  ‘Operation Paperclip’ 
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scientists’ backgrounds now begin to state that espousing Nazism was done ‘to 
combat communism’ and ‘improve Germany’s economic plight.’ ‘Operation 
Paperclip’ would not become public knowledge until 1984.499  
Because of their usefulness to American intelligence, most of those complicit 
in the Dora camp were never put on trial. The trial itself suffered from lack of 
evidence, as much of it was in the hands of the American intelligence community and 
not available to prosecutors. The Dora trial represents a miscarriage of justice in the 
sense that few of those responsible for the horrendous conditions of the camp were 
ever tried. Although Dora is the most extreme example, other camps trials suffered 
from defendants not being available for prosecution, as the case of Dr Strughold 
shows. 
 
F.  Conclusion 
Despite firm commitment in 1945 to prosecuting Nazi criminals, the politics 
of the emerging Cold War affected the United States administrative aims in Germany.   
The trials, and their legacy, were plagued by controversy caused in part to the ill-
conceived, largely, non-existent appellate process. Also playing a large role in the 
controversy were challenges brought by the defendants themselves claiming 
mistreatment. These challenges were brought in a politic climate where German 
goodwill was increasingly important to American foreign policy. In their closing 
years, the trials were to assist, or at least not deter, the economic and political 
unification of Germany by quickly processing the criminals of the old regime so 
Germany could be ‘cleansed’ and retake its place among the (American-allied) 
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Chapter 5: Clemency, Controversy, and Congressional Review 
 
By the late 1940s new foreign policy goals, resulting from amplified tensions 
with the Soviet Union, affected the United States’ occupational objectives in Germany 
despite a firm commitment in 1945 to prosecuting Nazi criminals. The war crimes 
trial programme was now perceived as a hindrance to securing the increasingly 
important German goodwill.  The statistics for convictions from the Dachau ‘parent 
trial’ in 1945 through the Buchenwald ‘parent trial’ in late 1947 (and the initial review 
by the JAG) indicate that, initially, most of the sentences were upheld or only slightly 
altered. However, amnesty programmes for those effected by denazification policy 
and by the Dachau courts began in the late 1940s and resulted in mass amnesties and 
commutations by the early 1950s. Furthermore, two major controversies arose from 
the Dachau trials; the methods used by interrogators in the Malmédy trial and the 
reduction of the notorious Ilse Koch sentence upon review from life imprisonment to 
four years’. The resulting public outcry, and an internal army investigation, triggered 
Congress to review both cases; the Dachau tribunals were scrutinized in particular for 
fairness. 
 
A.  Clemency: An Overview of the Review Process for Dachau 
 
1. The Changing Political Situation  
The sentences handed down by the courts at the concentration camp trials at 
Dachau were increasingly at odds with the contemporary political concerns of the US 
in Germany in the late 1940s and early 1950s.500 American policy in Germany 
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became more concerned with checking the expansion of the Soviet Union’s influence 
in Germany and Eastern Europe. In the summer of 1946, as the 60 Mauthausen 
‘parent trial’ defendants were being sentenced and the Flossenbürg ‘parent trial’ was 
beginning, there was unrest in Germany as ‘large numbers of people demonstrated for 
increased food rations, and for the collectivization of industry in the Ruhr industrial 
region.  There was also evidence that communism was becoming more popular 
among the German people’.501  This concerned the Americans, as the Cold War was 
getting under way. Furthermore, some tenets of the Potsdam Agreement, the end-of-
war settlement concerning the future of Germany between the Soviets and the 
Americans (and the British), were beginning to break down.502 At Potsdam, the 
Soviets had agreed to supply the (more heavily industrialized) US and British 
occupied zones with foodstuffs from their zone; the Americans and British, in return, 
would supply the (more agricultural) Soviet zone with industrial equipment. When the 
Soviets failed to ship much-needed foodstuffs General Clay stopped shipments of 
industrial equipment to the Soviets. The Soviets responded with an angry publicity 
campaign against the Americans within Germany and at home.  
The Soviets continued to tighten control over Eastern Europe, and concerned 
politicians in the US began to look for ways to counterbalance growing communist 
power in the east. 503  In January 1947, as the court at Dachau delivered the 
Flossenbürg ‘parent trial’ sentences, the German bizone economic region was created, 
which united the US and British zones of occupied Germany, in order to help advance 
the growing economic and political cooperation in western Germany. The Americans 
and British, in large part, were allowing the German states to govern themselves 
through representation at the national level—a system that was at odds with the 
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centrally controlled Soviet administration (The Zentralverwaltungen, a subdivision of 
the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SVAG)). In March 1948, the Soviets 
formally left the Control Council for Germany, thus ending cooperation between the 
former wartime allies on the occupation of Germany.504 
Relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated rapidly across all aspects of 
foreign affairs. After the British government announced that it would no longer be 
able to offer support to the Greek Government in its civil war against the Greek 
Communist Party, on 12 March 1947—one month before the opening of the 
Buchenwald ‘parent trial’, before a joint session of Congress, President Truman asked 
Congress to support the Greek Government against the Communists and to provide 
assistance for Turkey, since that nation, too, had previously been dependent on British 
aid.  Truman argued that the defeat of Greek (and Turkish) communism was an 
immediate foreign-policy concern because communism would destabilize this 
important region. Truman argued that the United States were compelled to assist ‘free 
peoples’ in their struggles against ‘totalitarian regimes,’ because the spread of 
authoritarianism would ‘undermine the foundations of international peace and hence 
the security of the United States’.505 This was the beginning of the so-called ‘Truman 
Doctrine’, which came to describe the American commitment to provide economic, 
political, and military aid to any democratic regime that felt threatened by 
authoritarian forces (namely the Soviets or Soviet-backed internal groups). To support 
the new interventionist direction of American foreign policy the ‘Marshall Plan’, 
named after the popular Secretary of State George Marshall who announced the plan 
in June 1947.506  The ‘Marshall Plan’ was to provide money to rebuild and modernize 
(and Americanize) Europe’s shattered economies. By April 1948, four month after the 
end of the Dachau trials, ‘the US Congress approved George Marshall’s European 
Recovery Programme, so that millions of dollars could begin to flow into the 
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devastated economies of (Western) Europe, including Germany’.507  The Soviet 
Union refused to let its satellite states in Eastern Europe to accept assistance from the 
‘Marshall Plan’, as the plan required recipients to accept Western democracy, thus 
further dividing Europe into West and East.  
 
2. The Military Review Process 
Throughout the escalating tensions between the occupation powers, the rulings 
of the Dachau court underwent the Army review process. The following was the 
standard review process for sentences given to Dachau defendants as set up by the 
United States army: First, the Deputy Theatre Judge Advocate for War Crimes 
reviewed the trial and issued a review document and recommendation for the Theatre 
Judge Advocate. Then, the Theatre Judge Advocate could confirm or reduce the 
sentences. In addition, in cases where a defendant faced the death penalty, a third 
review was conducted by the Army’s EUCOM (United States European Command) 
or, later, the Military governor, who could uphold or reduce the death sentence. This 
review process took the place of any formal appeals courts.508  
There were notable, and, as it turned out, controversial, aspects of this military 
administrative review. The first was how few written records the reviewing officers 
generated. This lack of written reports began before the review; as mentioned before, 
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unlike common practice in American criminal and civil courts, the judges at Dachau 
did not write judgements explaining their decisions. Thus, the Army review process 
did not have any explanation as to why the original judgement and sentence (or 
acquittal) had been handed down by the court.  It was forced to make judgements 
based on the trial transcript and inferred from the sentences. The written record left by 
a reviewing officer was a short report that summarized the evidence given, the 
witnesses’ perceived credibility, clemency petitions received post trial, and a 
recommendation for approval or disapproval of the sentences for each defendant in 
the trial. Furthermore, after the first reviewing officer, no other officer read the entire 
trial transcript, only a summary. Whether sentences were approved or recommended 
for reduction, the reviewing officers did not leave written explanations for their 
decisions.509   
Further practices used by the army in its review process for Dachau derived 
their controversial nature from the fact that they were at odds with normal legal 
practice in American appellate courts.  Reviewers, when examining the trial transcript 
made an attempt to judge the credibly of the witness based solely on the written 
record, and had available post-trial petitions made by defence lawyers, family 
members and the accused themselves, which were not available at the time of the 
original trial.  Reviewers appeared (again, no definitive record is available) to be 
looking for evidence of individual criminal acts, which was not the prosecutor’s 
original intention. The Dachau defendants had been charged, and convicted of, 
participating in the ‘common design’ of the camp. Col Densen would later complain 
to the investigating congressional committee that had he known that the reviewers 
would look for evidence of individual criminality, he would have provided it instead 
of focusing during the trial on proving ‘common design’.510 
Despite the obvious issues with the administrative review process, the 
impression that initial reviews of the sentences handed out at Dachau frequently 
overturned initial sentencing is not supported by analysis of the ‘parent trials’ at 
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Dachau (Table II).511 The percentage of cases where sentences were reduced upon 
initial review was limited in all the trials.  Furthermore, for the cases where the 
sentence was reduced, the majority of reductions would have been limited in scope, 
i.e. reducing a death sentence to a life sentence or a five-year sentence to a three-year 
sentence.  The controversial reduction of Ilse Koch’s sentence from life to four years’ 
imprisonment, the subject of the Senate review discussed below, was exceptional.  
 
 
 Number changed/Total number  
(percentage change) 
Dachau 9/40 (22%) 
Mauthausen 9/61 (15%) 
Flossenbürg 2/45 (4%) 
Buchenwald 12/31 (39%) 
Table 5. Percentage of initial sentences reduced upon initial review for four major 
concentration camp ‘parent trials’ at Dachau. 
 
However, while the initial review process did not cause large-scale sentence 
reductions, the lack of a separate justice system meant that the Dachau sentences and 
their administration were in the power of the military occupation administration in the 
long term. The military war crimes administration was intimately connected with 
Army occupation policy, and rapidly-changing American foreign policy. Or, as the 
historian Frank Buscher succinctly put it: 
…the main problem was that the war crimes procedures of the Dachau and 
Nuremberg programmes did not allow for appellate reviews of the judgments 
and verdicts. As a result, US occupation authorities increasingly resorted to 
administrative processes and to granting executive clemency to ensure equal 
sentences for comparable offenses and procedural consistency’.512  
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As clemency and amnesty increasingly became part of larger American policy 
towards former Nazis in Germany from 1948 onwards, the Dachau sentences were 
included in the movement towards general amnesty. 
3. Clemency 
As early as 1946, with still a year and a half left of trials at Dachau, the 
American military government, as Neil Gregor has noted, ‘whose policies began to 
betray the preoccupation of the emerging Cold War, slowly moderated its 
commitment to a firm line against the majority’.513 As early as the summer of 1946, in 
Buscher’s view, ’two military officers and two civilian attorneys within the War 
Crimes Branch began to formulate plans for a clemency programme…the equalization 
of sentences was to be the foremost goal of a future clemency programme’.514 
As ‘denazification’ in the American zone was handed over to German control 
(and grew more and more lenient), the Dachau tribunals were increasingly at odds 
with larger American policy. There were practical reasons for giving the 
denazification tribunals to the Germans. The ‘Law for the Liberation from National 
Socialism and Militarism’ (Befreiungsgesetz) of March 1946, which, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, barred all members of the Nazi party (as well as its formations) from 
employment (besides menial work), affected a huge number of the German 
population: ‘over 27 per cent of the adult population of the U.S. Zone (3,669,239 
persons)’.515  The work needed to acquit or convict all of these men (and women) was 
enormous and put huge pressure on the occupation government.  As General Clay 
explained in a phone call with a member of the occupation government, ‘Actually, if 
you gave me 10,000 people over here, I couldn’t do that job. With 10,000 people I 
couldn’t do the job of denazification. It’s got to be done by the Germans’.516  General 
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Eisenhower complained that the denazification of the American zone would take 50 
years.517 However, because the economic and social elite were the majority of the 
members of the denazification courts (Spruchkammern), ‘it instituted a quasi-judicial 
process through which local communities could impose strict punishment on radical 
Nazis while rehabilitating the mass of ordinary party members’518 and  ‘in practice, 
this meant that responsibility for denazification…was placed into the hand of a self-
regulating community: unsurprisingly, the great majority of appeals were 
successful’.519  
In 1946, amnesty programmes in the American zone began; first, the so-called 
‘Youth Amnesty’ law, which reprieved all men and women born after 1919 from 
conviction by the denazification courts (as long as they were not in category I (Main 
Guilty Party) or II (Guilty/Incriminated); and then the ‘Christmas Amnesty’ of 
December 1946 in which all low-income or physically disabled individuals were 
amnestied. This affected a huge number of people and took denazification personnel 
until mid-1947 to process. As a result, when the courts returned to more serious 
offenders in fall 1947, ‘enthusiasm for the process had waned further; disillusionment 
was great, even among its supporters; the inconsistencies and inadequacies of the 
system meant that it was widely discredited’.520 
By the end of 1947, the Office of Military Government for the United States 
(OMGUS) came under increasing pressure from the US government to end the 
denazification programme and the Dachau tribunals. In October 1947, occupying 
authorities gave more authority to local denazification courts, allowing the courts to 
reclassify people, including downgrading classifications (for example, from Fellow 
Traveller (category IV) to Not Incriminated (category V)), ‘unless he had been a 
member of one of the organizations declared criminal at Nuremburg’.521  By January 
1948, 400,000 men and women had been cleared in this way.  As historian Harold 
Marcuse argued: 
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Although by late 1947 the denazification programme was no longer taken 
seriously, in order to save face and preserve the appearance of fairness Allied 
policymakers wanted to pursue it to completion. In January 1948 
denazification prosecutors were further empowered to downgrade suspected 
“offenders” without approval from Military Government…In a face-saving 
attempt to complete the denazification programme by that date [May 1948], 
the chambers began rubber-stamping the remaining cases, releasing thousands 
of the heavily suspect internees without hearings in early spring 1948.522  
By August 1948, only about a thousand cases remained. By the end of September, 
tribunal personnel were given notice of their imminent dismissal and the closing of 
the tribunals. Historian Gregor commented, ‘The fact that 1000 difficult cases could 
be dealt with in a month or so demonstrated in itself how perfunctory the procedure 
had become, even when committed former Nazis were concerned’.523  
While overarching political aims would play a significant role in clemency for 
Dachau defendants in the 1950s, based on the sentencing statistics amnesty politics 
did not play a major role in the original Dachau trials or in their initial sentence 
review. If emerging Cold War political concerns were a major force driving force for 
more lenient sentencing during the trial and upon initial review of the sentence, one 
would expect to see a significant increase in lenient sentences in the latter trials in late 
1946 and 1947.  However, analysis of the subsequent Dachau trials, which ran from 
October 1946 through November 1947, does not support this hypothesis. The reverse 
was seen when comparing trials during 1946 to trials in 1947 and there was an 
increase in more significant sentences (such as life imprisonment or death) in 1947 
compared to 1946. 
Consequently, while clemency and amnesty policies affected the 
denazification courts as early as 1946, it was not until after 1949 that the Dachau 
trials’ sentences were disturbed by the new direction in American foreign policy in 
Germany.  
The United States military governor General Clay established the Board of 
Clemency early in 1947 to review the Army trials sentences (from Nuremberg and 
Dachau). Although the Board of Clemency became the final reviewing authority, its 
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members did not have jurisdiction over death sentences and ‘defendants whom 
military tribunals had found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity’.524 A 
Board of Review replaced the Board of Clemency in August 1947.  (Eventually four 
more Review Boards would be established within the Theatre Judge Advocate)  The 
Board’s task was to ensure fair trials by examining the Deputy Theatre Judge 
Advocates’ reports and recommendations. The Board also investigated charges of 
prisoner mistreatment.  After ‘the initial examination by the deputy theatre judge 
advocate, the Board of Review, the theatre judge advocate and the military governor, 
the number of court-assessed death sentences fell from 426 to 298…. Altogether, the 
theatre judge advocate and the military governor rejected only sixty-nine 
recommendations for sentence reduction’. 525  One of these approved sentence 
reductions was that of the notorious Ilse Koch. Her sentence reduction, along with an 
investigation into accusations of torture made by the defendants of the Malmédy 
massacre, put the Dachau trial process in the spotlight. 
 
B.  Controversy: Questions of mistreatment at the Malmédy Trial and the 
Sentence Reduction for Ilse Koch 
Two scandals undermined the perceived legitimacy of the Dachau trial 
process: the reduction of Ilse Koch’s sentence from life to four years and the 
accusation by defendants from the Malmédy trial that they had been tortured for 
confessions while in US custody.  These two scandals were widely covered in the US 
and German press and ‘reinforced growing perceptions within Germany that those 
convicted at Dachau were victims of a vengeful and unjust trial system’.526  A ‘beast’ 
got a reduced sentence, while ‘ordinary soldiers’ were tortured for confessions. These 
scandals put those in charge of the trials on the defensive.  The Theatre Judge 
Advocate Division of the Army’s European Command and, beginning in 1949, the US 
High Commission ‘mainly concentrated on ensuring the programme’s integrity to 
avoid additional charges of misconduct and becoming the targets of attacks from 
critics.’527 This furthered the pressure for an organized withdrawal from prosecuting 
																																																								
524 Buscher, The US War Crimes Trial Programme, 52. 
525 Ibid., 53. 
526 Jardim, The Mauthausen Trial, 208 




former Nazis and, while defending the trial programme in public, for the quiet 
implementation of mass clemency for those convicted by American military courts.  
 
1. Allegations of mistreatment from the Malmédy defendants 
The Malmédy defendants, the Waffen-SS soldiers of the Sixth Panzer Army 
accused and convicted of shooting 84 American soldiers who had surrendered during 
the Battle of the Bulge, alleged mistreatment by American authorities before their trial 
at Dachau.528  The Malmédy defendants were not the only Germans in US custody to 
complain of mistreatment. For example, Colonel-General Gert Naumann, a member 
of Hitler’s general staff published his diary in 1984, which he criticized the supposed 
mistreatment of German POWs while they were interned at Dachau 1945-1946.529  He 
wrote that the internees were pushed and punched, especially when entering the camp 
and when forced to tour the crematorium, which held pictures of the dead inmates and 
other atrocities the Americans had discovered there.  He felt this was unjust treatment.   
However, within his diary, he undermined his complaints by admitting that daily life 
in Dachau was ‘downright comfortable’, even as he grumbled about the lack of letters 
and packages allowed through to the inmates. 530   More serious charges of 
mistreatment were brought by a group of American lawyers on behalf of their clients, 
the defendants in the Malmédy trial. The complaints included the practice of physical 
and psychological torture by American interrogators to obtain confessions used to 
convict the men.   
The Malmédy trial ended in July 1946 with 43 of 74 defendants sentenced to 
death. Upon review, all but 12 death sentences were commuted. Colonel Willis M 
Everett Jr, the court-appointed US military attorney for the defendants, petitioned 
early in 1948 for the army to further review the case as his clients had not received a 
fair trial. Colonel Everett alleged that ‘the majority of confessions signed by his 
clients…had been acquired through the use of physical abuse, mock trials, stool 
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pigeons, of phoney priests’531 while the SS-men were detained at Schwabisch Hall 
from December 1945 to April 1946 for pre-trial investigations. This alleged 
mistreatment had been mentioned to the court during the trial, when three of the nine 
defendants who took the stand (out of seventy-four defendants in total) spoke of 
mistreatment that had forced them into signing their confessions.532  The court did 
nothing; its inaction indicating the court members did not believe the accusations 
merited belief.  However, within a year of their conviction, almost every one of the 
accused ‘began submitting affidavits repudiating their former confessions and 
alleging aggravated duress of all types’.533 Col Everett used these affidavits in May 
1948 when he petitioned the US Supreme Court on behalf of his clients for writs of 
habeas corpus.534  Col Everett’s petition failed, but only narrowly. The justices voted 
4-4, which, in US law, left the judgments of the Malmédy military court intact. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s tied vote prompted Secretary of the Army535 
Kenneth C. Royall, himself a Harvard-educated lawyer, to ‘appoint a commission 
under the leadership of Texas Supreme Court Justice Gordon Simpson to investigate 
Col Everett’s allegations and review 127 other death sentences handed down by the 
Dachau courts.’536 The military governor of Germany, General Clay, also investigated 
the allegations surrounding Malmédy, and ordered an examination of the case by the 
Administration of Justice Review Board. 
The two investigations came to differing conclusions. In September 1948, the 
Simpson Commission, the board convened by Secretary Royall, submitted its report 
first. The Simpson report exonerated the methods used by the investigators together 
with the trial programme as a whole. It concluded that there had been ‘no general or 
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systematic use of improper methods to secure prosecution evidence’.537  However, in 
a move perhaps undermining its report, it also suggested that all the remaining 
Malmédy death sentences be commuted.  The Administration of Justice report, 
delivered in February 1949 to General Clay, was much more critical of the army’s 
behaviour. The Administration report stated that violations had taken place including 
mock trials, in which the prisoners were forced to wear black hoods. This ‘at times 
exceeded the bounds of propriety’.538 Furthermore interrogators had threatened to 
harm family members of prisoners. It added that ‘undoubtedly in the heat of the 
moment…interrogators did use some physical force on a recalcitrant suspect’.539   
In the same month as the administration report was delivered, Judge Edward 
Van Roden, a member of the Simpson Commission who had originally signed off on 
its conclusions, claimed, in an article in The Progressive with the explosive title 
‘American Atrocities in Germany’, that ‘beatings and mock trials were in fact 
commonplace and that such activities had caused “permanent and irreparable 
damage” to “the prestige of America and American justice”. Military authorities at 
Dachau, Van Roden insisted, had “abused the powers of victory and prostituted 
justice to vengeance”’.540 This article and the Administration report appeared to 
support Willis M Everett’s claim that the Malmédy defendants had been mistreated. 
In response to the administration report and furor over The Progressive article, 
Secretary Royall and General Clay agreed to a temporary halt of all executions 
resulting from the American trial programmes (from both NMT and Dachau) and the 
Senate called for an investigation into the Malmédy investigation and into the 
American trial programme as a whole.541 
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2. Buchenwald: Ilse Koch Sentence Reduction 
In 1948, five review boards set up by the US army under JAG were busy re-
examining the sentences given in each trial at the military trials at Dachau (and 
NMT). The JAG members reviewed the trials and then wrote a report, which after 
approval eventually was intended for General Clay, recommending reaffirming or 
reducing each sentence. The boards were lenient towards defendants –the 426 death 
sentences handed down by American courts were reduced to 298 (representing a 30% 
reduction).  For example, among those who had their sentences reduced were ten 
members of the Einstazgruppen, responsible between them for killing at least two 
million people.542 Upon review of the Buchwald ‘parent trial’, the theatre judge 
advocate board members recommended the reduction of Ilse Koch’s sentence from 
life in prison to four years on the ‘grounds that there was insufficient credible 
evidence to sustain a life sentence.’543 General Clay approved all of the reductions, 
including Koch’s.  
When Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall received word about Ilse Koch’s 
sentence reduction, he confidentially asked for a second opinion from another Theatre 
Judge Advocate General, Thomas H Green. Green was the first outsider to examine 
the JAG recommendation and General Clay’s decision to reduce Koch’s sentence. 
After reviewing the case, Green wrote to Royall stating that in his opinion,  
…the defendant’s conviction and a substantial prisoner term [was] justified 
due to credible proof that Koch participated in the administration of 
Buchenwald, struck inmates, and repeatedly reported them for punishment. 
Despite his own feelings that Koch should have served a long sentence, Green 
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discovered no irregularities in the review process…in the rather surprising 
reduction of the court’s initial punishment.544 
Both the general public and chief prosecutor Lt Col William Denson were 
furious. General Clay had appeared to understand that Ilse Koch’s sentence reduction 
would be poorly received by the American public and kept the board review 
recommendation and his approval confidential for several months.545 However, three 
months after the Koch reduction in September 1948, Stars and Stripes reported the 
reduction. There was a ‘world-wide storm of angry and disgusted protest’.546 The 
press covered the reduction heavily, taking the opportunity to rehash the lurid details 
of Koch’s crimes (including, again incorrectly, the stories of her human skin tattooed 
gloves and purses and lampshades). The Harvard Law School Record wrote:  
The Army on the whole has seemed to be somewhat reticent to make a full 
and adequate disclosure of the record and other important facts. The press, 
however, took the initiative. In its entirety, the story had several sensational 
aspects, all of which made good copy.547 
Lt Col Denson, now retired to the private sector, found out about the reduction by 
reading it in the paper. He reacted by launching ‘an aggressive campaign in the press. 
His letter to editors drew praise and support nationwide and was [were] reprinted in 
dozens of papers across the country’.548 Lt Col Densen opinioned that, perhaps ‘Clay 
fell into the same pitfall I fell into when I first heard these stories [namely, not 
believing that anyone could be so cruel]’.549 
In 1950, in his autobiography, General Clay gave his own explanation of why 
he chose to approve this particular reduction. In over 500 pages, he mentioned the Ilse 
Koch trial just once: 
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…as I examined the record [of the Buchenwald ‘parent trial’] I could not find 
her a major participant in the crimes of Buchenwald. A sordid, disreputable 
character, she had delighted in flaunting her sex, emphasized by tight sweaters 
and short skirts, before the long-confined male prisoners, and had developed 
their bitter hatred. Nevertheless these were not offenses for which she was 
being tried and so I reduced her sentence, expecting the reaction which came. 
Perhaps I erred in judgement but no one can share the responsibility of a 
reviewing officer. Later the Senate committee which unanimously criticised 
this action heard witnesses who gave testimony not contained in the record 
before me.550 I could only take action on that record.551 
General Clay was incorrect about the reasons for Ilse Koch’s conviction – she was not 
convicted to life imprisonment by the court for wearing short skirts, although inmates 
did testify to this detail. She was convicted for beating inmates, and ordering others to 
beaten to death. Still, General Clay was angered at being ‘charged with deliberate 
softness in war crimes’ as he ‘had approved the death sentences of more than 200 war 
criminals’.552  Despite General Clay’s protests, the Ilse Koch sentence reduction 
caused enough of furore in the American press, for Senate to warrant the creation of a 
subcommittee to inspect it. Furthermore, the Malmédy accusations of mistreatment 
also received thorough inspection by the US Senate.  
 
C.  Congressional Review of Malmédy and Koch Cases: Judgement on the 
Dachau Trial Programme 
 
1. The Koch Review (December 1948) 
While the Malmédy Review, held four months later and focusing largely on 
pretrial interrogation methods, resulted in a generally positive judgement of the 
procedure of the trials at Dachau, the Koch Review resulted in a critical judgement on 
the review process after the trials. The majority of the Koch congressional review 
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focused on the Buchenwald trial and the subsequent Army review that led to Koch’s 
sentence reduction.  The Senate subcommittee had no authority to change Koch’s 
sentence or even for the army to change its practices. It could simply make 
recommendations. The subcommittee described its raison d'etre as ‘to analyse the 
judicial processes involved in the conduct of this trial by the United States military 
government authorities to make certain that, in the event flaws were discovered in the 
system, these deficiencies would be promptly brought to the attention of the 
appropriate authority’.553   
Congress empowered a subcommittee to investigate the sentence reduction of 
Ilse Koch. The subcommittee was chaired by Senator Homer Ferguson  (MI); other 
members were Senator Herbert O’Conor, subcommittee Chief Counsel William 
Rogers, and assistant chief counsel Francis Flannagan. All the major players in the 
Dachau trial programme were called as witnesses before the subcommittee: along 
with Lt Col Denson, the chief prosecutor, Army Secretary Kenneth Royall, was 
called, as was Emil Kiel, the president of the court for the Buchenwald ‘parent trial’; 
the chief defence counsel at the Buchenwald ‘parent trial’, Carl Whitney; Lt Col Clio 
Straight, now Chief of the War Crimes Branch of Judge Advocate General (JAG); and 
Col Edward Young, chief of the Litigation Branch of the War Crimes Branch of JAG.  
The subcommittee met in executive (closed) session, not in public hearings, although 
both the subcommittee’s report and transcripts from the hearing were made available 
to the press and public just days after the hearings ended.554  
The first man interviewed by the subcommittee was Secretary of the Army 
Kenneth Royall; Secretary Royall was also the man in charge of investigating the 
charge of torture of the Malmédy trial defendants; Royall, who would be called to 
testify four months later in the Malmédy investigation, was spending quite a bit of 
time in front of Congressional subcommittees defending the Dachau trial programme.  
Senator Ferguson began with preliminary questions about the organization and 
operation of the war crimes military courts at Dachau. This was followed by a 
discussion of the likelihood of repealing the reduction of Koch’s sentence. Royall 
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correctly reported that once General Clay had approved the reduction, there was no 
further recourse. The reduction would stand, regardless of the Senate subcommittee’s 
findings. 
 Colonel Young, who was chief of the litigation department in the War Crimes 
section of JAG, was asked to explain to the subcommittee how the reduction of 
Koch’s sentence had came about. Col Young placed responsibility squarely on his 
superior Colonel Straight, as he was the first to recommend the reduction of the Koch 
sentence. Colonel Straight, in turn, testified that he based his recommendation on a 
short summation of evidence, focusing mainly on the ‘credibility’ of the witnesses, 
written by one Col James L Harbaugh— the last man to read the entire court record 
(over 9000 printed pages). After him, only a short summation of the evidence, 
followed by a recommendation, was presented up the chain of command.  Nowhere in 
Young or Harbaugh’s reviews did the men indicate their reasons for why they, as 
William Rogers, the law member of the subcommittee put it, ‘so seriously disagreed 
with the original court.’555  As Col. Straight explained to the subcommittee, ‘…I wish 
to state that there was no legal or administrative regulation prescribing what the 
contents of my reviews and recommendations were to be. They could have been 
summary in nature, consisting of essentially a conclusion only’.556 
The following is just one example of how the subcommittee questioned Col 
Young as to how a reviewing officer could possibly reduce Koch’s sentence by so 
many years: 
Senator Ferguson: Is it not fundamental, that courts generally in America rely 
upon: that if they hear and see the witnesses, they are the judges of the fact?... 
Mr Rogers: What occurs, I think, to the committee, and certainly occurs to me, 
is: If any of these things are true or substantially true, enough to justify the 
judgement, how you could possibly reduce the sentence to four years. 
Colonel Young: I would try to explain that. But I am not the reviewing 
officer…they tried thirty people under a common charge of joint atrocity or 
conspiracy…Now these people were all found guilty of having participated in 
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the “common design”; but as you can see, and this is not indicated in this 
review, that if they had a cook who merely participated by cooking meals for a 
week, if he was held guilty, he still might be a participant; but his degree of 
guilty was not great. So, you proportion sentences based on the degree of guilt, 
which, in turn, is based on the degree of participation. Now, they say in this 
review of the record that this woman did beat somebody. Well, you will have 
to go to the record to see whether that beating was a mere slapping, and I think 
probably, I don’t know, I have not seen the record, it will show that this was 
not a serious beating…I’m just saying they have to apportion… 
Senator O’Conor: Except it is inherent in the sentence.557 
The subcommittee believed that the Court’s original sentence of life imprisonment for 
Koch must have reflected its belief that her crimes were serious. 
The congressmen were perhaps most shocked by the lack of written records 
left by the court and review process. The reviewing authorities did not document the 
reasons for their reductions. 
Senator Rogers: Could the committee send us any records that you have 
available for us, or if you do not have them, could you send for them, any 
records which would show the justification for this [the reduction of Koch’s 
sentence]? 
Col Young: …I will ask for them, but I’m almost convinced that you are not 
going to get any, that there was no other official record then the review 
mentioned…I don’t think that there is any official record that was made at the 
time. 
Senator O’Conor: That is very surprising…All of us who ever had any part in 
trials know full well how undependable memory is, how treacherous it is, and 
where you have undertaken such a serious thing as this, and for your own 
protection you should have it in writing…558 
The lack of written judgements was normal practice for both the original court and 
reviewing authorities of the Dachau trials. The IMT and NMT both issued written 
rulings from its judges. While no clear explanation was given regarding the decision 
to forgo explanations of court decisions, one can hypothesise that the emphasis on 
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speed as paramount to the Dachau trial programme to get through many hundreds of 
defendants had led to this practice. Still, it remained hard to understand, as written 
explanation of court judgements was traditional for all American courts, both civilian 
and military. Written explanations of why certain sentences were passed (or why they 
were reduced) would have allowed for more uniform judgements across the Dachau 
trials. They would have also allowed the court to explain why certain crimes deserved 
a specific punishment; this in turn could have served as precedent for awarding the 
same sentence to the same sorts of crimes. 
Like the press, the committee focused (rather undue) energy on the question of 
whether or not Koch used the tattooed skins of inmates for gloves and lampshades. 
Considering the charge was disproved in the trial, the Senate Committee showed great 
interest in the skins. The congressmen peppered Denson with questions, seemingly 
fascinated, about Koch’s alleged use of tattooed human skins: Did she use it? Did you 
have exhibits of the skins? Where did you find the skins? How large were the pieces? 
Did Densen have evidence of Koch’s possession of skin from inmates she personally 
came into contact with? For example: 
 Senator Ferguson: Did you have evidence that she did use human skin? 
Col Densen: I had evidence sir, to the effect that the persons who had entered 
her room, her bedroom, had seen articles of human skin in her bedroom. 
Senator Ferguson: Did you have any exhibits of the skin? 
Col Densen: That was in her bedroom? We had no exhibits of skin that was 
seen in her bedroom. We had exhibits of human skin, the same skin. 
Senator Ferguson: Where did you find these exhibits? 
Col Densen: Those exhibits, sir, had been found in various offices and homes 
throughout the camp when it was overrun by our troops. The American war 
crimes teams that moved in directly on the heels of the combat soldiers, 
collected this evidence, and they had a stack about 2 feet high. 
Senator Ferguson: How large were the pieces? 
Col Densen: The size of a man’s chest, one of them was. 
Senator O’Coner: Did you have evidence of her possession of human skin 
which compared with individuals that had been known in the flesh and who 
she had contact with? 
Col Densen: Jean Collette, I think was the name of either a Belgian or a 




think a schooner or galleon on his chest, and he was working on a detail and 
Ilse passed by. I am not sure whether someone saw her note his number or not, 
but anyway he disappeared. That was at the close of the day, He was never 
seen again. The tattoo was next seen in the pathological department where it 
was being tanned and it was later seen in her bedroom. 
Senator Ferguson: Who saw it in her bedroom? 
Col Densen: A man by the name of Froloess. 
Senator Ferguson: A prisoner? 
Col Densen: Yes, sir. A German prisoner. 
Senator O’Coner: Did you have several instances somewhat similar to that 
where the particular tattoo was used? 
Col Densen: That was the only one of that nature at all.559 
Col Denson seemed wearied by the continued intense focus of the Senators (and, 
perhaps the press and public at large) finally spoke up: 
Let me say, in all sincerity, I did not feel that this skin business, because of the 
tenuousness of the proof, was of so much importance. It merely showed the 
background of what went on and what took place there. The gravamen of her 
action was in beating prisoners with her own hand, and causing them to be 
beaten so that they died. That was the matter that was really the basis for that 
sentence, I am sure.’560 
Before the congressmen, Col Densen contended that he could have produced more 
witnesses against Koch, who could have testified further to her beatings and, perhaps 
even given more evidence about the tattooed skins, but he chose only the most 
reliable witnesses, and for expediency’s sake, only witnesses who could testify 
against more than one defendant. He concluded his testimony before the 
subcommittee with a comment on Koch’s guilty and her ‘gratuitous’ power: 
Mr Rogers: Mr Densen, based on your knowledge of this case, would you say 
that she [Koch] was less culpable than the other defendants? 
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Col Densen: I think she was more culpable because this was gratuitous on her 
part. There was no reason in the world for her exercising authority that she 
exercised. So to my mind, she was more culpable.561 
After Densen, several witnesses from the original Buchenwald trial (Dr Kurt Sitte, 
now a professor of physics at Syracuse University, Dr Paul Heller, and Dr Petr Zenkl, 
the former Deputy Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia) were called to give their 
testimony again – describing conditions and crimes at Buchenwald, especially 
pertaining to Ilse Koch – to the Senate subcommittee. This part of the subcommittee 
hearings was a bit like a trial de novo for Koch. Certainly, the senators were asking 
questions that they could have read about in the original trial transcript.   They 
questioned the three men about their time at Buchenwald, asking them to give 
evidence about Ilse Koch’s activities.  The subcommittee also questioned Brigadier-
General Emil Charles Kiel, of United States Air Force, who had led the Buchenwald 
Court. The General gave surprisingly vague answers about his time on the court, 
claiming that he had trouble remembering many details of the trial or debate in 
deciding the original verdicts. He mostly answered questions with ‘yes, sir’ and ‘no, 
sir’ and provided disappointingly little insight into the court’s decision-making 
process.  
Having heard the witnesses from the Buchenwald trial, the subcommittee 
turned with renewed criticism to the next witness, Col J. I. Harbaugh, the judge 
advocate on General Clay’s staff, who agreed with recommendations from Col 
Straights office, and advocated to the General that Ilse Koch’s sentence be reduced: 
Mr Rogers: In this case, Colonel, nobody states any reasons [for Koch’s 
sentence reduction]. That is what the committee can’t figure out… 
Col Harbaugh: The reasons were in our minds. Unfortunately, they weren’t 
put down. But under Colonel Straight’s review I believe that would he called 
the sufficiency of the evidence represented what he believed to be supported 
by credible evidence. 
Senator Ferguson: Then he passed on the credibility? 
Col Harbaugh: Yes, sir. 
																																																								





Senator Ferguson: Now, you show us the rule that allows a reviewing court to 
pass on the credibility of the evidence. 
Col Harbaugh: We did it uniformly. 
Senator Ferguson: Show us the rule. 
Col Harbaugh: It was a rule of procedure for our courts. 
Senator Ferguson: Show us the rule of procedure that allows that to be 
done….Are you a lawyer? 
Col Harbaugh: Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson: Have you ever known appellate courts to do that? 
Col Harbaugh: No, sir. But there were different kinds of trials.  
Senator Ferguson: That is what I want. If they are difference, why are they not 
in writing? Why would not that thing be in writing? It is not a common law 
procedure. It is not that a lawyer ever learned anything like that in a law 
school. Now, how would he ever get the idea that he had a right to pass on the 
credibility?562 
Already perturbed by these revelations, when Col Harbaugh revealed that the post-
trial reviews took into account post trial petitions (i.e. evidence that the original court 
would not have seen), Senator Ferguson exploded: 
Senator Ferguson: So they [the review board] had different evidence than the 
court had? 
Col Harbaugh: They had more evidence then the court had. 
Senator Ferguson: Different? 
Col Harbaugh: Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson: Then they considered that and on that evidence they 
decided that some of the witnesses were not telling the truth? 
Col Harbaugh: Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson: And for that reason they disregarded certain testimony and 
that caused them to reduce the sentence?  
Col Harbaugh: Yes sir. 
Senator Ferguson: And you followed that procedure as a lawyer? 
Col Harbaugh: Yes, sir. 
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Senator Ferguson: Do you know of any procedure in America in our 
administration of justice that allows the appellate court to consider evidence 
that was not before the trial court in the reduction of a sentence? 
Col Harbaugh: No, sir. 
Senator Ferguson: Is that in conformity of our ideas of justice?...Were we not 
trying over there to do justice in accordance with American principles of 
justice?563 
Essentially, the review process allowed a few men to substitute their judgements for 
that of the court.  At its inception, the American war crimes trial programme at NMT 
and Dachau (and the IMT, for that matter) had no appellate plan. After an America 
tribunal sentenced defendants, there was no higher court to rehear arguments or 
petitions. The only recourse the defendants and their lawyers had was to appeal to 
individual men in the War Crimes Department and the Military Government.  These 
men, Col Straight and General Clay, took the place of an appellate court. 
Administrative decision-making, much more susceptible to political pressure, filled in 
for a hierarchical justice system of appellate courts.  
The subcommittee saw no justification for Ilse Koch’s reduction of sentence. 
The senators ‘particularly faulted the relationship between the charges of the 
indictment against Koch and the review practices’.564 The subcommittee believed the 
review practice gave accused and defence lawyers an unfair advantage. Furthermore, 
the review process looked at individual crimes and seemed to overlook the original 
charge of participation in the ‘common design’ of the camp, which was proved in 
court. The subcommittee felt ‘the prosecutor would undoubtedly have put greater 
emphasis on specific crimes committed by Koch, had he known that this would be 
crucial during the review stage’.565  The subcommittee called for better cooperation 
between the prosecutor and the review authorities. The Washington Post published 
this summary of the Senate hearings and subcommittee report: 
Many people who were both amazed and shocked at the reduction of the war 
crimes sentence imposed on the notorious Ilse Koch will be heartened by the 
Senate investigating committee report taking sharp issue with the Army. The 
																																																								
563 Ibid., 1104. 
564 Buscher, The US War Crimes Trial Programme, 55. 




Ferguson committee has concluded after a painstaking analysis of the evidence 
that Army reviewing authorities were completely unjustified in commuting her 
imprisonment from life to four years. The committee confirms the picture of 
Frau Koch as a degraded, sadistic specimen of humanity whose whim caused 
the death of many concentration camp inmates and who took a fancy to 
objects d’art made of human skin…. 
Perhaps the most damning factor brought to light by the Ferguson committee 
was the shoddy fashion in which the verdict was followed up. Ilse Koch was 
tried, not for specific crimes, but for the larger offense of participating in the 
Nazi extermination scheme. But the tack taken by reviewing authorities was 
that each specific act should have been analysed. This was completely at 
variance with the scope of the trial. The chief prosecutor in the case, William 
D. Denson, confirmed in a letter published in the newspaper last September 
that plenty of evidence was available to connect her with individual crimes. 
And the committee notes that many of these would have justified a sentence of 
life imprisonment.566 
In the end, the subcommittee could only offer a strong rebuke and recommendations 
for ‘next time’.  The Americans could not retry Ilse Koch for the same crimes without 
risking ‘double jeopardy’.567 Instead General Clay urged the German authorities to try 
Ilse Koch for crimes against German victims at Buchenwald, promising American 
cooperation. Clay ‘urged the minister president of Bavaria to send a representative to 
work out charges against Koch with JAG’s war crime branch personnel, centring on 
crimes against German citizens’.568 Upon her release from American custody in 1949, 
Ilse Koch was rearrested by West German authorities, tried and convicted for crimes 
against German and Austrian citizens at Buchenwald from 27 November 1950 until 
15 January 1951, and sentenced to life imprisonment.  Ilse Koch committed suicide in 
her prison cell in September 1967.569 
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2. The Malmédy Review (April-June and September 1949) 
Four months after the Koch Senate committee closed, the Senate review of the 
Malmédy trial opened. It had been called in response to the Simpson Committee 
report and the Administration report.570 The subcommittee investigation hearings 
opened in March 1949, chaired by Senator Raymond E Baldwin, and included 
members Senator Estes Kefauver and Senator Lester C Hunt. To placate the more 
radical critics of the army, the subcommittee invited Senator Joseph McCarthy, an 
extreme decrier of the army, to join the committee as a visiting member. Senator 
McCarthy dominated the first two months of the hearings with his trademark 
inquisitorial style. 571  After Senator McCarthy dramatically withdrew from the 
committee in May, accusing it of ‘whitewashing the Army’s…Gestapo and OGPU 
[the Soviet Union secret police] tactics’,572 the hearings continued in a more orderly 
fashion.  By its own tally, the Malmédy subcommittee heard 108 witnesses, including 
defence attorneys, investigating officers, members of the court, reviewing officers, 
and even religious leaders, over a period of several months before issuing its final 
report.573  
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 The Malmédy subcommittee’s final report was published on 13 October 1949. 
The report was largely a positive assessment of the trial programme and the conduct 
of the army. It serves as excellent overview of some of the controversial issues that 
arose in the American trial programme at Dachau; namely the charges of mistreatment 
during the pre-trial investigations as well as aspects of the trial and review procedures. 
The practices of the pretrial investigations were compared to standard American 
practices of investigation and prisoner treatment.  
As discussed above, the main impetus for the investigation by the 
subcommittee was the accusations of mistreatment and duress of the accused by the 
investigating officers and the prosecution team, made by Colonel Everett and 
documented in the Administration Review. The alleged abuse took place while the 
men were concentration for pre-trial investigation and interrogation at Schwäbisch 
Hall (The men were transferred to Dachau in May 1946 and held at Dachau during 
their trial). The twelve man investigation team had separate cells available to them to 
hold the prisoners they were interrogating – the committee found no difference 
between these cells and other cells in the prison, except they had two doors so were 
more secure. Prisoners alleged that they were kept in special cells for weeks on end 
without food. The investigation team said they were kept for 2 or 3 days at a time and 
with full rations.  The committee sided with the investigation team – pointing out; that 
there are only five such cells and several hundred suspects were screened during a 
period of 4 months’574 –it was not possible in that time frame, with that number of 
prisoners for the men to be confided for very long.  The subcommittee reported that 
‘there is no doubt that many of the suspects in the Malmédy case were kept in 
separate cells for extended periods of time, but [the subcommittee] has no criticism or 
complaint of this normal practice’.575 Furthermore, the suspects were given water and, 
with ‘the exception of one occasion’ (when the men were punished for 
communicating with each other and put on bread and water ration for a few days), the 
defendants were fed ‘three adequate meals a day’.576 
The Malmédy defendants and their lawyers claimed that ‘tricks’ had been used 
to coerce confessions.  These ‘tricks’ were relatively standard in American criminal 
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law investigations, such as the ‘pretence of having information from other accused 
implicating the suspect being interrogated’.577 The subcommittee wrote in their final 
report that they felt ‘they cannot condemn them since they represent the usual and 
accepted methods of criminal investigations’.578 The committee addressed some of the 
specific tricks such as the use of mock trials, in which a table covered in black cloth 
with a crucifix and two candles in a dark room was the faux court, to elicit 
confessions.  They found that in twelve cases out of several hundred, mock trials were 
used, although the defendants were never told specifically that they were on trial – 
they were just led to believe so for a short while. When ‘these mock trials had reached 
a certain point they would be disbanded and the prisoner taken back to his cell, after 
which the person who had posed as his friend would attempt to persuade the suspect 
to give a statement’.579 There was not any evidence of ‘any physical brutality in 
connection with the mock trials themselves’.580   The subcommittee condemned the 
practice, but did ‘understand’ that this practice was based on the practice of pre-trial 
examination by a judge in Germany.   
The committee also investigated other accusations of the use of ‘tricks’ 
including hoods, fake priests, and fake hangings. While it is ‘an undisputed fact that 
hoods were placed over the heads of the suspects when they were moved from their 
various cells and back and forth around the prisoners, ‘in view of the previous 
difficulties incurred in this case when no security was used….the subcommittee does 
not condemn the use of hoods’.581 The subcommittee rejected the charge of the use of 
fake priests outright, reporting: ‘It is considered most unfortunate that many 
prominent religious people have been misled by the use of uncorroborated 
statements…and apparently accepted the allegation as being true.’ 582  The 
subcommittee also rejected the alleged use of fake hangings; ‘the subcommittee feels 
in the absence of competent evidence to support allegations concerning hanging that, 
in fact, they never happened’. 583  The army investigators had used spies and 
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informants to secure evidence, which the subcommittee approved of, as ‘traditionally, 
the use of stool pigeons has been practiced by our American prosecuting authorities 
and is a recognized practice in criminal investigations’.584  
The second half of the subcommittee report concerns the trial and the review 
procedures. The subcommittee, by its own admission, ‘was keenly interested in the 
various reviews and investigations that were made by the Army of the Malmédy 
case’,585 and the apparent effort that was made to make certain that no accused 
suffered because of procedural or pre-trial errors. As in all war-crimes cases, the 
findings and sentences of the court had to be reviewed by the staff judge advocate. 
Because the Malmédy trial followed the same procedure and same review process as 
all the courts at Dachau, particularly the concentration camp trials, the subcommittee 
report served a Senate review of the entire trial process. 
Unlike the Koch subcommittee, the Malmédy committee accepted outright 
that the Dachau trials followed their own unique set of rules: 
The rules of procedure under which this case was tried were not those that are 
used by Anglo-Saxon nations in regularly constituted military or civilian 
courts. In attempt to evaluate the manner in which the court was conducted, 
the subcommittee soon found that it was impossible to do so until this point 
was clearly understood.586  
The Malmédy subcommittee offered no rebuke of these unique rules of procedure in 
general. However, the defence team had made a series of accusations that the trial 
procedure at Dachau was inherently unfair. For example the defence complained that 
they were not given adequate defence time as they had 74 accused men to defend and 
these defendants were only made available to the defence team on 17 and 18 April, 
and the trial began on 16 May. The subcommittee wrote that ‘due to the limited time 
available, the defence was considerably handicapped in preparing its case for trial. 
The subcommittee does not believe that this seriously affected the outcome of the 
trial’. 587  While dismissing this complaint with, the Malmédy subcommittee 
investigated in detail the following two charges: that the mass trial was a 
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problematic/illegal format and that the defence team had not adequately representing 
its clients by not allowing them to testify in court in their own defence. 
One of the more controversial aspects of the Dachau tribunal programme was 
the use of mass trials. The major positive aspect of mass trial, indeed its raison d'être, 
was speed. In the first day of the Malmédy trial, the defence counsellors asked the 
court for a motion of severance because a mass trial would make it difficult to defend 
each defendant fully. The court denied this motion. Furthermore, the War Crimes 
Review Board upon examination stated that, ‘it did not appear that the denial of the 
motion resulted in an injustice to any of the accused to such a degree as would 
warrant a new trial’.588 The Malmédy subcommittee commented that it did ‘not feel 
that it has the authority to serve as an appellate court to judge the ruling in this 
particular case’.589 But the committee did go on in its report to make suggestions for 
‘future trials of this kind’:590 
When so many accused, of varying ranks, are being tried together on a single 
charge, there must be some conflict of interest between the superiors and the 
subordinates. On the other hand, it is recognized that the scarcity of officers 
and the time elements that are involved in matters of this kind, made it 
extremely difficult to conduct large numbers of trials for separate 
defendants.591 
The subcommittee went on to make a garbled suggestion for a ‘basic rule [to] govern 
cases of this kind’ suggesting that ‘where there is more than one defendant and it 
appears that their joint indictment and trial will result in a conflict of interest to the 
extent that an individual defendant or group of defendants will be so seriously 
prejudiced as to prevent a fair and just trial, they should be indicted and tied 
separately or appropriate severances granted.’592 This hardly clarified matters, but it is 
the final word the report had on the subject. 
The committee spent considerable time commenting on ‘one point which was 
developed during the course of the subcommittee’s investigation, which is believed to 
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be of great importance in this case’— the failure of the accused to take the stand on 
their own behalf.  
…it appears that it took considerable persuasion and argument on the part of 
certain of the American defence counsel to persuade the accused not to take 
the stand. On the surface, that appears to be most unusual. It is the opinion of 
the subcommittee that it is an inherent right of an accused to take he stand in 
his own defence…593 
Because the defendants claimed they had been mistreated, the committee pointed out 
that the defendants should have taken the stand and testified to their ill treatment in 
court. 
It would seem entirely likely that, had these statements been proven at the time 
of the trial to the satisfaction of the court and reviewing authorities, they might 
have served as the basis for a different decision in this case. Therefore, the 
subcommittee is of the opinion that the defence counsel in this case either did 
not believe the stories of the defendants, of which they apparently had 
knowledge, concerning physical mistreatment, or that they erred grievously in 
not introducing such testimony into the record. 
It is difficult for the subcommittee to reconcile the fact that this was not done. 
And the apparent acceptance and support of the various members of the 
defence counsel now give to the affidavits submitted some 16 months later by 
the defendants in this case.594  
The committee found the defendants’, and their lawyers’, claims of maltreatment 
questionable because the men did not testify in court at the time to this mistreatment. 
Whether their lawyers, who encouraged them not to take the stand, misrepresented the 
Malmédy defendants, or if the Malmédy men were opportunistic after the trial with 
their complaints of mistreatment, the committee did not directly comment upon. But it 
can be assumed that the subcommittee members did not believe the defendants’ 
accusations of torture because their report offered no strong condemnation of 
misrepresentation by army lawyers. 
It is worth noting that throughout the subcommittee’s report there a number of 
assumptions made about all SS men, which resulted in a restrained bias against them 
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throughout the report. In particular, some of the accusations made by the Malmédy 
men were dismissed because the accused were ‘hardened, experienced, members of 
the SS who had been through many campaigns and were used to worse procedure’.595 
An example is found in the subcommittee’s response to the Malmédy defendant’s 
allegations of (1) beatings, (2) threatening their family members, and (3) lack of 
access to medical treatment. The most serious charge made by the Malmédy 
defendants was that ‘they were beaten severely and sadistically, not only by guards 
moving them around the prisons, but by the staff of the war crimes investigating team, 
for the purpose of securing confessions’.596 This was the accusation most often 
reported by defendants, their advocates, and in the press. The subcommittee 
investigated this charge with great interest and found that only four men had been 
beaten and those beatings were by guards when transporting the prisoners, not by 
investigators to secure confessions. The most complete evidence supporting the 
beatings was given in an affidavit by a prisoner named Dietrich Schnell, whom the 
subcommittee questioned. The court believed that Schnell was lying in his originally 
affidavit because he ‘changed his story in substantial detail’597 when questioned by 
the court. The subcommittee report, the court took the time to described Schnell as ‘an 
extremely intelligent former Nazi paratrooper…a Kreisleiter in the Nazi Party…one 
of the bulwarks of the Nazi party…[who] literally had life-and-death authority over 
the people’.598 Perhaps part of the reason the subcommittee did not believe Schnell’s 
evidence of beatings stemmed from fact that he was a former Nazi party functionary. 
Because of his ‘extreme intelligence’ the senators more easily believed, as the 
subcommittee reported, ‘his entire story indicated that it had been carefully prepared 
and rehearsed’.599  In their report the subcommittee wrote it was ‘convinced that 
Schnell, because of his Nazi affiliations, was a most interested witness. …the 
subcommittee feels it should give little credence to the testimony of Schnell’.600 In the 
end, the subcommittee was ‘convinced that the confessions made by the prisoners, 
																																																								
595 Ibid., 19. 
596 Ibid., 10. 
597 Ibid., 12. 
598 Ibid., 12. 
599 Ibid., 13. 




and the evidence submitted at the trial were not secured through physical 
mistreatment of the accused’.601  
The subcommittee heard accusations that investigators had made threats 
against the accused’s family members and that the men had been denied proper 
medical treatment. While the subcommittee believed that threats had been made 
against the men’s families if they refused to confess, the subcommittee simply noted 
that this was regrettable. Moreover the subcommittee did not believe these threats 
invalidated the men’s confessions: ‘It is questionable as to the effect such statements 
would have on the type of individual under interrogation, but it is hard to believe that 
this by itself would make a man perjure himself to the point of making a false 
confession and bearing false witness against his comrades’.602  In their affidavits 
many men alleged they were denied adequate medical facilities and treatment. 
However, there was an American doctor and staff at Schwabisch Hall and these army 
members gave ‘clear, professional, and convincing’603 testimony to the subcommittee 
that medical treatment was received by all Malmédy subjects.  The committee noted 
that it believed these American medical staff over the German civilian dentists who 
claimed he had treated men with their teeth knocked out from beatings.  
In general the subcommittee found little to fault in the investigation methods 
and army trial. The subcommittee members were defensive of the army and, 
noticeably, were keenly aware that the attacks on the army using the Malmédy claims 
were harm to its reputation. The subcommittee report concluded its report with a 
warning that there was more at stake then the Army’s conduct of the Malmédy trial: 
“Attacks on the war-crimes trials in general and the Malmédy massacre case in 
particular” were meant to revive German nationalism and to cast doubt upon 
the US occupation of Germany as a whole…the report cited evidence of the 
existence of groups in Germany seeking to have the United States withdraw its 
troops from Germany for two reasons: to pass a general amnesty for former 
Nazis convicted of war crimes and to establish close relations with the Soviet 
Union. The protests against the Malmédy trial were part of this conspiracy, the 
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report claimed, and were intended to exploit the controversy’s potential to 
damage the image and reputation of the United States.604 
In this way, current political concerns about the Soviet Union entered into the review 
of the Malmédy process. The subcommittee was clearly concerned about the effects 
of criticism of the army.  
 
D.  Conclusion 
Because clemency and sentence modification effectively substituted for 
appellate procedure,605 a handful of men controlled the fate of the men (and woman) 
sentenced at Dachau. Some mistakes were made, with Koch’s reduction and the 
Malmédy accusations garnering press attention, and the US Senate felt it was its duty 
to investigate the trial programme and its review process. The results were mixed with 
a generally positive (anti-German) report on the Malmédy trial, contrasted with a 
negative judgement in the Koch report on the review process after the trials.  In his 
autobiography, General Clay wrote about the impact of Koch and Malmédy 
controversies on perceptions of the trial programme at Dachau: 
I have been asked if the Ilse Koch and Malmédy charges discredited our war 
trials in Germany. It is true that they were prime subjects for Communist 
propaganda. On the other hand, the full discussions in our press and radio and 
the obvious interest of the American people in justice and fair play rather 
impressed the German population. At least they learned that an official 
representing the United States must exercise his responsibilities in the bright 
light of public discussion. This was another and valuable lesson in 
democracy.606 
One newspaper, at the time, agreed and opined:  
What comes of it is that Ilse Koch is, as Gen Clay said, “a strange, disgraced 
character” who was happy in the atmosphere of sadism and murder and who 
therefore may have been a murderess many times over, but that Mr Denson 
made no such case. He did show that she had beaten a prisoner. This being the 
fact, had reviewing authorities allowed the sentence to stand, they would have 
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been accomplices in conviction by hearsay, which would have been borrowing 
the morals of the very kind of people we are trying. By all signs, American 
justice did not fail in this matter; it prevailed over a strong temptation to take a 
more popular course.607 
Despite these ‘valuable lessons’, increasingly ‘the war crimes trial programme was 
perceived as a hindrance to the reestablishment of a stable and democratic German 
state and to securing of German goodwill in the wake of the growing tensions 
between the US and the Soviet Union’.608 After 1949, the US clemency programme 
picked up pace as General Clay was replaced as military governor by the first 
American High Commissioner for Occupied Germany, John J McCloy (served 21 
September 1949 – 1 August 1952). The Army’s clemency programme became the 
War Crimes Modification Board.  The War Crimes Modification Board considered 
more then just the trial record when reviewing defendant’s sentencing; a defendant’s 
membership and rank, the nature of the defendant’s crimes, mitigating circumstances, 
the original sentence and the severity of the sentence compared to other accused of the 
same offense, and finally, character references and the defendant’s conduct in prison 
all became possible reasons for sentence reduction.  The United States Army 
implemented ‘good conduct time’ (sentence reduction given to prisoners who 
maintain good behaviour while imprisoned) as ‘the British had recently increased the 
“good conduct time” allowance for war criminals imprisoned at Werl to ten days a 
month’.609  In January 1951, McCloy announced sweeping clemency decisions; as one 
scholar argued, ‘the purely political desire to dispose of the war crimes programme in 
order to set the stage for German sovereignty and rearmament replaced the legal 
concerns [of early sentence modifications]’.610 McCloy reduced the sentences of 78 of 
the 87 Nuremberg defendants held in Landsberg. ‘The German industrialists, who had 
faced the Nuremberg tribunals in the Flick, I.G. Farben and Krupp trials, benefited the 
most’.611  General McCloy did let stand 5 of the remaining 15 death sentences; ‘The 
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five were Oswald Pohl, head of the SS Economic and Administrative Head Office, 
and four leaders of the Einsatzgruppen’.612 
 These sweeping amnesties and the refocusing of American foreign policy on 
containing (and combating) the Soviet Union’s increasing power, undermined 









Conclusion: The Dachau Trials in History 
The study of Dachau presents an alternative path to the history of the wider 
postwar reckoning of Nazi crimes. At the end of the Second World War, the 
American army, along with the other occupying Allied powers, faced, among other 
things, the monumental task of dealing with the perpetrators of crimes in the 
concentration camps. Increasingly at the end of the war, President Roosevelt’s 
wartime rhetoric was directed at a legal means of delivering justice for the crimes 
committed. However what form this justice should take was contentious. Prior 
attempts at postwar justice, namely the Leipzig trials after the First World War, had 
failed. 
As the American government debated how to enact justice, two opposing 
views emerged within the executive branch - the Morgenthau plan and Stimson plan. 
After much debate, three paths of American justice emerged: the International 
Military Tribunal (in cooperation with their Allies), the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals, and the Dachau tribunal programme. Finding their genesis in the Bernays 
plan, the Dachau trials were based on the internationally recognized and signed Hague 
(1907) and Geneva (1929) conventions, although the trials grew increasingly 
complicated in their approach to law as prosecutors confronted larger Nazi crimes .  
Centered on military tribunals, first tested in the Saboteurs Trials (1942), the trials set 
out to be large scale, efficient, and fair. The trials were to serve as an appropriate 
reaction to the discovery of particularly gross war crimes, including the treatment of 
inmates at the concentration camps.  It was hoped that thorough and fair trials would 
educate the German population about the criminality of the Nazi regime, while 
functioning as an example of the fairness of democracy. Furthermore, the trials would 
serve to discourage future war criminals by setting a legal precedent of American 
reaction. 
Along with the ‘Fliers trials’ (202 trials of 582 German citizens who killed or 
injured downed Allied airmen613) and the ‘Rüsselsheim Case’ (a trial of staff members 
from the Hadamar euthanasia facility), were the concentration camp trials, which tried 
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personnel from the Dachau, Mauthausen, Buchenwald, Flossenbürg, and Dora-
Mittelbau concentration camps. These Dachau military courts were legally based 
predominantly on the ‘customary’ laws of war. However, the concentration camp 
trials also incorporated the innovative legal concept of prosecuting defendants for 
participating in the ‘common design’ of the concentration camp, which was labelled 
criminal organisation.  Thus by ‘aiding, abeting, or participating’ all individuals were 
culpable.  In order to facilitate the trials efficiency, the court first sat in session on a 
‘parent trial’, in which the prosecution established jurisdiction over the crimes 
committed by the defendants and presented a large amount of evidence to prove that 
the concentration camp in question and its subcamps were criminal organizations.  
Once established, subsequent courts took ‘judicial notice’ of the criminality of the 
camp – no further evidence needed to be presented.  This left the prosecution in 
subsequent cases with the relatively simple task of establishing that the defendant was 
present at the camp. In turn, the defendants’ only line of defence was to prove that 
they were not present at the camp.  The strength of this structure was that it ensured a 
huge number of defendants were tried in a short two years. 
American lawmakers and occupation authorities had spent a good deal of time 
focused on the problem of how to begin the trials (What charges? What courts? 
Which defendants?) and very little time planning for the aftermath of the trials. Thus, 
the winding-up of the trials in 1947 and 1948, in the face of growing tensions between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, revealed the major problem with the Dachau 
trials; namely the lack of long-term plans for the appeal process for those convicted.  
In this absence, administrative clemency programmes, initiated first by American 
occupation authorities, and eventually by the newly formed West German 
government, saw all those imprisoned by the Dachau tribunals released by the mid-
1950s. 
The blockade of Berlin by the USSR (24 June 1948 – 12 May 1949) marked 
the beginning of a new conflict. The Soviets blocked land and water access to West 
Berlin in response to the issuing of a new Deutschmark, hoping to drive the western 
Allies (Great Britain, France, and the United States) out of the city. In response, Great 
Britain and the United States rushed supplies to western Berlin in round-the-clock 
flights. The Berlin blockade solidified the division of Germany, heightened tensions 
between the Americans and their Allies in the west and the Soviets and their bloc in 




Allies had signed up to the creation of a new military alliance, NATO (The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4 April 1949).614 
With the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1949, control 
of judicial proceedings against war criminals was handed over to the newly-formed 
Bonn government. Lt Col Denson, for one, was hopeful, especially because the 
German government could punish crimes committed against Germans, something the 
Americans had not been able to under international law.  He initially believed that the 
German courts would be vigilant as ‘those acts [war crimes] were acts against the 
peace and dignity of the sovereignty of Germany’.615 However, as seen in the 
previous chapter, FRG officials had little interest in continuing the unpopular 
denazification courts, as, the ‘Germans increasingly saw lesser perpetrators brought 
before American courts as victims of unfair proceedings rather than as war 
criminals’.616  As one scholar argued, the record of genocide perpetrated by the 
Germans was a ‘wild card in the process of identity- (re)formation and 
reestablishment of stability and sovereignty’617 and was thus generally ignored or 
forgotten. 
The new FRG constitution contained Article 131, which governed the rights of 
civil servants. In essence it allowed for the reinstatement of Nazi era public servants 
and for the restoration of pensions for those entitled to pensions of their work under 
the Nazi regime. In practice the law ‘soon showed that essentially no one who applied 
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[for a federal job] was refused reemployment’618 based on his or her activities during 
the war. The law stated in full read: 
The legal relations of persons, including refugees and expellees, who on 8 
May 1945 were employed in the public service, have left the service for 
reasons other than those recognised by civil service regulations or collective 
bargaining agreements, and have not yet been reinstated or are employed in 
positions that do not correspond to those they previously held, shall be 
regulated by a federal law. The same shall apply mutatis mutandis619 to 
persons, including refugees and expellees, who on 8 May 1945 were entitled 
to pensions and related benefits and who for reasons other than those 
recognised by civil service regulations or collective bargaining agreements no 
longer receive any such pension or related benefits. Until the pertinent federal 
law takes effect, no legal claims may be made, unless Land law otherwise 
provides. 
In December 1949, the FRG parliament passed a blanket amnesty for all crimes 
whose minimum punishment was less than six months. These crimes included 
‘wrongful deprivation of personal liberty,’ ‘grievous bodily harm,’ (common crimes 
during the 1938 pogrom) use of false identity (common at the end of the war), 
denunciation, and the public use of firearms’.  The latter two crimes, denunciation and 
the public use of firearms, were ‘a common crime in the final phase of the war when 
uptight Nazis tried to force their faltering neighbours to fight to the bitter end…these 
latter crimes were fresh in the memories of many Germans, and amnesty was intended 
to help restore social peace’.620  Or, as historian Ian Kershaw summed up:  
The understandable thirst for the punishment of those responsible had to be 
quenched, not left to poison the long-term efforts for social as well as political 
reconstruction. High passions had to be contained. Natural justice had to be 
subordinated to politics. Looking to the future had to take precedence over a 
more thorough cleansing of the past. Collective amnesia was the way 
forward.621 
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A.  Were the Dachau Trials a Success? 
It is hard to sidestep the question of whether the Dachau concentration camp 
trials were successful or not.  The Dachau trials were never well publicized and are 
largely forgotten today, except in a very small circle of scholars, in favour of their 
more famous cousins, the International Nuremberg Tribunal and the Nuremberg 
Trials. This is unfortunate because the Dachau tribunals represent the largest attempt 
by the United States to punish Nazi crimes committed at the concentration camps 
liberated by the Americans and thus add a significant untold story to the study of 
postwar Germany and the transitional justice programmes happening there. As laid 
out in this thesis, because they differed significantly from the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg and the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, they add another layer, 
an alternative path, to the history of the wider postwar reckoning. 
The IMT and NMT had their drawbacks. The International Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg was slow (the men were indicted on 6 October 1945 and the verdict 
was delivered almost a year later on 1 October 1946) and tried only twenty-two 
defendants. The participation of the Soviet Union was problematic as was the 
inclusion of Soviet judges in light of their own crimes, particularly in occupied Poland 
(i.e the Katyn massacre of Polish officers in April and May 1940). Even in 1945 
among the Allies, Soviet participation in the IMT was controversial in the light of 
Russian aggressions and atrocities. John Troutbeck of the British Foreign Office 
wrote a scathing memo in response to the proposal of the IMT: ‘Surely to have a 
Russian sitting in a case of this kind will be regarded as almost a high point of 
international hypocrisy…There have been two criminal enterprises this century—by 
Germans and Russians’.622  Moreover, the IMT was further problematized by the 
Allied killing of 500,000 German civilians in the Strategic Bombing Offensive.  
Furthermore, it remains difficult to defend the IMT against the criticism that the trial 
used ex post facto law to convict its defendants.  ‘Crimes against humanity’, for 
example, did not exist in law when they were committed by the Nazi regime. 
However, the clear criminality of participating in the murder of millions makes this 
legal argument conceptual.  As one scholar noted, ‘…the final outcome was less 
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prejudiced and more self-evidently just than…objections might imply.  The trial did 
not fabricate the reality of the Third Reich and the death of as many as seven million 
men, women and children murdered…’623 The IMT was widely publicized and 
generally considered fair. Today it is seen as the direct predecessor to the current 
International Criminal Court.  The twelve Nuremberg Military Tribunals arraigned 
more defendants than the IMT, by using the same new laws that the IMT used, but 
even they are forgotten today as they have ‘struggled to find their identity and their 
place in historical discourse’.624 
The criteria for success most used by the major scholars working on aspects of 
the American trial programme are as follows: (1) how many perpetrators were 
punished and were they adequately punished and (2) did the trials ‘teach the 
Germans’ to reorient towards democracy by revealing the extent of Nazi crimes. 
Based on these criteria most previous scholars, including most German language 
scholars,625 argued that Dachau was not a success.  Rudolf Schlaffer, in his study of 
the Flossenberg ‘parent trial’, and Martin Gruner, highlighting the subsequent Dachau 
trial of Alex Piorkowski, went so far as to challenge the very legality of the trials and 
dismissed their ability to create justice.626  
Buscher concluded that the American war crimes programme failed to achieve 
the two major goals of the American occupation authorities – it did not adequately 
punish the convicted and did not convince Germans of the need for reform.627  To be 
sure, Jardim concluded that ‘as an exercise in expeditious justice, the Mauthausen trial 
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[the subject of his study] was a great success for its American organizers’, and ‘as a 
vehicle for punishment, the Mauthausen trial was staggeringly effective’.628  He also 
argued that Mauthausen was a success in spite of the prosecutor using ‘the pre-
existing mechanism of military law’.629 However, he went on to say that the goal of 
the trials at Dachau was to ‘reorient Germans toward democracy and reveal to the 
German public and the world the true extent of Nazi criminality.’ Although the 
evidence given in the courtroom was excellent, ‘few outside the courtroom heard [the 
testimony]’. 630  Thus, in this regard, ‘the Mauthausen trials were ‘a resounding 
failure’.631 In her dissertation Yavnai disagreed with this measure of success and 
argued that even the evidence that was presented was partial. She concluded that 
while the concentration camp trials did provide some ‘timely measure of retribution 
for the victims’ they were important because of ‘their timing, rather then their 
completeness of evidence’.632  Marcuse concluded that because the Germans did not 
‘learn the lessons’ of the trials the American trial programme was largely a failure. He 
wrote of the trials at Dachau, as well as the NMT and IMT:  
In the years that followed [the conclusion of the Dachau ‘parent trial’], 
however, the Western Allies became markedly more lenient because they want 
to win the West Germans as allies in the emerging Cold War. And most 
Germans proved resistant to leaning the ‘lessons’ these trials were supposed to 
impart.633 
Former chief prosecutor William Denson had different criteria for success at the 
Dachau concentration camp trials. He was concerned that the trials should be fair to 
the defendants. He believed that in this regard the Dachau trials were a success. He 
explained: 
…I call your attention to the fact there are certain elements, that are 
considered by lawyers versed in common law as essential to constitute a fair 
trial and one such element is the obligation of due process. I do believe that 
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the way these courts handled the rules that circumscribed their activities and 
their powers were such as to comply and comport very favourably with our 
concepts of due process. That is each man has a right to a hearing, has a right 
to confrontation, has a right to be represented by counsel and know on his 
arraignment he had the perfect right to enter a plea of not guilty and if he 
didn’t plea, the plea of not guilty was entered for him which thereupon 
automatically cast upon the government the obligation of proving the offence 
charged beyond all reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty. So that I think 
the safeguards that we are accustomed to in the State and Federal practice in 
this country were followed in those cases in Germany.634 
Centred on military tribunals, the Dachau trials set out to be large scale, efficient, and 
fair. The result was, I would argue, that the Dachau trials, in general, accomplished 
what they set out to accomplish.  In this way the Dachau trials were a success.  When 
an individual parent trial is studied, as has been the case in the limited prior research, 
it is easier to focus on the limitations and shortcomings of the trial, but when seen 
through the lens of the entire programme and through the monumental task that was 
undertaken by the American army – it’s accomplishments can be better seen.  The 
Dachau trial programme was efficient. It tried a huge number of defendants from 
multiple concentration camps and subcamps. The trials were based on contemporary 
legal precedent as it stood in 1945. Despite lax rules of evidence and the introduction 
of the occasional controversial ‘common design’ charge, defendants were accorded 
fair and vigorous legal representation, a certainly imperfect but available appeals 
process (something not present at either of the Nuremberg trial programmes), and an 
opportunity for clemency. Any trial, tribunal, or judicial programme would have its 
compromises and shortcomings – and these limitations were at the forefront of the 
staff who planned and undertook the trial programme.  
The Dachau trials were largely resistant to outside influences including the 
limited press coverage the trials received and domestic policy changes, at least until 
the ending trials in 1947. While prior authors have claimed that the Dachau trials were 
influenced by the Cold War, the analysis of sentencing completed in this thesis 
showed that sentencing actually increased when comparing 1947 to 1946.  This is the 
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opposite of what would be expected if, as other scholars have claimed, the Cold War 
was forcing leniency in the courtroom. Futhermore, despite the obvious issues with 
the administrative appeals process, the impression that initial reviews of the sentences 
handed out at Dachau frequently overturned initial sentencing is not supported by 
analysis of the ‘parent trials’ at Dachau. The percentage of cases where sentences 
were reduced upon initial review was limited in all the trials.  Instead leniency was 
seen at a later date through mass clemency for convicted perpetrators during the 
1950s. The Dachau trials did generate controversies, such as the Ilse Koch sentence 
reduction and Malmedy defendants’ claims of being tortured to produce their 
confessions. This led the United States Senate to conduct a thorough review process 
of the whole Dachau tribunal progamme, in which the congressional review board 
concluded that the Dachau trials, although not without problems, were lawful. This 
congressional review process further justifies the claim that the Dachau trial 
programme was, generally, legitimate and fair. 
Because of their design and emphasis on military law and legal precedence, 
the trials were more respectful for national sovereignty, especially seen in the 
decision, as problematic as it may seem today, to only persecute individuals who had 
committed crimes against the United States or its allies.  Furthermore, it cannot be 
overlooked that the Dachau trials, as seen within the larger process of postwar 
reckoning and denazification, were, in the end, successful in ensuring that Nazism 
was not revived in post war Germany.635 
 
B. Final Thoughts 
More scholarship on lesser-known postwar trials is necessary. We know little 
about trials other than the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, particularly 
the various National trials, which made up a majority of the judicial efforts to 
administer justice in the wake of Nazi crimes. Whether a study of the other 
occupation powers in Germany (France, Britain, USSR) or the subjugated countries 
coming to terms with the crimes committed during German occupation (The 
Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Norway, and Poland to name a few), more 
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work could be done to study these individual national responses. The American 
Dachau trials are an important and neglected part of this huge project of reckonings.   
Thus the Dachau trials make a correction in the prevailing historiographical 
literature on the postwar reckoning with Nazi criminality, and indeed on the 
development of human rights. The Dachau trials provide a more politically cautious 
and legally conservative model for postwar justice by using the long-standing Hague 
and Geneva Conventions as their primary standard.  This was more in tune with the 
contemporary temperament of world politics, in an era before the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and all that followed became part of customary 
international law. Accordingly, the Dachau trials were more respectful of state 
sovereignty and less attuned to the emerging ideologies about genocide and crimes 
against humanity.  They were run along narrower, traditional lines of military justice, 
and more conducive to clemency during review. When compared to the well known, 
and well studied, International Military Tribunal and, to a lesser extent, Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals, the Dachau trials, the largest of the three trial programmes, 
followed an alternative view, a traditional view, to the new developments in 
international law in mid-1945. This is what makes the Dachau trials, arguably the 
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